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This thesis presents a sociological analysis of the concept of
revolution in social forms. It is argued that any concept of
revolution makes available a version of the relationship of
speech to language. The concept of a revolution in social forms
is grounded in a view of the relationship of the revolutionary
enterprise to the dialectical transformation of man's nature or
essence.
Two modes of orientation to Marx's revolutionary theorising are
analysed:
1. The principled version which understands Marx's theorising
as offering a concept of revolution as universal and engaged
orientation to principle.
2. The rule-bound version which views Marx as representing
revolution in terms of technique - the 'correct rules' for
subverting capitalism.
We investigate the redirection of the principled vision in Marx
by Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky and Mao. Finally we consider the
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Introduction
This thesis has undergone a very long period of gestation. It
grew out of an initial concern with the philosophical and
organisational parameters of the relationship of theory to
practice. Eventually I realised that my real concern was to
produce a theorisation of the concept of revolution. One might
ask why study the concept of revolution? From my viewpoint there
are two answers to that question. Firstly, the perspective which
I am beginning to learn from and to practice (the analytic
perspective referred to below developed by Peter McHugh, Alan
Blum and Stanley Raffel) requires itself to be seen as nothing
short of revolutionary. The kind of learning I have been engaged
in has had a revolutionary impact upon those who have allowed its
force to touch them. Secondly, like Arendt, I acknowledge the
prescience of Lenin's comment that the twentieth century would be
characterised as a century of revolutions. If a sociologist's
role is conceived as exploring the wisdom of the ancients in
relation to the concerns of the present (as I think that role
should be interpreted), then using revolution as both resource
and topic is an appropriate choice.
Every mode of theorising presents a conception of the
relationship of speech to language, and this relationship
provides one of the central foci of the dissertation. There are
two options concerning the relation of speech to language, each
(iv)
of which produces a different view of revolution. Firstly
revolutionary theory can attempt to generate a sense of the
groundedness of its own speech - to seek to orient to the idea of
which revolutionary speech is an exemplar or expression. In
short revolutionary theory can choose to be reflexive in its
orientation to principle. This perspective in treating its topic
(revolution) not as secured, or given, views topic as a resource.
To theorise in this way is never to lose sight of the question of
the good of revolution, ie to see theorising on revolution as a
moral enterprise. A second view of revolution could choose to
face away from the grounded character of its own speech - to
choose to ignore the relationship of its speech to the idea of
which its speech is an expression. This uncentred view would
typically repress questions of the good or value of revolution,
ie orienting nihilistically to the question of the good, the
moral character of its own speech. Instead of orienting to the
good of revolution, this perspective is committed to what the
Greeks called 'techne1. This view is committed to the notion of
revolution as rule, theory being conceived of in terms of
utilitarian effectiveness. Each version of revolution
presupposes a conception of man - a conception of the strongest
possible speaker/actor, though this is again repressed annd
denied in the second version.
This thesis seeks to investigate a tradition of revolutionary
thought - what I call the 'principled' version of Marx. In a
very specific sense I trace the history of that tradition and
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consider its development. I chose the term 'in a specific sense'
to underline that this thesis is not what would conventionally be
understood as 'the history of ideas'. For me tracing the history
of a tradition (like Marxism) means attempting to orient to the
intelligibility of its speech in the first place. That is, the
continuous task is one of seeking to investigate reflexively the
grounds of speech on revolution. Likewise developments and
degenerations of the tradition are understood in terms of their
ability to remain faithful to the principle of which that
tradition is an expression. This is reflected in the structure
of the dissertation. I consider the redirection of Marx's
tradition by Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky and Mao, and the rediscovery
of that tradition in certain tendencies within modernism.
Perhaps I can exemplify the distinctiveness of this approach to
the 'history of ideas' if I contrast this approach to an
alternative and well known approach to the Marxist tradition.
Leszek Kolakowski's massive three volume work 'Main Currents of
Marxism' attempts an encyclopaedic review of the main tendencies
(and some of the minor too) within Marxism. In no way is this
text either aimed at a comprehensive review, nor of a sampling of
'representative' figures within that tradition. The authors I
consider are treated as exemplary in the sense that they
illustrate alternative modes of orientation to the tradition.
The perspective utilised in this thesis seeks the philosophy of
the ancients as a source of inspiration. One of the guiding
(vi)
influences of my concept of revolution is the Greek concept of
Paedia - which concept the Greeks used to understand the way in
which education is of necessity a revolutionary process. Paedia
refers to a process by which a universal change is achieved in
man with respect to his nature or essence. We see Marx's vision
of revolution in terms of his understanding of revolution's place
in relation to the dialectical development of man's nature.
A further sense in which this thesis has a different character to
that of Kolakowski is in our view of modernism. For Kolakowski
modern Marxist theorising is evocative of the terminal decline of
that tradition. My view of modernism is quite different. While
the state of much of modern Western Marxist theory has been
fragmentary and partial in its analysis, I sense an attempt to
overcome this isolation and dispersion in an attempt to reorient
to and regenerate the tradition. I hope this thesis preserves
some of the sense of re-orientation and openness characteristic




We begin with the question of what is the good of the concept of
revolution in Marx. To ask such a question is to begin to
investigate revolution as a morally oriented enterprise, one
which shows a knowlege of the worth of revolution in itself. To
see Marx's conception in this way, then, is to see revolution as
being oriented decisively to principle. In being oriented to
principle Marx, as revolutionary, is characterised as an actor
who embodies a self-reflective concern for revolution. This is to
say that the question of the good of revolution is not
externalised in Marx, never seen as something which once oriented
to, can be treated as secure or completed. The question of the
principled (moral) conception of revolution treats the good, the
worth of revolution as an enduring question i.e. a question which
rather than being a barrier to be surmounted and eventually left
behind, is seen as a constant stimulus and source of direction
and influence.
Already, we have begun to generate a resistance to the notion of
a principled conception of revolution, through consideration of
its relationship to an alternative conception (one which is not
truly faithful to Marx). This alternative would resist basic
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questions concerning the good of revolution. We may call this
version a technical or rule-bound reading of revolution in Marx.
This version would see Marx as providing the best (correct) rules
for revolution - someone who provides the neccessary techniques
for a subversion of capitalism. What is concealed in this
version is the worth of the exercise in itself - seeing
revolution for what it is.
Each version of revolution produces a version of an actor -
either a competent actor - one who knows and enacts the rules
skilfully in the technical conception - and one who is committed
in the principled version.
In order to develop these issues we can consider the question of
what is Marx's conception of man? This question is essential to
the view of revolution as oriented to principle. The moral
character of revolution is connected with Marx's understanding of
the role of revolution in relation to the realisation of man's
nature. Thus, when Marx talks of all of the pre-revolutionary
history of man as pre-history he makes reference to the idea that
man only becomes man, that man only begins to realise his
(potential) nature after a genuinely socialist revolution.
However, in order that we might develop a strong version of the
principled conception of revolution in Marx, we shall generate
some resistance to the question by considering the debate on the
initial viability of Marx's conception of man.
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The debate concerning the importance or otherwise of the question
of Marx's conception of man is a pivotal moment in a broader
debate which while not absent from the earliest period of Marxist
debate, only surfaced as a serious issue in the context of
modernist (i.e. post-Stalinist) discussion. 1 It is
significant in itself that the question of Marx's conception of
man should be rediscovered as an important question in the modern
period. However, this question is raised in a subsequent chapter
of the thesis (the final chapter concerning modernist concepts of
revolution) and receives fuller discussion at that juncture. An
exponent of a version of those modernists who treat seriously the
question of Marx's concept of man is the Jugoslav Marxist, Gajo
Petrovic. In relation to the debate we are considering he has
the following to say: 2
"What makes a man-man? What, if anything,
makes somebody more and somebody less a man?
If Marx had bypassed these questions, they
would still demand an answer. But nothing is
more false than the assumption that Marx con¬
demned discussion about man in general. It is
unneccessary to quote texts from "Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts" because it is well
known that Marx speaks there about man as man.
But it is sometimes held that Marx later came
to the conclusion that all general
speculations about man are inadmissable. In
support of this assumption some passages from
"German Ideology" can be quoted. But is "The
German Ideology" Marx's last word in
philosophy? Did not he also write "Capital"?
According to "Capital" the labour process is:
"human action with a view to the production of
use values, appropriation of natural
substances to human requirements; it is the
neccessary condition for effecting exchange of
matter between man and Nature; it is the ever-
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lasting nature-imposed condition of human
existence, and therefore is is independent of
every social phase of that existence, or
rather, is common to every such phase. It
was, therefore, not necessary to represent our
labourer in connection with other labourers;
man and his labour one one side, Nature and
its materials on the other, sufficed. As the
taste of porridge does not tell you who grew
the oats, no more does this simple process
tell you of itself what are the social
conditions under which it is taking place,
whether under the slave owner's brutal lash,
or under the anxious eye of the capitalist,
whether Cincinnatus carries it on in tilling
his modest farm or a savage killing wild
animals with stones."
Marx in "Capital", then, stresses that we can speak not only
about labourer, capitalist and slave-owner, but also about man,
labour and nature in general.
Now, while Petrovic is a writer who does aspire to a principled
view of Marx's conception of revolution he can only take us part
of the way to a mature reading. While his response to those who
would debar the question which interests us is important in that
it shows the vitality of this question in a text which opponents
claim has exorcised the spirit which gives life to it, his answer
is weak in certain respects and displays the extent to which he
is still partially under the sway of a technical concept of
revolution. Petrovic's argument is only partially adequate for
the following reasons:
i. While it is necessary to make reference to texts where Marx
discusses 'man in general' as opposed to man in one of his
socially specific guises, as feudal lord or feudal serf,
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capitalist, proletarian etc, one should avoid fetishising the
text (letting the text rule our investigation). That is, it is
necessary, as part of the process of reading, transforming or
discovering a text to avoid treating the text as secured rather
than as a problematic. Therefore discovering that Marx permits
discussion of 'man in general' is not sufficient. We have to
treat the text as something which invites engagement, invites
interpretive labour, rather than as something which speaks for
itself. There is a danger, then, in Petrovic that analysis can
degenerate into pure scholasticism which risks the very
technicality (letting the text rule) which he is seeking to
avoid.
ii. It is noteworthy that Petrovic concedes that, "It is some¬
times held that Marx later came to the conclusion that all
general speculations about man are inadmissable. In support of
this argument some passages from "The German Ideology" can be
quoted. But is "The German Ideology" Marx's last word on
philosophy?"
It seems, then, that Petrovic is offering us a reading which says
that in some texts the question of man qua man is permitted by
Marx, and in others e.g. "The German Ideology", it is treated as
illegitimate. At best, Petrovic is saying that 'the last word'
belongs to the philosophical Marx. Now, while there may be
something to the argument that a 'mature' statement may be
regarded as having greater depth than an 'immature' statement,
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we are still left with the problen of accounting for this
'maturity' in more than simply temporal terms. That is to say, we
are still charged with the question of accounting for the process
of maturation, of which the final speech is the offspring.
What are we to make then of Petrovic's statement concerning "The
German Ideology"? Are we to conclude, with Petrovic, that Marx
was a vacillator, who would sometimes 'permit' consideration of
questions of man's general nature, and sometimes forbade it?
Clearly, an extreme form of this argument would be the
postulation of a schizophrenic attitude in Marx, or (the very
form of argument which Petrovic is trying to resist) the view,
best exemplified by Althusser 3 that we are really dealing with
two thinkers in Marx, and not one at all - that Marx's thought is
characterised by an 'epistemological break' marking off the
'pre-scientific' from the 'scientific' theorist. Or, are we to
take a more moderate view, that has been adopted by some 4
that Marx simply 'changed his mind' on several issues, throughout
his prolific writings.
Here we must distinguish between (a) a technical reorientation -
where orientation to principle remains the committment (this
thesis argues that there are several of these sorts of change,
e.g. as exemplified in the last section of chapter two concerning
which area of the world was likely to experience the first
revolutionary transformation to socialism) and (b) a change
which expresses an abandonment of orientation to principle in
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favour of technique. (An example of this change would be implied
by Althusser's 5 reading of the early 'Hegelian" Marx concerned
with issues of the nature of man, converting into the
'scientific' thinker who grounded his theorising in adequate
conceptions of the lawful character of social structure.)
While Petrovic is an example of the writer who regards Marx's
concept of man as a fundamental question, he stands in danger of
being charged with the same kind of intellectual blindness
('wishing away' a text, or refusing to do the work of reading
and transforming a particular text) he charges his opponents
with.
iii. We can make an advance upon Petrovic if we choose not to
face away from what on the surface might be taken to be a text
which is uncomfortable for our reading. Here we recommend being
engaged with the text rather than avoiding it. Orienting to what
the text says in a deep way, rather than avoiding this
committment by shying away from what the text appears to say will
aid the development of a conception of revolution as orientation
to principle rather than rule. Cur investigation will develop
the principled conception by seeking to examine and transform the
text of "The German Ideology", as we seek to engage with all of
Marx's texts.
iv. What is addressed by Marx in "The German Ideology" and what
makes Petrovic uneasy is the question of the relationship of
general conceptions of man (man's nature, his essence) to
specific manifestations of that nature (man as
plebeian/patrician, man as feudal lord/serf,man as
capitalist/proletarian). The question is indeed faced squarely
and directly in "The German Ideology". The following quotation
is an example of this directness of emphasis. 6
".... we do not set out from what men say,
imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated,
thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to
arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from
real active men...."
For Marx then the issue is not the banning of general questions
concerning man - 'real active men' are still to be seen as having
a definite and identifiable nature which marks 'man' off from
beast. What is at question however, is that generality does
carry with it a risk. An excess of generality can detatch its
connection to the specific 'factually' real forms which the
general collects together. The fundamental opposition which this
extreme generally creates is the opposition between man as
'imagined' and 'realised' man. What is really open to critique
is not general understanding but abstract understandings.
Abstraction is generality which becomes detached or disengaged
from reality.
Abstraction is literally Utopian in the sense that it is
unrealised and unrealisable - it has become disconnected from
'real' man. Abstraction, then, as the disengaged excess of
generality is what is to be rejected as a starting point. In
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terns of our conception of revolution, then, abstraction as a
risk would entail seeing revolution not as orientation to
principle (not as realisation of man's nature) but as
fetishisation of principle - treating the general, treating man's
nature as a secured entity, as a given.
This involves converting principle into a rule to be conformed




The questions we begin with are:
1. What is the conception of man which underlies Marx's version
of revolution and...
2. What is the relationship between this conception of man, and
revolution? - What is human about revolution?
In seeking to respond to these questions we can usefully recall
two issues raised in the 'introduction' to this thesis.
(a) Firstly, we indicated that every theorist of revolution could
be seen as presenting a version of the relationship of speech to
language. So far we have begun to develop a view of Marx as
offering a conception of revolution as an orientation to
principle, rather than a reading of Marx which formulates the
speech/language relation in terms of orientation to rule. Marx
begins characterising man's essence (potential) in terms of
constructing a version of the strongest possible speaker/actor.
This speaker/actor exemplifies the principled orientation of the
revolutionary to a standard. What kind of speaker/actor, then,
is required by this version of revolution? We can begin to
respond to this question by recognising that, for Marx, labour is
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the basic, and defining characteristic of man. Labour, man's
creative activity, is not to be understood, as it may be in the
technical conception, and as it is within capitalism, as purely
economic activity. Labour as the primordial activity of man is
conceived of in a deeper sense. As Marcuse points out in Marx: 7
"Far from being a mere economic activity,
labour is the 'existential activity of man',
not a means for maintaining his life."
Labour is, as we shall see, a broad metaphor summarising the
relationship of man to nature, man to his fellow man, and man to
himself. In this way labour is seen as a medium of tranformation
in man's social interactions. However, if labour simply connotes
any kind of broadly defined productive activity, then there are
problems for insisting that that labour is particular to man;
that man's essence is distinct from that of either brute or
beast.The distinction between man's nature and that of the animal
is a recurrent theme which never becomes submerged in Marx. For
example,in "Capital", he argues against the utilitarian
philosopher, Jeremy Bentham: 8
"To know what is useful for a dog, one must
study dog nature. This nature is not to be
deduced from the principle of utility.
Applying this to man, he who would criticise
ail human acts, movements, relations, etc. by
the principle of utility, must first deal with
human nature in general, and then with human
nature as modified in each historical epoch.
Bentham makes short work of it. With the
driest naivete he takes the modern shopkeeper,
especially the English shopkeeper, as the
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normal man. Whatever is useful to this queer
normal man, and to his world, is absolutely
useful. This yardstick then he applies to
past, present and future."
So it is recurrently postulated that the 'species-character' of
man is distinct from that of animal, but what does this mean? Co
not animals also produce? What is the distinctive nature of
labour that characterises Marx's version of the actor required in
his vision of man?
The first characteristic of human creative activity, of labour,
can be seen by considering the following excerpt from "The
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" 9
"...productive life is species life. It is
life-producing life. The whole character of a
species, its species-character, resides in the
nature of its life activity, and free
conscious activity constitutes the species
character of man"
So the first distinction between man and beast in terms of
essence, in terms of species-character, is that man's productive
activity, his labour, is both free, on the one hand, and
conscious on the other.
Let us consider what it means to say, in the first place, that
human labour is to be characterised as free. Here we can again
refer to Marx. 10
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"It is true that animals also produce. They
build nests and dwellings, like the beaver,
the bee, the ant etc. But they produce only
their own immediate needs or those of their
young;....they produce only when immediate
physical need compels them to do so, while man
truly produces only in freedom from such
need".
Thus, while man may produce materially, in the first instance to
satisfy his corporeal needs, in its essence, human labour in
contradistinction to the productive activity of the beast, is
production which goes beyond physical needs. In this way human
labour is to be seen as different from pure productive activity
in the sense that it can only be genuinely carried out where
compulsion, as a stimulus is absent. All of this is to say that
man relates to nature in a different way to the beast. The beast
orients to nature in terms of survival; the beast displays an
adaptive relation to nature, while man is oriented to shaping, or
acting on, or transforming nature. However, in the act of labour
man changes not just nature, but also himself. In this context
we may consider the following two quotations from Marx....11
"The animal is immediately one with its life
activity. It is not distinct from that
activity; it is_ that activity. Man makes his
life activity itself an object of his will and
consciousness. He has conscious life
activity. It is not a determination with
which he directly merges. Conscious life
activity directly distinguishes man from
animal life activity. Cnly because of that is
he a species-being. Or rather, he is a
conscious being, i.e. his own life is an
object for him, only because he is a
species-being."
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"It is therefore in his fashioning of the
objective that man really proves himself to be
a species-being. Such production is his
active species-life. Through it nature
appears as his work and his reality. The
object of labour is therefore the
objectification of the species-life of man :
for man reproduces himself not only
intellectually in his consciousness, but
actively and actually, and he can therefore
contemplate himself in a world that he himself
has created." 12
Thus, labour or human productive labour is conscious activity as
well as free activity, in the sense that man actively shapes
nature, rather than simply adapts to nature. Therefore nature is
not seen as something which rules man's existence, nature is not
mans fate, it is actively shaped. Nature is something of which
man is conscious. By shaping nature in terms of his own
objectives, in terms of his conscious will, man can contemplate
himself 'in a world he himself created.'
So labour is a self-creative, self-conscious, reflective
activity, as it 'is conceived in Marx. Man not only works on
nature,his 'inorganic body', he also re-creates himself through
labour. In this way man's history is not to be construed as
something abstracted from man:
Man creates his own history, not just through the transformation
of nature, but also through his own self-creation. One concept
which Marx provides for understanding this notion of human labour
as free and conscious activity is that of praxis. Praxis is a
concept of productive activity which has the characteristics of
firstly, being free - i.e. activity which does not take place
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under conditions of material or social compulsion, but is freely
chosen by the actor, by the subject. Secondly, praxis has the
characteristic of being self-reflective, action which displays a
consciousness of the place of self and other. The actor required
by Marx's concept of revolution is therefore to be considered as
one who is situated; one who knows the place of self in relation
to other, where other can be understood as both nature and other
human beings.
(b) Thus far we have seen that the actor required by Marx's
concept of revolution - Marx's concept of man - is to seen in
terms of a concept of praxis. This requires that the actor is
seen as:
(i) Acting freely rather than under compulsion.
(ii) That the actor be self-reflective about his action, i.e.
that the actor is self-responsible for his acts.
(iii) That the actor is a situated member, in the sense that
he is aware of self's relation to other, i.e. is
oriented.
We can develop these questions e.g. the question of in what way
the actor is oriented to principle, by recalling a second theme
of the discussion of revolution in the 'Introduction'. In the
introduction we considered the classical Greek idea of education
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as a revolutionary activity. The concept of 'Paedia' can be
understood as: 13
"... that which leads to turning the whole man
round in his nature or essence."
Now, if revolution is to be conceived of as a turning, and a
turning of the whole man 'in his nature or essence', we can see
that in Marx, 'man' and "the whole man' are intimately
interlinked. Indeed we could not begin to theorise Marx
adequately without noting this interconnection. The question of
'totality' and 'wholeness' in Marx's concept of man is a central
concern for many analysts of Marx, and in particular for those I
have termed elsewhere as 'Modernists'. * Indeed a recent
conference was devoted entirely to this issue. 14 Articulate
discussions of the place of the concept of totality, and in
particular how this points up Marx's indebtedness to Hegel are
presented by both Lukacs 15 and Marcuse. 15 Lukacs has the
following to say: 17
"It is not the primacy of economic motives in
historical explanation that constitutes the
decisive difference between Marxism and
bourgeois thought, but the point of view of
totality. The category of totality, the all
*In this connection one could list many writers. Some of the
foremost are:
Marcuse, H. : "Reason and Revolution", McLellan, "Marx's
Grundrisse", Frcnm,E.: "Marx's concept of Man", Nicolaus, M.:
"The Unknown Marx" in Blackburn, R.(ed.) "Ideology in Social
Science", Lukacs, G.: "History and Class Consciousness".
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pervasive supremacy of the whole over the
parts is the essence of the method which Marx
took over from Hegel.."
The question of 'totality' in relation to 'dialectic' is
discussed towards the end of this chapter. At this juncture we
have to ask the question what is the character of this
'totality', this conception of revolution as a turning of the
'whole man in his nature or essence'. Here we must return to
Marx's concept of praxis - of what distinguishes human labour
from that of the beast. Consider the following 18
"Man is a species-being, not only because he
practically and theoretically makes the
species - both his own and those of other
things - his object, but also - and this is
simply another way of saying the same thing -
because he looks upon himself as the present,
living species, because he looks upon himself
as a 'universal' and therefore free being.
Species-life, for both man and for animals,
consists physically in the fact that man, like
animals, lives from inorganic nature; and
because man is more universal than animals, so
too is the area of inorganic nature from which
he lives more universal."
and....19
"The universality of man manifests itself in
practice in that universiality which makes the
whole of nature his inorganic body, (1) as
direct means of life and (2) as the matter,
the object and the tool of his life activity.
Nature is man's 'inorganic body', that is to
say nature in so far as it is the human body."
and....20
"..animals produce one-sidedly, while man
produces universally... they produce only
themselves while man reproduces the whole of
nature."
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Revolution as a turning of the 'whole man' relates to man's
universal nature. Man is oriented universally, or totally,
rather than producing 'one-sidedly', he produces all-sidedly, or
universally. To locate this concept in terms of our earlier
discussion of praxis, man is conceived of as an oriented, or
situated being. While the beast can only relate to itself (its
own species), man is an universal being in that he can relate
self (the human species) to other (nature, other species).
Universalism is a concept which is fundamental both to Marx's
concept of man, and to his concept of revolution. Revolution
provides the turn which transforms man's nature/potential as a
total producer into historically realised form. Praxis then is a
total conception of man - a conception of the 'whole man', rather
than the partial man. Any partial conception of man, e.g. man as
an economic being - even where the economy is an important focus
of analysis - is to be rejected in Marx. Nor is man simply to be
understood as a collection of his partial manifestations e.g
economic man plus potential man, since the concept of totality or
universalism makes whole man a transformation of his partial,
alienated forms. This aggregated concept of parts would still be
one-sided rather than universal in the sense that it would have
no place for the 'turn', or transformation of the partial into
the total i.e. aggregated man implies an evolutionary form of
change, universal man necessitates a revolutionary form of
change. *
To summarise, then, universalism characterises Marx's concept of
both man and revolution. Universalism provides a conception of
an engaged relationship between the part and the whole. There
are, then, two extremes which universalism aids to moderate and
transform. Firstly there is the extreme of partiality. Partial
conceptions have no place for the 'whole man'; they disengage or
detatch the part from the totality within which the parts are
integrated. In this sense partial versions of man amount to pure
particularism, or specificity. The second extreme is an
abstracted total view of man. Here the whole is reified or
* This distinction between two concepts of man in relation to
views of social change is paralelled in the words of Thomas Khun,
(Khun, T. "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions"), who draws a
distinction between two concepts of science and respective views
of scientific change. Khun attempts to distinguish between, on
the one hand, a 'conventional', or 'text-book' version of science
which produces an 'incrementalist' or gradualist perspective upon
scientific change, and on the other hand a 'paradigm1 model of
social change which requires a revolutionary view of scientific
change.
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fetishised. Ken in society are seen as detached entities;
disconnected from the peculiar manifestations of man. This is
the danger of utopianism, where principle cannot be oriented to.
Abstraction treats principle as something to be conformed to, and
hence converts a principle into a rule.
Focussing upon the interpretation of universalism helps to
regenerate a familiar feature of Marxist theorising. The need to
see every other sphere of existence as offering the possibility
of revolution is an outcome of the stress upon man's universal
nature. In particular, we can read the invasion of every mode of
theorising and that there is a Marxist aesthetics, a Marxist
psychology, a Marxist sociology etc.,is an outcome of this
principled commitment. Furthermore, as Marcuse indicates, a
genuinely Marxist Theorising attempts to straddle the subject
boundary specialisms - this too can be seen as an outcome to this
commitment. c.f. especially Marcuse, H. "An Essay on
Liberation".
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Let us consider a partial concept of revolution. The partial
conception of revolution is a rule-bound version of revolution.
This conception requires an actor who conforms to the rules of a
particular normative order. So, for example, a partial
conception of revolution which is economically deterministic
requires a view of man conforming to the normative rules of an
economic system. We can carry through our understanding of the
weakness of a partial conception of revolution by considering the
following extract: 21
"For each new class which puts itself in the
place of the one ruling before it is
compelled, merely in order to carry through
its aims, to represent its interests as the
common interest of all the members of society,
this is expressed in an ideal form, it has to
give its ideas the form of univesrality. The
class making a revolution appears from the
very start, not as a class but as the
representative of the whole society."
Marx is talking here of a specific type of partial revolution - a
political revolution. Here he indicates, that of necessity, even
in a partial revolution, universality requires to be stated as an
aspiration. However in a partial revolution universality remains
on the level of appearance (the partial rvolutionary's speech
cannot orient in a principled way to language - it has the
character of groundless speech). In a partial revolution
universality is a gloss for the particular interests of the
ruling class. Therefore, in this conception of revolution,
universality is unrealised and unrealisable.
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According to Marx all revolutions, up to the present, were
partial revolutions. This is evident if we consider the
following extract from "The German Ideology", where he attempts
to characterise the difference between all prior revolutions and
the coming socialist revolution. 22
"In all revolutions up till now the mode of
activity always remained unscathed and it was
a question of a different distribution of this
activity, a new distribution of labour to
other persons."
In all previous revolutions, man's basic activity, then, labour,
was only partially revolutionised. With the advent of capitalism
all of this changed. Capitalism as a social system occupies a
unique position with respect to the question of universalism, to
the totality of man's creative powers. The uniqueness of
capitalism is attributable to its capacity to universalise. It
is to the character of capitalism's universality that we now
turn. Capitalism is unique for Marx not just in the sense that
it has developed man's productive powers to unprecedented levels,
but that as a system it requires continuous revolutionising of
its 'mode of production'. Consequently, capitalism contains
within itself a dynamic which propels forward a particular form
of universalising tendency. Consideration of the following
extract may help us to understand this....23
"The need of a constantly expanding market for
its products chases the bourgeoisie over the
whole surface of the globe. It must nestle
everywhere, settle everywhere, establish
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connections everywhere.
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation
of the world market given a cosmopolitan
character to production and consumption in
every country. To the great chagrin of
reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet
of industry the national ground on which it
stood. All the old esablished industries have
been destroyed or are daily being destroyed.
They are dislodged by new industries, whose
introduction becomes a life and death question
for all civilised nations, by industries that
no longer work up indigenous raw material, but
raw material drawn from the remotest zones;
industries whose products are consumed, not
only at home but in every quarter of the
globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied
by the production of the country, we find new
wants, requiring for their satisfaction the
products of distant lands and climes. In
place of the local and national seclusion and
self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every
direction, universal interdependence of
nations. As in material, so also in
intellectual production. The intellectual
creations of individual nations become common
property. National one-sidedness becomes more
and more impossible, and from the numerous
national and local literatures, there arises a
world literature.
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of
all instruments of production, by the
immensely facilitated means of communication,
draws all, even the most barbarian, nations
into civilisation.
It compels all nations, on pain of extinction,
to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it
compels them to intrduce what it calls
civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become
bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates
a world after its own image."
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So through the agency of the market capitalism universalises
history. Capitalism creates 'world-historical' individuals out
of previously isolated and segregated cultures by means of a
forceful unification. This is not simply a geographical
universalisation, nor even a purely material universalisation, it
paves the way for a cultural universalisation since, 'in
intellectual production', 'common property' is made of the
private property of isolated cultures. The rational basis of
prior forms of production has been transformed into the
universalised character of capitalistic production. The
all-sided, universalism of capitalism replaces its one-sided
forerunners. Here we have one crucial criterion for a future
socialist society. If socialism is to produce a genuine
revolution it has to be achieved universally in the sense of
internationally. Nationalism is synonymous with partiality and
one-sidedness. The proletariat 'can only exist internationally'
or 'world historically'. As such a socialist revolution differs
from all previous revolutions to the extent that it achieves a
change of the whole man - it is the first revolution to be
genuinely universal. Capitalism plays a part in providing the
necessary beginning for the development of future universal man
in a socialist society.
It is quite clear that Marx's version of universalism is thorough
going, in the sense that any barrier to man's development of his
total being is to be swept aside. As we have seen national
barriers are to be transformed into open doors. So too will
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barriers which present themselves superficially as 'natural'
barriers of difference. As Alfred Schmidt has pointed out...24
"Marx accepted no rigid facts about man,
either of a spiritual of a biologico-material
nature."
Just how far this sweeping aside of barriers to the attainment of
universal development and man has to go is highlighted in the
following extract...23
"Just as, previously, Sancho explained all
crippling of individuals, and so of their
conditions, by means of the fixed ideas of
school-masters, without worrying about the
origin of these ideas, so now, he explains
this crippling by the merely natural process
of generation. He has not the slightest idea
that the ability of children to develop
depends on the development of their parents
and that all this crippling under existing
social conditions has arisen historically, and
in the same way can be abolished again in the
course of historical development. Even
differences that have arisen naturally within
the species, such as racial differences, etc.,
about which Sancho has nothing to say, can and
must be abolished in the course of historical
development."
So race, like the nation-state may be a fact, but it is also a
contingency, and as such is subject to historical transformation
through human intervention. Thus far we have noted that
capitalism is historically unique for Marx in that it is the
first form of society to provide a drive towards the unification
of a world system i.e. a form of universality. Marcuse makes
this point when he says...26
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"Hegel's philosophy revolved around the
universality of reason: it was a rational
system with its every part...integrated into a
comprehensive whole. Marx shows that
capitalist society first put such a
universality into practice. Capitalism
developed productive forces for the totality
of a uniform social system."
However the universalism required by socialism, by a society
which provides conditions where man can produce in harmony with
his nature, is qualitatively different from the universalism
developed in a capitalist society. Socialist (genuine)
universality is not merely an extension to, nor elaboration of,
nor a smooth continuation of the universality of capitalism. As
I shall demonstrate the universalism of capitalism is a negative,
inverted and dependent universalism, and requires transformation
(revolutionary change) rather elaboration (reform). *
* The two alternative methods of conceiving of the relationship
between socialist universalism and capitalist universalism may be
formulated as revolution (change as orientation to principle) or
reform (change as conforming to rule). The relation between
revolution and reform from a Leninist perspective is taken up in
chapter two. What is important here is to note that, to see
socialist universalism as an evolution of capitalist universalism
is to make no room for the idea of a turn in revolution i.e. that
the rule-bound conception abstracts the whole from the turn.
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In ordeE to develop this argument further, we should pause to
summarise. Thus far we have generated a principled concept of
revolution which requires a particular view of man. The actor
required in this version is seen as....
a. One who acts freely rather than under compulsion.
b. That the actor be self-responsible for his actions. The
actor is conscious, self-reflective and self-creative.
c. That the actor is situated i.e aware of and responsive
to the selfs relationship to other, i.e he is oriented,
he is a SOCIAL being.
d. The actor is a whole or integrated (universal) being
rather than a partial or specialised member.
However, rather than integrating and fulfilling these elements of
man's being, capitalist universalism negates or inverts them.
The universalism of capitalism thus creates a universe of bondage
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rather than liberation. Just as the concept of 'totality' was
developed from Hegel, so to was the idea of its inversion or
negativity. The concept of alienation * connotes this
negativity.
In Hegel reality is spirit reflecting itself or realising itself.
As later in Marx, creative activity is seen as the essential
character of what it is to be human. Alienation in Hegel is the
inability to comprehend that the world is not external (alien to)
spirit.
Hence the resolution of alienation (the negation of alienation's
negativity) lies in the liberating comprehension that the world
is the creation of spirit. Marx's critique of Hegel, is, for the
purposes of this discussion, quite straightforward. He has the
following to say 27
"In Hegel...the appropriation of man's
objectified and alienated faculties is thus
firstly only an appropriation that occurs in
the mind, in pure thought..."
* The following discussion in no way attempts to give a
comprehensive analysis of the idea of alienation. Useful,
thorough discussions of the concept are to be found in
Kolakowski: 'Main Currents of Marxism', Vol 1; Meszaros: 'Marx's
Theory of Alienation'; Marcuse, H: 'Reason and Revolution'.
-28-
There are two points which we can understand from a consideration
of the above. Fristly, Marx is not, here, rejecting Hegel's
concept of alienation in its entirety. In its general form, it
has validity. However, following on from the first point, it is
its sheer (extreme) generality (its character as 'pure' thought)
which limits his conception. In a word Marx is charging Hegel
with abstraction. Hegel's abstraction provides a basis for the
understanding of alienation, yet only on a partial basis.
We can further our understanding of the alienative character of
universalism within capitalism by considering how alienation
negates man's general nature and the specific elements of that
nature.
With respect to man's general nature, alienation negates man's
uniquely human essence by obliterating the distinction between
man and beast. In being deprived of what is genuinely human in
his productive activity man is reduced to beast. 23
"(In alienated labour) the result is that man
feels that he is acting freely only in his
animal functions - eating, drinking and
procreating - or at most in his dwelling and
adornment - while in his human functions he is
nothing more than an animal."
In this way the capitalistic (alienative) form of universalism
negates man's human essence rather than confirms it. Alienation
has a parallel impact upon each of the specific elements of man's
essence.
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(a) While the revolutionary view of man requires an actor
who creates freely, rather than under coercion, the alienative
universalism of capitalism produces an actor who is coerced in
his productive activity. Creative activity, which is intrinsic
to man's nature, becomes externalised as an alien force - it
becomes extraneous to man's actual existence within capitalism.
This is brought forth clearly in the following extract...29
"What constitutes the alienation of
labour?....the worker feels himself only when
he is not working: when he is working he does
not feel himself. He is at home when he is
not working and not at home when he is
working. His labour is therefore not
voluntary, but forced, it is forced labour."
The all-pervasive alienation of capitalism thus disintegrates the
totality of existence creating a fundamental break between
different types of creative activity and estranging e.g. domestic
and industrial labour.
(b) While man's nature/potential dictates that he be a
self-creative being i.e. in control of his history, in control of
his creative powers, alienation inverts the relationship between
man as producer and the product of his activity. In genuinely
human creativity the object of labour depends upon the creativity
of the producer, whereas alienation produces a process where
human labour appears to depend on the product. Products within
capitalism (commodities - goods for sale within a market) appear
to dominate producers. Hence...30
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"....This fact simply means that the object
that labour produces, its product, stands
opposed to it as something alien, as a power
independent of the producer. The product of
labour is labour embodied and made material in
the object, it is the objectification of
labour. The realisation of labour is its
objectification. In the sphere of political
economy this realisation of labour appears as
a loss of reality for the worker,
objectification as loss of and bondage to the
object, and appropriation as alienation."
(c) While the actor required in Marx's revolutionary vision
of man is seen as a truly social being; one who is oriented (is
conscious of and responsive to self's relation to other), the
negativity of alienation transform's man's social being (an end
in itself) as a producer into a mere means of individual
survival. Man's communality is thus threatened through the
specifically negative universality of alienated labour in
capitalism. This theme is dealt with in greatest depth in the
section entitled 'Fetishism of Commodities' in 'Capital'. Here
we see that the system of commodity production in capitalism
creates the semblance of an inversion - man's social
relationships appear as relationships between things
(commodities) and relationships between things appear as social
relationships. Consider the following extract....31
"A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing,
simply because in it the social character of
men's labour appears to them as an objective
character stamped upon the product of the
labour; because the relation of the producers
to the sum total of their own labour is
presented to them as a social relation,
existing not between them, but between the
products of their labour. There is a definite
-31-
social relation between men that assumes, in
their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation
between things This I call the Fetishism
which attaches itself to the products of
labour, so soon as they are produced as
commodities."
The production of commodites in capitalism inverts the social
nature of man's productive labour in a variety of ways. Out of
'live' labour (human production or 'objectification') it creates
'dead' labour (commodities or exchange values); out of concrete
labour it creates an abstraction.
(d) While the actor required by Marx's conception of
revolution is seen as a whole, integrated or universal being, the
alienative character of capitalist, negative universality
disintegrates man's comprehensive productive capabilities. The
agency which achieves the end of stunting man's all-round
capabilities is the division of labour within capitalism. A
highly developed division of labour creates a system where....32
"Each man had a particular, exclusive, sphere
of activity, which is forced upon him, and
from which he cannot escape."
So instead of encouraging man to develop his several talents in
an integral way, the negativity of alienation represses this
wholeness, creating a 'detail-worker' ie fragmenting man's
totality as a being. Thus, each dimension of human capacity is
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developed in isolation, and functions which belong together
become estranged, eg mental and manual labour. *
The history of alienation is thus the history of man's
estrangement from his social (universal) essence. In every class
society man's productive powers are directed not to attaining the
ends of all men, but only the particular ends of a ruling class
within society.
Having been largely concerned with the question of 'the whole
man' in revolution, we must now ask how the turn of 'the whole
man' is to be achieved - what is the motive power for the turn.
What we are now asking is, what is the character of the decisive
intervention which is the only movement which can achieve the
turn of the whole man? Specifically, we are interested in
questions such as, how is the negativity of alienation to be
negated, or how is the negative universality of capitalism to be
forcefully transformed into the positive universality of
socialism?
* For an extended discussion of this aspect of alienation see
Sohn-Rethel, A. 'Intellectual and Manual Labour'.
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Marx names the mode of forceful intervention as dialectic. *
Dialectic connotes the movement necessary to make a real
(genuine) change rather than a merely superficial change in the
world. 'The world" as conceived of by Marx is composed of two
relevant entities...33
"....man and his labour on one side, nature
and its materials on the other."
Nature is often described by Marx as 'sensuous' thus alerting us
to the point that nature offers up the possibility of mediation,
of human intervention. Man's labour, says Marx, 'humanises1
nature. However we must move from abstraction to consideration
of man's relationship to nature in its specific, concrete
manifestation. As we have seen, by consideration of the
'Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts', etc., man's relationship
to nature in all pre-socialist societies has been an alienative
one, ie negative or inverted in that nature has appeared to
control man, rather than vice versa. Now this is true even in a
society (capitalism) which develops mman's productive powers (his
* There are, inevitably, (since this idea is fundamental to an
understanding of Marx) many commentaries on Marx's concept of
dialectic. Those which have been of greatest Importance for this
discussion are; Schmidt, A. 'Concept of Nature in Marx'
especially parts 1 and 3; Marcuse 'Reason and Revolution' part
2; Blum, 'The Corpus of Knowledge" and Colletti, L. 'Marxism and
The Dialectic' in 'New Left Review' Vol. 93 (1975).
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work on nature) to unprecedented levels. Liberation, or the
negation of the negativity of an alienated relationship to nature
can only be achieved dialectically.
We must now face directly the question of what kind of work, or
labour, what kind of movement is implied in dialectic. The
dialectic is a mode of orientation to principle in the sense that
it exemplifies orientation to the ongoing possibility of man's
realisation of his universal nature in the world. In short,
dialectic is the movement which is oriented to the realisation of
man's essence. How does dialectic make possible this form of
realisation? What kind of reality is realisable through the
motion of dialectic? Marcuse has the following to say concerning
dialectic 34
"The historical character of the Marxian
dialectic embraces the prevailing negativity
as well as its negation. The given state of
affairs is negative and can only be rendered
positive by liberating the possibilities
immanent in it."
Consider the 'prevailing negativity' as the environment
(material, political, economic, etc.) within which men currently
exist. However the factuality - the concrete existence of this
environment in one way or another - is not to be confused with
its reality. The factuality of an environment is negative - a
contradiction which conceals beneath it a potential to which
dialectic movement is engaged. In other words dialectical
thought, in conceiving of history as a movement of negation,
makes a fundamental distinction between appearance (the
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empirically correct, factually accurate description of man in his
environment, eg an empirically accurate description of the
movement of prices in a market economic system) and the reality
or potential inherent in human essence as it is emodied in any
particular situation. Dialectics, then, is a movement which
violates or subverts appearance in the service of the realisation
of man's potential. The aim of dialectical intervention, then,
is to bring forward the positive (potential) latent within the
negative, ie a complete turn or revolution.
What does it mean, then, to say that dialectic names a principled
(engaged) conception of man's development, such that the
negativity of appearance can be subverted to forward its positive
potential? To begin to answer this question we have to focus
upon what it means to say that what the revolutionary manifests
is an engaged concept of man in relation to his environment. A
principled conception of revolution acknowledges that revolutions
are not possible at any or all periods, nor in any or all
environments, ie that revolution has a place. In so doing the
revolutionary conception of man's relation to his environment
conceives of changes in that relationship (of history) as having
a specific character. Consider the following well known
quotation... .35
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Men make their own history, but they do not
make it just as they please; they do not make
it under circumstances chosen by themselves,
but under circumstances directly encountered,
giving and transmitted from the past. The
tradition of all the dead generations weighs
like a nightmare on the brain of the living."
The real meaning of this statement is that man must recognise
that his orientation to his environment must take cognizance of
the point that environments offer both opportunities (potential)
and resistances to the development of that potential. An engaged
concept of revolution shows its consciousness of the force of
both opportunities, positive latencies and of resistances. Thus
a principled, engaged conception of man's relation to his
environment recognises the difference between favourable
conditions for a revolution and unfavourable conditions. While
attempting to transform (the potential of) unfavourable
circumstances into favourable, his violation of these
circumstances recognises their power.
Furthermore, since the socialist revolution orients to
universality the socialist revolutionary looks not just at
favourable conditions for a revolution in his society, but the
consequences of the timing of his revolution as a (favourable or
unfavourable, timely or premature) condition of world revolution.
This is an important point which we shall return to repeatedly.
We can now see that a principled conception of revolution (one
which is oriented to the distinctions implied in our reading of
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Marx) could see the difference between an engaged and an
unengaged, or abstract, version of revolution.
A failure to be engaged - a disembodiment or dislocation of
principle - is the problem of abstraction, most commonly
manifested by the Utopian. For Marx Utopians display their
un-engaged version of revolution as a concept of revolution which
exists 'only in the head' ie theorising which is content to
remain abstract or cannot transform its abstraction and become
engaged or focussed upon the specificity of the world it is
seeking to revolutionise. For Marx one of the main exemplars of
Utopianism of this kind was Bakunin, of whom he says.....36
"But there the innermost thought of Mr.
Bakunin comes to light. He does not
understand a thing about social revolution,
only the political phrases about it; its
economic conditions do not exist for him. Nov;
since all hitherto existing economic forms,
developed or undeveloped, include the
servitude of the worker (be it in the form of
wage worker, peasant, etc.) he believes that
in all of the a radical revolution is equally
possible. But even more! He wants the
European social revolution, founded on the
economic basis of capitalist production, to
take place at the level of the Russian or Slav
agricultural and pastoral people. Will, not
economic conditions, is the foundation of his
social revolution."
This characteristically acid statement on Bakunin nonetheless
reveals a great deal about Marx's conception of the difference
between a principled, or engaged conception of revolution and an
abstract, unprincipled conception. There are a number of
distinctions referred to here which will be analysed later, eg
-38-
that the revolution is 'social' and not merely political
(discussed in the next chapter with respect to the French
Revolution) and the distinction between speech (phrases about
revolution) and language (the principle of revolution). For the
purposes of the present discussion this passage tells us that
abstracted, disengaged revolutionary theorising violates the
specificity of man's relationship to his environment. The
Utopian inhabits a featureless environment - a revolution is
achievable at any time, in any society. Utopian man is
one-dimensional in the sense that all he has is desires - 'Will'.
In short the abstracted Utopian has unmoderated desires -
unmoderated in the sense that his conception of desire is
disengaged from the resistance of the environment. For the
Utopian, man exists in a featureless environment, where
opportunity exists but resistance does not. The unengaged
concept of revolution thus has no respect for the distinction
between man - conceived of as someone who has to labour (against
resistances) to enact his will, and god - who can enact his
wishes. The Utopian thus respects spontaneity - pure action of
desire while the principled revolutionary respects decisive
(timely) action. Thus Utopians are unengaged to the extent that
they see no need to orient to environment. Another way of
putting this is to say that the Utopian forgets (wishes away) the
necessity of relating self to other. The labour of engagement,
of the turn, cannot be generated by the Utopian who relies
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instead upon 'spontaneity', the pure (disengaged from other)
self. *
Dialectic as engagement actively identifies the positive
potential of man's relationship to specific environments. As we
have seen, in capitalist society man's relationship to his
environment is negative (alienative) on a factual level.
Dialectical engagement seeks to negate this negativity through
transforming the positive potential latent within or beneath its
negative appearance. Now in order to restrain the temptation
towards abstraction we can ask - how does this mode of analysis
manifest itself in specific terms within Marx's theorising?
The first important aspect of a dialectical intervention is a
general point concerning the potential of capitalist society as a
whole. Since the system of production within capitalism creates
a universality of dependence, as this system spreads and reaches
its highest stages of development, any future socialist
revolution must free all men toegether. In other words the
development of capitalism itself - the creation of (albeit
* This concern is taken up in the chapter on Lenin.
'Spontaneity' as an overriding concern is something which links
Utopian, anarchist and terrorist versions of revolution.
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alienated forms of) interdependence - produces conditions which
offer the possibility of a revolution which would be
qualitatively different from all previous revolutions. The
social agency which can produce this intervention is the
proletariat 37
"In all revolutions up till now the mode of
activity always remained unscathed and it was
a question of a different distribution of this
activity, a new distribution of labour to
other persons, whilst communist revolution is
directed against the preceding mode of
ectivity, does away with labour, and abolishes
the rule of all classes with the classes
themselves, because it is carried through by
the class which no longer counts as a class in
society, is not recognised as a class, and is
in itself the expression of the dissolution of
all classes, nationalities, etc. within
present society; and both for the production
on a mass scale of this communist
consciousness, and for the success of the
cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass
scale is necessary, an alteration which can
only take place in a practical movement, a
revolution; this revolution is necessary,
therefore, not only because the ruling class
cannot be overthrown in any other way, but
also because the class overthrowing it can
only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself
of all the muck of ages and become fitted to
found society anew."
The proletariat, then, is unique in the sense that it is the
first class of ' a universal significance' - the first class
which will not just throw off the oppression of one ruling class
but all ruling classes - the 'muck of ages'. This is the first
and basic sense in which the prior conditions for a
transformation of capitalism are created by capitalism itself.
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What it means to say that dialectic is a movement of negation is
that dialectical movement identifies potential within negative
(alienative) conditions and negates the superficial negativity of
conditions by activating their positive inner core. Since
capitalism is a system based upon a fundamental and
irreconcilable contradiction (between capitalist and proletarian,
between 'dead labour' - Capital and 'live labour' - Labour) the
more alienation develops - the greater capitalism develops - the
further the potential immanent within the system offers up
favourable (positive) conditions for revolution. This is the
real sense of the phrase in "The Communist Manifesto" that "What
the bourgeoisie produces above all is its own grave-diggers'.
Thus as alienation reaches its apex within capitalism 'ensnaring'
everyone within the world market - producing universal
dependence, dialectical intervention generates the possibility of
transforming this dependence into mutual inter-dependence.
If capitalism creates its own grave-diggers, then we must ask
what are the positive elements of negative or alienated
relationships which are the 'transitional forms' that dialectical
intervention can transform? Throughout his work Marx refers to
the growing (albeit forced) interdependence of labour within
capitalism as the 'socialisation' of production relationships.
This discussion is most fully developed in two works, "The
Grundrisse' and "Capital', where Marx identifies two transitional
forms - the Joint Stock Company and the Worker Co-operative as
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embryonic socialist forms within capitalism. Thus there is a
definite revolution implied in property relationships from
individual private property through capitalist private property
to communal property. This movement is clearly a developing
universalisation of property relationships.
Let us deal firstly with the joint-stock company, which Marx
describes as a 'transformation of the capitalist mode of
production within the capitalist mode of production'. This
transitional form transforms....38
"the actual functioning capitalist into a mere
manager, administrator of other people's
capital, and of the owner of the capital into
a mere owner, a mere money-capitalist. Even
if the dividends which they receive include
the interest and profit of enterprise, ie the
total profit (for the salary of the manager
is, or should be, simply the wage of a
specific type of skilled labour, whose price
is regulated in the labour market like that of
any other labour), this total profit is
henceforth received only in the form of
interest, ie as mere compensation for owning
capital that now is entirely divorced from the
function in the actual process of
reproduction, just as the function of the
person of the manager is divorced from
ownership of capital. This result of the
ultimate development of capitalist production
is a necessary transitional phase towards the
reconversion of capital into the property of
producers, although no longer as the private
property of the individual producers, but
rather as the property of associaated
producers, as outright social property."
So the early capitalist owner-manager becomes a 'mere owner' in
advanced capitalism, the separation of ownership from control
being the main consequence of the joint-stock companies' growth.
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The crucial issue for us is that this represents a further
development of the drive towards universalisation created by
alienation within capitalism. In the later stages of
capitalistic development, not only does the proletariat
experience alienation 'in concentrated from' but so too does the
capitalist, estranged from control over what it is that defines
his existence - his capital.
The second example of a 'transitional form' exhibiting
revolutionary potential is the worker co-operative. Marx lauds
the co-operative form as 'a great social experiment' as one which
has shown that, 'production on a large scale may be carried
out without the existence of a class of masters employing a class
of bonds'. We are, however, now faced with a problem. Some
might interpret Marx in a rule-bound way here. Some might argue
that this analysis presents a view of revolution being governed
by a set of inflexible rules which postulate that socialism is an
inexorable, spontaneous, natural outcome of capitalism. This
version is however at variance with the essence of Marx's
theorising. In contradistinction to the version of revolution as
conforming to rule, we see Marx as providing a version of
revolution as orientation to principle. These transitional forms
do not automatically produce socialist forms. The process of
movement named revolution requires a decisive intervention,
rather than the smooth continuity produced in the rule-bound
version. Decisive intervention displays its commitment to
principle in its recognition that transitional forms display not
just the mark of the future, but also of the (distorted) present
ie that they too require transformation. There is no
inevitability about worker co-operatives automatically producing
socialist (universal) relations of production since....39
"At the same time, the experience of the
period from 1848 to 1864 has proved beyond
doubt that, however excellent in principle,
and however useful in practice, co-operative
labour, if kept within the narrow circle of
the casual efforts of private workmen, will
never be able to arrest the growth in
geometrical progression of monopoly, to free
the masses, nor even to perceptibly lighten
the burden of their miseries."
and furthermore 40
"The co-operative factories of the labourers
themselves represent within the old form the
first sprouts of the new, although they
naturally reproduce, everywhere in their
actual organisation all the shortcomings of
the prevailing system. But the antithesis
between capital and labour is overcome
(aufgehoben) within them, if at first only by
way of making the associated labourers into
their own capitalist, ie by enabling them to
use the means of production for the employment
of their own labour."
Thus left to develop on their own (without decisive intervention)
co-operatives would reflect the alienated conditions within which
they grew. Only revolutionary guidance can transform the
co-operatives from localised, nationally based organisations,
from one-sided private producers into universal associated
producers. Transitional forms have no internal linear logic,
their potential requires the application of authoritative
(principled) action for their positive development. If, as Marx
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asserts, socialism must emerge 'out of the womb of capitalism' we
can see that the principled, dialectical version of revolution
requires the action of a midwife. The revolutionay actor is best
understood as the Socratic * theorist par excellence.
Some (especially those adhering to the rule-bound conception of
revolution) might argue against the appropriateness of the
analogy with midwifery arguing that birth is a 'natural' process
which does not require the agency of midwifery. We can counter
that the art of the midwife (timely and authoritative
intervention in the development and birth of a child) is highly
appropriate to the revolutionary. Midwifery ensures a concern
not just for the survival of a child (as in the case of classical
midwifery - Maieutics - survival is not a blind requirement of
the midwife - the midwife was charged, in certain circumstances,
with ensuring that the child did not survive) but in its positive
development, ie midwifery displays a moral commitment rather than
a mere technical orientation.





In seeking to deepen our analysis of Marx's concept of revolution
we can investigate the way in which that concept is developed in
relation to three revolutions - namely the French Revolution of
1789, the 'failed' European revolutions of 1848, and finally the
'coming' socialist revolution of the future.
For Marx, the importance of the French Revolution lies in what it
tells us about the possibilities (the strengths and weaknesses,
above all the limits) of a particular politically-based
revolution. What is significant about the French Revolution is
that it is based upon a unique contradiction. On the one hand
this revolution is based upon an appeal to universal ideals
('liberty', 'equality', etc. for all) yet on the other it creates
a society in which this universalism is unattainable ie although
it is now possible for anyone regardless of birth to become a
bourgeois, capitalist society requires that not everyone will
become a bourgeois. 1 Thus while the French Revolution creates
some of the necessary conditions for socialism, (eg the sweeping
away of particularitic criteria of social selection - the
'accident of birth') the fact that its universality is strictly
limited to the political sphere ensures that it cannot be used as
a model for socialist revolution.
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The real lesson of the French Revolution, then, is that a
socialist (universal) revolution is not possible within the
limiting conditions of a (partial) bourgeois revolution. Any
attempt to induce or force through a socialist revolution in
these conditions by purely political means, ie as the Jacobins
attempted in the French Revolution, will result in a
counter-productive reign of terror. Jacobin terror is
fundamentally partial rather than universal in the sense that it
ignores the absence of the all-round development of man (ie not
just in the political, but also in the social, economic, etc.
spheres) as a necessary pre-condition for a successful
revolution, ie successful in the sense of faithful to its
principles. Marx is unreservedly critical of Jacobinism to the
extent that the reversion to terror is tantamount to the attempt
to impose a political order in a situation where the social
conditions for the development of that order have not yet been
created. Terror, then, is something which is abstract -
\
abstracted from specific conditions - rather than engaged.
The lesson of the negativity of terror is applied equally to the
'failed' revolutions of 1848 2 and the Paris Commune of 1871.
3 His comments upon the 1848 revolution are particularly
illuminating. Here Marx criticises both the French Blancists and
the followers of the German insurrectionist Heber, both of whom
commit Jacobin errors. In each case a restriction of struggle to
political activity and, ultimately, terror is an admission of
defeat.
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Perhaps the difference between Jacobin/Blancists and Marx, or
between terrorism and revolution is best exemplified in the
following quotation which inaugurated a split in the League of
Communists in 1850. It shows quite clearly that Marx learned
quite a different lesson from the 'failures' of 1848 to the
Jacobins (in this case the Willich-Schapper faction). 4
'Instead of the universal view of the
Manifesto there comes the German one, and the
national feelings of the German artisan are
being flattered. Instead of the real
conditions they point to the will as the major
factor in the revolution.
While we tell the workers: "You have to endure
and go through 15, 20, 50 years of civil war
in order to change the circumstances, in order
to make yourselves fit for power" - instead of
that, you say: "We must come to power
immediately, or otherwise we may just as well
go to sleep.'
This is an important statement and deserves detailed
consideration. What can we learn from it?
Firstly, that for Marx the revolution must be universal, and not
restricted to a material revolution, no matter how 'advanced' the
German proletariat may have been. Secondly, terrorism relies
upon spontanteity, upon immediaate action, it demands the
revolution now, irrespective of conditions. Thirdly, and most
importantly in contradistinction to immediacy and spontaneity the
revolutionary is prepared to take the risk of advising the
proletariat that, 'You have to endure and to through 15, 20, 50
years of civil war to make yourselves fit for power'. In other
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words, for the terrorist the proletariat needs no preparation for
producing a revolution, while for Marx the proletariat has to
suffer and learn (to move from 'one-sidedness' to an 'all-round',
or universal development) before a revolution is possible. The
abstraction of terrorism is likely to lead to premature action
(action which is not cognizant or engaged with social as opposed
to purely political conditions). Furthermore premature action is
not to be confused with decisive intervention, since decisive
intervention can lead to a turn of the whole (man or society)
whereas premature action is self-limited and partial.
Organised terrorism of the Jacobin kind is essentially a
clandestine or conspiratorial view of change. Hence^ in relation
to the German Jacobin he asserts 5
'Their business lies precisely in trying to
pre-empt the developing revolutionary process,
drive it artificially to crisis, to create a
revolution ex nihilo, to make a revolution
without the conditions of a revolution. For
them, the only necessary condition for a
revolution is an adequate organisation of
their conspiracy. They are the alchemists of
the revolution, and they share all the
woolly-mindedness, follies, and idees fixes of
the former alchemists. They throw themselves
on discoveries which should work revolutionary
wonders: incendiary bombs, heel-machines of
magical impact, emeutes which ought to be the
more wonder-working and sudden the less they
have any rational ground. Always busy and
preoccupied with such absurd planning and
conniving, they see no other end than the next
toppling-over of the existing government.
Hence their deepest disdain for the more
theoretical enlightenment of the workers about
their class-interests. Hence their not
proletarian, but rather plebeian, anger at
those gentlemen in black coats (habits noirs) ,
the more or less educated people, who
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represent this side of the movement, and from
whom they never manage to free themselves
wholly as the offical representatives of the
party.'
Conspiracy tends to degenerate into terror because of its
political partiality. Instead of engaging self with other - the
work of the revolutionary dialectician engaging with the
proletariat - the conspirators are limited to self ie their own
clique. Their limitation to the (internal) political also leads
to a disdain for intellectuals (see Lenin chapter) since for
Jacobins, the proletariat require no development, education or
preparation for siezing power.
Section II
The version of Marx's concept of revolution presented here,
revolution as orientation to principle, is at variance with many
other readings of Marx, notably that which I have referred to as
producing a version of revolution as conformity to rule. Now
there is one 'alternative' reading of Marx which must be faced
squarely. This is the reading of Hannah Arendt. * Her text is
highly articulate and one which has been, ironically, much
ignored. 6 A particular reason for making a detailed excursion
is that she, like the current writer, claims an affinity with the
ancients, even though her definition excludes all revolutions
before 1776.
Arendt's argument is straightforward. Politics is an eternal
struggle between freedom and tyranny (or necessity). What
distinguishes all revolutions is the struggle for freedom. We
might note, in passing, that Arendt rightly distinguishes between
freedom and civil liberty. Freedom is greater than the mere
presence of civil rights which simply requires the absence of
* Arendt, H. 'On Revolution' Penguin 1973.
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tyranny and despotism rather than the freedom implicit in the
I
right 'to participate in the public sphere - a right first
enjoyed in the ancient Greek city-state or 'polis'. Freedom,
then, is a positive idea which is quite different to the negative
idea of the preservation of civil liberties against a government
which has infringed upon these rights.
Arendt argues that modern revolutions (she has in mind especially
the Pussian and all post-Russian revolutions) have degenerated in
that they have lost sight of their inspiration (freedom) and
become tyrannies dominated by doctrines of necessity. This
degeneration is traced to the 'failure' of the French Revolution,
and in particular to the lessons that were drawn from it. The
principal architect of the degeneration, according to Arendt, was
Marx. The following quotation from Arendt illustrates one facet
of her attitude to him. 7
'...he finally strengthened more than anybody
else the politically most pernicious doctrine
of the modern age, namely that life is the
highest good. Thus the role of revolution was
no longer to liberate men from the oppression
of their fellow men, let alone to found
freedom, but to liberate the life process of
society from the fetters of scarcity so that
it could swell into a stream of abundance.
Not freedom but abundance became now the aim
of revolution.'
Clearly Arendt sees Marx's vision of liberation as being a
limited, one-dimensional view restricting revolution to an
economic transformation of the material productive powers. Now
this view is certainly a curious one, since capitalism itself is
capable of developing the productivity of man's economic powers
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to unprecedented levels 8 as Marx himself acknowledges. The
distinction between capitalism and socialism in Marx is not in
terms of the aggregate amount that each can squeeze out of the
economy (scarcity versus abundance), since no matter how powerful
man's economic powers, man's economic capacity is only a partial
aspect of his all-round or universal capacities. The distinction
between the two (capitalism and socialism) is between an
alienated, negative, partial development of man's capacities and
an all-round universal development of his (more than economic)
powers. The question Marx was interested in was the universality
of man as it is realised in revolution. This is a question of
human value rather than aggregate value, of quality rather than
quantity; it refers to the good of labour itself, whether labour
is free or coerced, realises repressive or liberatory ends etc.
Furthermore Arendt has the following observations to offer...9
'It was the scientist in Marx, and the
ambition to raise his 'science' to the rank of
natural science, whose chief category then was
still necessity, that tempted him into the
reversal of his own categories. Politically
this development led Marx into an actual
surrender of freedom to necessity. He did
what his teacher in revolution, Robespierre,
had done before him and what his greatest
disciple, Lenin, was to do after him in the
most momentous revolution his teachings have
yet inspired.'
Arendt here is making the same distinction (between the
philosopher, 'early' Marx who was interested in freedom and the
'later', scientific, Marx, fixated on necessity) that we earlier
argued was characteristic of those who produced a version of
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revolution as conforming to rule. According to Arendt there is
no difference between Robespierre, Marx and Lenin in the lessons
that they learned from the French Revolution, ie that all
abandoned freedom in favour of necessity as the guiding force of
revolution. Now I have sought to demonstrate that Marx learned
quite different lessons from the French Revolution to those
attributed to him by Arendt. Arendt equates Robespierre with
Marx, though as I have shown, Marx rejected Robespierre,
Jacobinism, terrorism as conspiracy as models of the
revolutionary actor. A view of Marx understanding revolution as
conforming to rule (necessity) would be quite compatible with an
equation of him with Robespierre (the relation of Lenin to Marx I
leave to the next chapter). On the other hand, a view of
revolution as orientation to principle with an underlying view of
revolution serving the attainment of man's universal, creative
nature rather than conforming to rule of partial/alienated
economic powers produces nothing of the sort.
So far we have concentrated on Arend't reading of Marx, but what
of her concept of revolution? The first point to make is that
for her revolution refers exclusively to the political sphere of
man's existence. For Marx, as we have seen, a socialist
revolution is universal in its implication. In the view of
Arendt, indeed, it is revolution's contamination with what she
sees as extra-political issues, ie social and economic issues,
which brings about the downfall of modern revolution. "The
Social Question' in Arendt refers to one issue, ie mass poverty.
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10 Poverty dooms the zeal for freedom in the sense that the
poor are 'determined by necessity' and hence, in Arendt's terms
inappropriate agents of revolution. We can now see why it is
that Arendt expresses such a strong preference for the American
over the French Revolution. In the American revolution, the
rulers of America were largely unencumbered by mass poverty.
Hence Arendt makes the following observation. 11
%
"The sad truth of the matter is that the
French Revolution which ended in disaster, has
made world history, while the American
Revolution, so triumphantly successful, has
remained an event of little more than local
importance.'
Now it is indeed original to note that, even amongst North
American intellectuals, the American Revolution is overshadowed
by the French Revolution, and indeed this may imply an important
lacuna in modernism. However we must inquire further into what
are the Implications of this judgement of success 3nd failure.
In a concept of revolution as orientation to principle, a
judgement of success can only mean - faithfulness to principle.
A revolution is successful only insofar as it embodies the
principle of which it is an expression. If revolution is seen as
rule-bound, as expressing conformity to rule, success can mean
the creation and survival of a state of affairs. Now we must be
extremely cautious about the 'triumphant success' of the American
Revolution when Arendt admits that the American Revolution has
declined because of....12
'...the fatal passion for sudden riches.'
So how can we understand this 'success' in the light of the
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corruption of the principles of the republic by 'material
desires' - the 'fatal passion'? Arendt goes on to argue....13
"Had Robespierre lived to watch the
development of the new government of the
United States, where the
revolution....succeeded precisely where the
French Revolution failed, namely in the task
of foundation.'
Thus 'unsurpassed success' means the creation and survival of an
enduring republic which manages to preserve 'civil liberties' -
though not the higher principle of freedom (which Arendt
acknowledges, as I have argued, is much more than those liberties
which simply guarantee, something which is important - the
absence of tyranny - but no more). Failure - as in the French
case - means the failure to establish an enduring republic - a
state - with the advent of the Bourbons. Hence, despite the
undoubted insights of her analysis, Arendt produces a version of
revolution as conforming to rule.
Perhaps this reading is too harsh upon Arendt. Is she really
blind to principle? A better reading of Arendt would recognise
that she is not interested per se in revolution - she is only
concerned with revolution insofar as it relates to her real
interests which are the origins of war, violence and tyranny. By
abandoning freedom for necessity, Arendt argues, the modern view
of revolution begets violence, terror and war, ultimately
tyranny. There is a continuum of necessity between revolution,
violence, war and tyranny. Indeed Arendt begins her analysis 14
by concurring with Lenin that the 20th century has been a century
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of both wars and revolutions. The modernist conception,
according to Arendt, stands in opposition to the classical
version of politics. Of this alternative she has the following
to say 15
'....the conviction that political relations
in their normal course do not fall under the
sway of violence, and this conviction we find
for the first time in Greek antiquity, in so
far as the Greek polis, the city-state,
defined itself explicitly as a way of life
that was based exclusively upon persuasion and
not upon violence.'
Arendt thus externalises war from politics, sees it as basically
inimical to a good state.
Now there are a number of important relationships raised but not
thoroughly investigated in Arendt. Firstly there is the
relationship between violence and terror. As we have sought to
demonstrate, for Marx there is a fundamental difference between
violence and terror. This distinction is discussed in greater
detail in the next chapter on Lenin. Suffice it to say that, in
Arendt, violence and terror are, if not wholly interchangeable,
certainly part of the same cycle. Secondly consider the
relationship of war to politics and revolution. Again, for
Arendt, there is an iron consistency between war and violence on
the one hand and revolution on the other, even though
theoretically and practically they may be distinguished.
Hence...15
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'.. .we must not fail to note that the mere
fact that revolutions and wars are not even
conceivable outside the domain of violence is
enough to set them both apart from all other
political phenomena. It would be difficult to
deny that one of the reasons why wars have
turned so easily into revolutions and why
revolutions have shown this ominous
inclination to unleash wars is that violence
is a kind of common denominator for both.'
Now what allows Arendt to see a rule-bound and linear connection
between violence and terror is that she has an abstracted
conception (or an absolute conception) of the virtue of freedom.
However, is this not to violate the ancients? Freedom exists not
as an isolated virtue, but as a virtue in relation to other
virtues. For example, is justice not a virtue with which the
ancients were concerned when considering the composition of the
ideal state? * An absolute conception of the virtue of freedom
ironically turns freedom into a despotic virtue, repressing other
virtues. In recognising the existance and importance of other
virtues we need not negate freedom nor ignore its goodness. What
is important is to see that freedom has a place (it is not the
only virtue) in relation to others.
No-one could read Plato's 'Republic' for instance and argue
against this contention.
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If we admit of justice as a virtue, then we have to recognise
what Arendt fails to; that it is possible to conceive of a just
war. If we are correct in asserting that justice as well as
freedom were seen as virtues in the Greek state, then the
question of a just war does become less that absurd, less than
irrational. Indeed the Greeks did conceive of a just war - the
Persian Wars. * To make this kind of a judgement is a
blasphemy to Arendt - there is simply no such thing as a
justified war for her, as the following makes apparent 17
"Perhaps it is because of this noticeable
absence of the freedom argument from the
traditional justifications of war as the last
resort of international politics that we have
this curiously jarring sentiment whenever we
hear it introduced into the debate of the war
question today. To sound off with a cheerful
'give me liberty or give me death' sort of
argument in the face of the unprecedented and
inconceivable potential of destruction in
nuclear warfare is not even hollow; it is
downright ridiculous."
While we may agree with Arendt, here, to the extent that most
wars are immoral and modern warfare doubly so, this does not mean
that all wars are unjust.
* This point is conceded by Arendt - "Cn Revolution" p. 12.
However she argues that even this war is to be regarded as
extra-political since it did not concern the internal governance
of the city-states.
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The problem with Arendt's view of revolution is that it is
partial and tends towards abstraction. Partial in a number of
senses. Firstly in that she makes us choose freedom to the
exclusion of all other virtues. Secondly in that she sees
politics in a particular way. Essentially politics for her is an
internal feature of the governance of individual states. We are
faced with a choice between individual states and individual
revolutions - Greece versus Rome, the American versus French
Revolution, etc. Thirdly in the estrangement of the political
questions from the social questions. This partial version of
revolution is at variance with the universal conception of
revolution we have been considering and would be unlikely to find
favour in Marx.
In Arendt revolutions are unlikely to succeed, except in
individual societies unencumbered by the 'social question' or
mass poverty, eg the United States. For Marx, 'socialism in one
county' is incompatible with the view that the revolution serves
to realise man's nature it is a one-sided concept.
Furthermore, he would argue that one cannot see the absence of
poverty (a crucial criterion for the success of a revolution in
Arendt) in one nation in isolation from its presence in another.
The universality of the market in modern capitalism creates a
forced interdependence, where the affluence of the Western world
is dependent upon the poverty of the third world.
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There are, however, important points of contact between Marx and
Arendt. Neither underestimates the difficulties of a successful
revolution, and each is aware of the possibilities of revolution
degenerating into its extremes. Arendt has the following to say
concerning this problem 18
"Though the whole record of past revolutions
demonstrates beyond doubt that every attempt
to solve the social question with political
means leads into terror, and that is is terror
which sends revolutions to their doom, it can
hardly be denied that to avoid this fatal
mistake is almost impossible when a revolution
breaks out under conditions of mass poverty."
Marx would agree that 'terror sends revolutions to their doom',
yet would argue that terror is not inevitable. Furthermore, as
we have seen in his arguments with the Jacobins (Willich-Schapler
factor for example) of his time, he was aware that premature
action - revolution under 'conditions of mass poverty'- could
also send a revolution to its doom.
The distinction between Arendt and Marx is only glimpsed at if we
say that one views revolution as a partial and the other as a
universal concept. Both Arendt and Marx are aware of the
difficulties surrounding revolution. However in Arendt this is
focussed upon the exclusive virtue, or the dominance as a virtue,




The argument that, while Marx produced a richly detailed analysis
of capitalist society, he had little definite to say of communist
society is a commonplace of many reviews of Marx's work. Now if
this means he did not provide rules for the production of
socialist society, or norms to which behaviour should conform in
socialist society, then there is some truth to this argument.
Indeed Marx argues that he would refuse to....19
"...write recipes for the cook-shops of the
future"
However, we have argued that Marx does not provide an
understanding of revolution as conformity to rule, but on the
contrary as orientation to principle. Perhaps we can understand
this better by arguing that Marx was not (what the modernists
consider as a version of someone who has something to say of the
future) a futurolcgist. The futurologist produces a rule-bound
conception of the future, which generates certain lawful methods
for extrapolating current trends into the future. Ibis violates
Marx's view since it has no room for the turn, no room for what
is novel - genuinely new in revolution. It is not continuity but
discontinuity which distinguishes revolution. What he does
furnish us with is a vision of the realisation of a principle.
This vision tells a story of the potential realisation of man's
essence. Rather than being a disengaged or Utopian vision,
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Marx's vision investigates the possibility of orienting to the
development of man's universal nature in any given situation.
Marx's vision is therefore engaged in the sense that it requires
that one relates to 'real' conditions in the service of realising
a principle. However this is quite a different matter to arguing
that in Marx conditions automatically produce a revolution (a
rule-bound reading of Marx, similar to that of Arendt's where
'necessity' is what produces Marx's view of revolution).
Conditions are important (they provide favourable or unfavourable
opportunities for revolutionary action, for example), but in the
principled account they are not crucial. Marx's principled
account is an active one in the sense that revolution requires
that conditions be galvanised, the opportunities which they
provide be siezed upon and directed by conscious, free and active
individuals with a socialist vision. We may recall here our
earlier discussion which argued that Marx saw free activity as an
integral feature of man's universal essence. His view of the
revolution is thus active rather than passive. Furthermore, he
sees revolution as engaged, not in the sense that it simply
creates a new set of conditions (a new state), since the
objective is not just new conditions (a reified conception of
socialist society) but the creation of freely associating,
universal individuals. This question is referred to in the
following extract.... 20
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"One must above all avoid setting 'the
society' up as an abstraction opposed to the
individual. The individual is the social
entity. The expression of his life....is
therefore an expression of the life of
society."
The free individual is therefore at the heart of Marx's analysis.
So much for the commonly held view of 'an absence of a theory of
the individual in Marx'. 21
Abstracted views of man see individual and society as
disconnected, producing 'individualistic' or 'collectivistic'
views of man. Marx sees the two, individual and society,
reconciled in his vision of the universal individual.
The dialectical motive power for the push from capitalism is not,
then, blind 'objective' conditions, though these are important,
but the development of a revolutionary class - the embryonic
model of the universal individual. Since the universal
individual is at the same time a free and conscious actor - it is
not just the appropriateness of material conditions which make
for a revolutionary situation - but the decisive development of
(self)consciousness amongst the proletariat. Marcuse is keenly
sensitive to this point when he argues....22
"The revolution requires the maturity of many
forces, but the greatest force is the
subjective force, namely the revolutionary
class itself."
Thus the revolution can only come about through the authorisation
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of a proletariat which is self-conscious, self-responsible and
grown to adulthood. When Marx talks of the transition of the
proletariat from being 'a class in itself' to 'a class for
itself' he is naming the revolutionary process of the
proletariat's education. For a revolution to be successful the
proletariat has to move from ignorance (of itself) - mere being -
to knowledge of itself or to become self-responsible.
The requirement of a revolutionary consciousness among the
proletariat has definite consequences for a principled conception
of revolution. If socialist society is to be transformed out of
capitalist society, then amongst other requirements....
1. A proletariat must be constituted in itself, ie there is an
identifiable capitalist social structure with a proletariat
(rather than, for example, a peasantry) as its largest element.
2. Through a period of class struggle, involving sacrifice, the
proletariat develops a mature consciousness of itself as a class.
It is important to note, then, that any attempt to create a
revolution before these forces have been created is likely to be
premature action, even when superficially conditions appear
propitious. As we have seen before, Marx does not see the
proletariat (even where it is a class 'in itself') as
automatically 'fit' for rule. To be 'fit' for rule the
proletariat has to undergo a process of educative
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self-transformation. For our reading, what is really decisive is
not so much the 'factual' existence of the proletariat even
though this is a 'sine qua non', as the extent to which that
proletariat is self-conscious and mature. Cur view is in strict
contrast to the post-Marx debates of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin on
the proletariat in the Russian Revolution where these theorists
concentrate almost exclusively on the 'factual' questions, eg in
Trotsky's case great store is placed upon the proportion of the
population which was proletarianised in the rapid period of
industrialisation immediately prior to the October revolution.
A further important divergence between rule-bound and orientation
to principle readings of Marx relate to how we are to interpret
Marx's changes of mind concerning the likely locale for the
initial socialist revolution. At various stages Marx considered
France, England, Germany and Russia as possible or even probable
host societies for the first revolution. In a rule-bound reading
these changes of mind create fundamental problems. Lack of
predictive power implies inaccurate rules for the production of a
revolution. Accurate forecasting is essential to the
futurologist and 'failure' here looks like vacillation, or the
absence of good rules. 23 More generous pro-Marx readings
within the rule-bound tradition 24 see the earlier vacillations
leading to an intellectual break where the later work produces
good rules (ie accurate predictions) for the production of a
revolution.
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While the rule-bound perspective sees nothing but difference and
lack of unity in Marx's theorising on the first socialist
revolution, the principled view sees a deeper unity underlying
the superficial 'changes of mind' concerning the location of the
first revolution. We are not saying that Marx does not change,
or learn anything from these changes of mind. What we are saying
is that each change of mind indicates development - learning
something new - with respect to the way in which the principle of
revolution can be embodied, ie each change implied a
re-orientation to principle. While the vacillator in the
rule-bound reading abandons principle, and is dazzled by the
apparent opportunities of the immediate, Marx learns new ways to
embody an enduring principle.
All of the foregoing can perhaps be best illuminated if we take
two examples of a change of mind on this issue - France and
Russia.
As we have already mentioned, Marx attributed the greatest
importance to investigating the French Revolution and its demise.
At several stages, especially in mid-nineteenth century, Marx
considered that French society displayed revolutionary potential.
However he always expressed reservations about this potential.
In "The Class Struggle in France" he had the following to say in
criticism of the leaders of French socialists....25
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"... they think that they would be able to
consummate a proletarian revolution within the
national walls of France, side by side with
the remaining bourgeois nations."
The important point to be learnt from this is that the revolution
- socialism - in one country is a nonsense to Marx. Now we have
to go further and ask how can he reach this conclusion. If
revolution is a process which is intended to orient to the
principle of the realisation of man's universal essence, then
this can only be done inter-nationally rather than nationally.
The purely national seizure of power represents a one-sided
change - a revolution requires an all-sided change. Thus we have
the crucial lesson that any national revolution is doomed to
failure (failure to realise the principle which inspires it) if
it remains a national rather than an international movement -
even in cases where the political edifice of the revolution
survives, ie even where state power is maintained by a national
proletariat. If revolutions are to serve the realisation of
man's universal nature they must move beyond the bounds of a
nation-state or collapse. Furthermore this is not a strategic
point. Some might interpret Marx to be saying that a revolution
can be crushed or threatened by the encirclement 26 of
counter-revolutionary societies. Our reading evaluates the
warning against national one-sidedness not in terms of rules (the
correct tactics) but in terms of embodiment of principle.
The second example is that of Russia. His analysis here is
clearly of the greatest importance, especially for our
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understanding of Marx in relation to Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin.
It is frequently noted that, towards the end of his life, Marx
turned his attention to the possibility of a socialist revolution
in Russia. In support of this view, a passage from Marx's
preface to the Russian edition of the "Communist Manifesto" is
usually cited. It is worth considering this passage in some
detail 27
"If the Russian revolution becomes the signal
for a proletarian revolution in the West, so
that both complete each other, then the
present Russian system of community ownership
of land could serve as the starting point for
a communist development."
Now we have to be extremely careful to avoid making too quick an
inference about this passage. What Marx is really addressing
here is the relationship between two necessarily integrated
moments in the revolutionary process, ie the relation between the
universal (international) and particular (national) moments of
that process. In the above quote Marx refers only to the
revolution in the West as a proletarian revolution. He was well
aware of the relative under-development of the Russian
proletariat in relation to the peasantry. 28 The particular
or national revolution (Russia) cannot produce a successful
revolution (one which embodies the principle of socialism) unless
it successfully links itself into (becomes a signal for) the
universal (the international revolution).
A national revolution only makes sense, to Marx, if it can become
generative of a push beyond the one-sided national boundaries
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which threaten to limit it. A Russian revolution which occurs
before the proletariat as a force is mature is a pre-mature
revolution - ie it cannot embody principle universally. This
possible prematurity has two aspects - there are two ways in
which a Russian revolution could fail to be a timely or decisive
intervention. Firstly, if the national proletariat of Russia was
not sufficiently mature, self-conscious and developed, the
revolution would inevitably stagnate and atrophy. Secondly,
externally, a Russian revolution could be less than timely in
relation to the development of the proletariats of Western
Europe. Marx has attempted to show that timeliness is of the
essence. In addition, he has attempted to demonstrate that the
universalism of orientation to principle should be engaged (with
the particularity of national conditions) rather than abstract.
Whilst the rule-bound conception of Marx sees his theorising on
the first socialist revolution as indicative of fundamental
differences in his works, we see these differences as surface
features of a deeper unity. At different points in his work Marx
evaluates the prospects of revolution in different societies.
However these different locales are seen in terms of the extent
to which they embody potential for the embodiment of a principle.
Marx's story of revolution is thus a moral tale in the sense that
it investigates the ongoing possibility of orienting to the




The aim of this chapter and chapter four is to provide and
analysis of the relationship of Lenin's theorising to that of
Marx. In so doing we will be primarily concerned with the extent
to which Lenin allows us to consolidate and advance the concept
of revolution as orientation to a standard, or whether he
violates this conception and regresses by reading Marx's
conception of revolution as orientation to rule. This is clearly
a complex goal, and one which is made no less straightforward by
the blockages created in the works of certain leading
interpreters of Lenin.
Those problems which might serve to deflect us from our primary
aim are twofold.
Firstly, many interpretations create a cold war cloud which
distorts Lenin's theorising. Thus much conventional
interpretation of Lenin in the Soviet Union is little better than
hagiography, converting Lenin into a god. As I shall argue below
this represents a fundamental violation of Lenin's theorising
which relied upon making explicit the distinction between man and
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god, and advocates respect for that distinction. On the other
hand much Western interpretation of Lenin suffers from being
based upon what Meyer 1 calls
"
a philosophy that is uncongenial to
writers in our culture."
E. H. Carr is blunter, but probably closer to the truth, when he
says that a state of 'moral blackmail' characterises the view of
many western intellectual interpretations of Soviet writers.
Just how much of a problem this is for serious consideration of
Lenin can be gleaned by considering the works of Conquest, 2
regarded by some as a writer relatively untainted by cold-war
pressures. However Conquest argues that the Russian revolution
replaced one form of 'tyranny' by another, and that the Russian
revolution achieved nothing that could not have been achieved by
other, 'less repressive' means. (We may therefore feel entitled
to question whether Conquest is really talking about a revolution
or an insurrection.) Conquest concludes his reading by advising
that Lenin is best seen as 'a monster'. 3 Since our interest
is not in the superficial, neither acclamation nor defamation,
neither god nor monster can provide us with a serious beginning.
k
k
A concrete reading might misinterpret this as an advocacy of
moral nihilism. This is not the case. Indeed the opposite is
the case. The analysis of Lenin I offer as an alternative to
hagicgraphy/assassination is one which investigates Lenin's
relation tc£ a moral tale. Thus the question of the 'good' of
Lenin is intended to be at the centre of my analysis.
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The second set of barriers which might deflect our analysis
relates to a persistent reluctance to treat Lenin as someone who
can be properly regarded as a theorist. Until very recently the
conventional view of Lenin in the West was of an
actor/conspirator/tactician, rather than as a theorist. An
exemplar of this mode of interpretation is Carew-Hunt who argues
that 4
"The theoretical side of Lenin is, in a sense,
not serious."
In a similar way Conquest argues...5
"His impact upon the world was not, generally
speaking, that of a theoretician the power
and influence of all such writing (Lenin's)
has arisen largely from the fact that the
author himself carried out a major
revolution."
Since 1970, * however, Western intellectuals have begun to
rekindle an interest in Lenin's theorising. Writers such as
★
It is true that Lukacs, a writer who is important in both
Western and non-Western communist traditions, was giving Lenin
serious attention as "the greatest thinker to have been produced
by the revolutionary working-class movement since Marx" in 1924.
Lukacs' contribution is both unique and exceptional.
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Althusser (1971), Corrigan et al (1978) and Harding (1980) have
devoted their attentions to Lenin as a revolutionary philosopher.
Lane (1981) was the first writer to develop a fully-blown
analysis of Lenin as a sociological theorist, and his work is
discussed at length below.
Within the writing of those who are reluctant to see Lenin as a
theorist, there is an implicit version of Lenin's relation to
Marx. If one considers Conquest's work, for example, there is a
view of a fundamental distinction between Marx as theorist and
Lenin as actor. Mow however crass and simplistic this version of
Lenin's relationship to Marx may be, it noentheless serves to
highlight an important area of investigation in any account of
that relationship.
What serves as a beginning for us, then, in examining the
relation of Lenin to Marx is the question of praxis, the question
of the relationship of speech to action, theory to practice,
saying to doing within Lenin's concept of the revolution. I
treat Lenin's version of praxis in a developmental fashion. The
core of his theory of praxis is developed in the text "What Is To
Be Cone?" and represents a pre-revolutionary view. This view is
developed in "State and Revolution" and in the post-revolutionary
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text "Left-wing Communism - An Infantile Disorder". We begin
with "What Is To Be Done?" *
* For an earlier, less critically developed view of Lenin's
concept of praxis see "Reading Lenin's 'What Is To Be Done?' " by
the present author in "Friends, Enemies and Strangers", edited by
Blum, A and McHugh, P.
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Section II
Lenin's "What Is to Be Bone?" is an attempt to counteract the
tendencies of reformism and terrorism and to show the character
of the genuinely revolutionary. In characterising reformism and
terrorism as tendencies, we can understand Lenin as avoiding the
reification of these ideas as things or positions (to be agreed
with, disagreed with, got rid of and so on). To see reformism
and terrorism as tendencies is to understand them as perpetual
possibilities within the dialectic of political thought.
Tendency as perpetual possibility is an important conception for
my analysis, and especially for thinking of the relationship of
my reading of Lenin to that of others.
Reading "What Is to Be Done?" in this way means neither
considering reformism and terrorism within the context of an
epoch, within time, nor within the context of the idea of social
structure. It is to think of reformism and terrorism as ideas
whose essence is independent of concrete context. (This is not
to say that in all epochs, or societies, these tendencies will
assume the same guise or appearance, nor is it to say that the
technical aspects of strategy adopted towards them by
revolutionaries will be invariate. Nor is it to imply that this
was Lenin's last word on the relationship of theory to practice.)
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Therefore while some may have it that Lenin is only talking about
the 'Economists' (reformists) and 'Revolutionists' (terrorists)
who opposed the position of the revolutionary newspaper Iskra to
which Lenin contributed in prerevolutionary Russia, I read Lenin
as saying something about the intelligibility of reformism and
terrorism independently of these considerations. Even though the
exemplar of reformism at the time Lenin wrote "What Is to Ee
Done?" might have been the group associated with the newspaper
Rabocheye Dyelo, I read Lenin's speech on reformism as making
reference to a theory of gradualism which will surface in any
situation where politicians and other human actors appear.
Seeing the tendencies of reformism and terrorism as perpetual
possibilities is to see them as permanently available alters.
That is to say that Lenin sees reformism and terrorism as
ever-present temptations to the revolutionary. To see them as
temptations is to see reformism and terrorism both as ideas which
require resisting against, but also which have some good to them.
Therefore "What Is to Be Cone?" is to be read not as an attempt
to obliterate, smash or get rid of reformism and terrorism, but
an attempt to transform them. "What Is to Be Done?" is
conventionally understood as a polemic, where polemic's sense is
understood as the nullification of alter - making nothing of
alter. Perhaps we can restore the good sense of polemic. In
seeing tendency as perpetual temptation Lenin makes available a
way in which reformism and terrorism can be polemicized. That is
reformism and terrorism constitute poles or extremes. Insofar as
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they constitute extremes they require to be resisted by the
revolutionary. But equally this resistance takes form in
cognizance of the fact of the tempting character of thee poles.
Since the poles have some good to them - are tempting - they
display their potential (to be more than they are) . A
conventional polemicist sees his task as taking an extreme
position to defeat another extreme. The practice of polemic by
Lenin, however, does not involve Lenin becoming an extreme, but
names the constant labour of working with his own extremes. The
peculiar power of "What Is to Be Done?" is Lenin's own
recognition that a real change - a revolution - involves changing
self as well as other.
How does Lenin understand the version of the relationship between
speech and action displayed by reformism and terrorism? Consider
the following.... 6
"....These people who cannot pronounce the
word "theoretician" without a sneer reveal in
practice a failure to understand our most
imperative practical tasks"
In this version, reformism and terrorism are characterised as
being disdainful of speech. By regarding theory as an
"indulgence", reformism and terrorism show a conception of speech
as a weak actor. Theory, for them, is not a crucial concern;
theory is not where the real action is.
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Furthermore we might think about this piece...7
"...Some began to say that the working masses
themselves have not yet advanced the broad and
militant tasks which the revolutionaries are
attempting to impose upon them, that they must
continue to struggle for immediate political
demands, to conduct the economic struggle
against the employers and the government
....Others said that....all we need to do is
to snatch up our old friend, the "accessible"
cudgel. To drop metaphor it means that we
must stimulate the "spiritless" progress
of the working-class movement by means of
excitative terror."
In expressing a concern for the "immediate" and, in other
passages, the "palpable", the "concrete", reformism is showing a
preference for speech over language. Reformists use words - make
speeches - but the reformist seeks to speak rather than to say,
as Heidegger might have it. The reformist understands speech as
rhetoric. Speech for the reformist is about persuasiveness. It
does not matter what you say - as long as it succeeds in being
convincing. Rhetoric faces towards results, consequences, and
away from origin.
All of this is not to say that the reformists do not theorise.
Reformists do theorise - they have a theeory of gradualism (see
below). However reformism makes its speech into a corresponder,
a fitter. For example, they make their speech fit "the mood of
the people". Hence when Lenin speaks of the reformists not being
"responsible", we can read this as saying that reformism does not
authorise anything by its speech. reformism conceals self by
corresponding to (using) other in its speech. Reformism cooes
not own up to its speech. In a deep sense, reformism is not
serious about its speech.
So what the revolutionary can show the reformist (how the
revolutionary can transform the reformist) is the necessity to
act responsibly, to own up to one's own speech. By concealing
self - fitting self to other - the reformist fails to exercise
self's responsibility, that is, he fails to see how it could
make-a-difference-it-self. The reformist's irresponsibility is
tempting to the revolutionary in that it manages the avoidance of
rejection by the masses. Given a shared knowledge of the need
for mass participation in a revolution, nonrejection, or
acceptance appears attractive. However this fall short of the
revolutionary once it is recognised that mere acceptance implies
a sterile and therefore nonproductive, nonparticipative
relationship. The revolutionary has to recognise what the
reformist faces away from - that the act of owning one's speech
necessarily carries a risk which also has to be worked with.
At the other extreme, terrorism in taking up the "accessible
cudgel" has abandoned speech in frustration at the inaction of
speech. Speech becomes an oracular mouthpiece in terrorism.
"Words" take the guise of pronouncement, eg after an act of
"excitative terror". Speech makes the appearance of announcer
stating what has been done or what will be done. Terrorism is
pre-emctory in that it wants to draw the lesson of a tale without
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doing the work of telling the tale. In this way terrorism shows
its disdain for alter. A statement or pronouncement is not a
request for a response dirrected towards an equal, ie coworker.
Pronouncment is not the work of a dialectician, but the
determining of a reaction. Terrorism is the work of
behaviouralism. Terrorism shows its behaviouralism in its
reaction to the "spiritlessness" of alter (the masses). The
reaction of the terrorist to this "spiritlessness" is to excite
alter - apply a stimulus for the required action. The terrorist
fails to act responsibly; he fails to make-a-difference by
thinking that self is responsible for everything, thereby failing
to see the palce of alter in what is to be done. The terrorist
cannot wait for and shows no respect for what is other than self.
The kind of irresponsibility displayed by terrorism is tempting
in that given a pressing need for something to be done, the
immediacy of doing anything/everything holds an appeal. However
this falls short of the revolutionary in that it is a way of
reacting to a frustration with the masses which fails to involve
participation. Terrorism fails to transform what it started
with: its impulses.
So the praxis of the revolutionary resists the extremes of
subordinating other to self (terrorism) and subordinating self to
other (reformism). The revolutionary seeks to transform the
excesses of thinking that self is responsible for all that is
other (terrorism) and that self is responsible for no other
(reformism) by the exercise of a responsible praxis. This act,
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the revolutionary act, seeks to act in a way which shows itself
(takes responsibility for, owns up to its speech), but which
(wpows respect for other by leaving it with something to do. As
such, the revolutionary sees the limits of boredom (reformism)
and excitement (terrorism) as poles which require oscillation, ie
which require something (responsibility) to turn themselves
(expand their potential) into self-transformatory, ie
revolutionary, practices. Terrorism and reformism cannot make
the revolution in the deep sense that neither is a revolving
actor. Both reject rather than revolve each other. Lenin
moderates his extremes, holds the middle, by restraining yet
acknowledging them. The revolutionary owns himself, rather than
owning nothing (reformism) or owning everything (terrorism).
While the tendencies of reformism and terrorism, in forgetting
the relationship between theory (language) and action (speech),
can only see speech as a weak actor, Lenin understands speech as
a powerful actor. Lenin shows us ways in which speech can act.
For example:
1. Speech guides action - "Pussian revolutionaries, guided by a
genuinely revolutionary theory can at last rise to full stature."
2. Speech changes minds (converts?) - "A newspaper is a
collective agitator."
-83-
3. Speech co-ordinates actors + actions - "A newspaper is a
collective organizer."
For the revolutionary, speech is a powerful action. But consider
the following: "...Without revolutionary theory there can be no
revolutionary movement." Here we can read speech as an
indispensable action. The only decisive action, the only action
which makes-a-difference, is that which is oriented to the action
of speech. How is it that speech can make a difference? Let us
collect together again some senses in which Lenin sees speech as
acting. Speech changes minds, speech organizes actors, and
speech co-ordinates actions. What idea of speech would give form
to these concrete usages? We can start by noting that speech is
being understood in some way as a mover. Thus speech moves
minds, moves people together (and apart), and lends momentum.
Accordingly it's not so much that "Without revolutionary theory
there is no revolutionary movement", as the action of speech is
movement.
Perhaps this is too brash, for understanding speech as movement
does not resonate too well with Lenin. To see some sense in our
reading we must first come to grips with these dissonances.
Consider that if soeech is a powerful action, then formulating
speech as sheer movement is inappropriate. If speech is sheer
movement, then soeech might move us anywhere (everywhere and
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nowhere). But the revolutionary is not interested in moving
anywhere since the revolutionary's interest is in moving
somewhere. Another way of thinking about this is to recognise
that the revolutionary is not a drifter. Sheer movement (drift)
is movement for movement's sake. This is to say that sheer
movement is impersonal motion - drift does not make necessary the
idea of a person (an actor?). We might think of the motion of a
stream or the motion of the wind as exemplars of sheer movement.
Sheer movement is the motion of being carried along - anywhere
will do. Furthermore, drift does not make necessary Lenin's
questioit "What is to be done?" because that question requires the
idea of a person. Person can be conceived of as displaying the
control necessary to start up or slow down his motion.
Revolutionary movement as against the movement of drift shows the
labour, the activity of generating and arresting. Drift leaves
no room for self as responsible feature of environment. Drift is
a dehumanised (personless) motion. Both the reformist and
terrorist are exemplifications of drift. By failing to own his
speech the reformist consigns himself to drifting with the
prevailing political consciousness, while the terrorist is pushed
along by his impulses in having failed to arrest them.
Another way of movement which is dissonant with the
revolutionary, and which Lenin faces squarely, is vacillation.
In arguing with the reformists and terrorists Lenin points out
that "...they should have avoided confusion and vacillation."
Vacillation is the urge to move in two polar opposed ways
-85-
simultaneously. In failing to control the urge to go in two ways
at once, the vacillator moves nowhere. Vacillation is the
tearing of self between two poles, two extremes, two alters. In
merely feeling the pull of two temptations, the vacillator
remains indecisive in his experience of them. Through his
indecision the vacillator fails to transform either self or other
(temptation, extreme). The inevitability in vacillation is its
repetitiveness. Failure to transform means always repeating what
one has experienced (sheer attraction) before. Vacillation's
indecisiveness means the vacillator is stuck in the same groove.
On the other hand, the revolutionary displays what the vacillator
lacks - knowledge of the good of decisiveness. The revolutionary
experiences temptation, but rather than being torn by
temptations, the revolutionary response is to moderate the
extremism of temptation. The revolutionary experiences
temptation as a challenge to be welcomes as an occasion for
action (decisiveness). Decisiveness' good is in its recognition
of how speech is author-ised. The vacillator's speech identifies
self with other. Decisiveness recognises the author-ity of its
own speech; it recognises self can make-a-difference.
What idea of movement will help us to make sense of the
revolutionary conception of speech, if we can understand that
this idea can neither be that of sheer movement, drift (moving
anywhere), nor that of the confused two-ways-at-once movement
displayed by the vacillator? A revolutionary conception of
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speech understands movement as going somewhere rather than
anywhere. Lenin's version of speech is movement which knows
where it is going. Speech is the movement which does not lack
orientation. The movement which displays its knowledge of what
is to be done (its orientation) is movement which displays
direction. How does the revolutionary produce a sense of
direction - an orientedness? The importance of the presence and
continual temptation of extremes (reformism and terrrorism) lies
partly in the fact that the work of labouring with polarities
provides a bearing for the revolutionary. The continual work of
achieving a relaationship with an internally generated extreme
provides the bearing necessary for direction.
The idea of speech as orientation, as direction, obliges us to
return to the notion that the revolutionary, in contradistinction
to its extremes, makes available the idea of a person - the idea
of a responsible self. The revolutionary is a personal mode of
theorising. Direction and orientation make necessary the notion
of an actor - a self who displays responsibility. The idea of a
person is the idea of the actor who shows responsibility as a
feature of recognising both the place of self (that self can
make-a-difference and ought to own his actions), and other (that
other is left with something to be done). The personal, on the
one hand, makes reference to the attempt to show the
interrelatedness (mutually necessary in-corporation) of the
potentially estrangeable. Reformism and terrorism are, on the
other hand, impersonal modes of theorising which begin and end
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with an acceptance cf estrangement as precondition.
How can we now understand the direction of revolutionary speech
in relation to the speech of the vacillator? We might consdier
that Lenin sees vacillation as an outcome of lack of principle.
This is a topic to which he journeys back frequently. At one
point Lenin re-emphasises a statement of Marx: 8
"...Enter into agreements to satisfy the
practical aims of the movement but do not
allow any bargaining over principles, do not
make any theoretical concessions."
The principled speech is that which recognises and respects both
its origins and where it is going (its direction). Principle
implies a relationship between beginning and end. This is not a
relationship between points, positions, or states of being, but
more the achieving of a relationship between inspiration and
aspiration. The revolutionary (principled), unlike the
vacillator (unprincipled), learns the place of authority (that
self can make-a~difference) and decisiveness (the need to act as
a person, the need for human action. So the speech which
displays direction is the speech which is principled. The
principled speech in its directness is not to be diverted,
unlike the vacillating speech which is diverted from one pole to
another. The directness of revolutionary speech obliges us to
concentrate our energies on the problematic. To be direct is to
face up to rather than away from, to confront, to contend, to
struggle. To hear the revolutionary in this way is to understand
speech as an act of engagement, a struggle.
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In trying to flesh out the idea of speech as a struggle, we might
consider how Lenin characterises that which fails to
make-a-difference, that which falls short of a struggle. For
instance, consider Lenin's warnings about the danger of
opportunism. The opportunist is characterised as being
"slavish". While to struggle is to make a response to a
situation, the opportunist, in waiting for a break, lets the
situation control him. The opportunist accedes to the fact of
lacking control and accepts his subordination to history. Note
how the opportunist can accomplish his subordination.
Subordination is only possible through the divorce of self from
other (history), ie it is only possible through the
externalisation of history. In this way the opportunist fails to
see himself as a responsible (involved, engaged) feature of his
environment. In pointing out the weakness of opportunism, Lenin
is not just saying do not trust the fickleness of circumstances
as though he were making a complaint. Complaining somehow seems
to rest on a proffered lack of, or negation of, control. To
complain is to say I am not the proper executive of control, but
I want someone to exercise control for me. Complaining is a
request to be seen as one on behalf of whom control ought to be
authorised. What Lenin is saying is that the appropriate
response to an opportunity is to struggle with it - the
revolutionary seeks to transform opportunity from limit to
contingency. The opportunist accepts history, chance, as a limit
(ie an absolute, once-and-for-all, fixed boundary) whereas the
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revolutionary is he who contends with history, he who sees
history not as mechanically independent puppet-master of man and
doler of breaks, but as an intimate process offering the
possibility of human engagement. To struggle is to see history's
problematical character, to see history as raising the problem of
what is to be done. The opportunist reads history as fate; he
says I am controlled by irresistably powerful forces, and my work
is to make the best of whatever comes my way. However, the
revolutionary sees the humanity of force; he sees the
possibility of self's involvement in force as the work of coming
together to become involved in the interaction of forces. Note
how it is necessary for Lenin to show in the first place why
opportunism has to be resisted. Seeing history as the
opportinist does is a temptation. If history is a matter of the
play of fate, then the opportunist cannot be censured in failure
(the breaks did not turn up equals the opportunist's failure).
Yet even in failure the revolutionary has to display labour - has
to come to terms with - grapple with the implicated nature of
failure. Given the need for constant struggle, the ease of
opportunism is a seductive alternative.
Perhaps we can now see that to understand that reading the
movement of revolutionary speech as struggle is not to see the
revolutionary as he who snatches any and every opportunity to
act. We can think of how it might be that to engage is to resist
the urge to do something. For example, there are occasions when
inaction is a strategic imperative. This might be the case in a
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situation where the opportunity to act is available but one does
not have the necessary resources to bring off an action. This is
not only a technical matter for what we have said can also be
read as saying that struggle incorporates the idea oof patience.
Patience can be understood as a struggle in that to be patient is
to control the impulses of the self. (As we shall see this is
one way in which the revolutionary can be distinguished from the
terrorist.)
Mow, in terms of the relationship between self and other,
struggle cannot be understood as the attempt of self to dominate
other for that would be to fail to contend with self. That is,
the revolutionary does not understand one person's work as
leading to the domination of an-other. The revolutionary makes
room for - leaves a place for - respects other. Eecause he has a
place, a part, we can see again that the revolutionary is
somewhere, rather than the terrorist who seeks to be everywhere,
and the reformist who seeks to be nowhere. A preference for
somewhere shows a preference for doing over drifting, character
(the product of a person) over fate (the work of chance) . The
revolutionary shows us the humanity of intervention - struggling
in between two extremes.
How can we understand the relationship between that which
displays the idea of speech as the praxis of struggle
(revolution) and that which falls short of struggle (reformism
and terrorism). We might consider that Lenin characterises both
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tendencies as being subservient. Reformism and terrorism are
conceived of as "bowing" and "cringing" to spontaneity. These
characterisations can be read as icons of the tendencies' failure
to struggle with history. The failure of the extremes is the
failure to see themselves as responsible features of history.
This is linked to the problem of spontaneity. Spontaneity if the
expression of the momentary, the immediate, which can serve as
dislocators - separating present from past, self from history.
The urge for spontaneity is the urge for production without work,
wishes without planning, an end without a beginning. Reformism
and terrorism are a-historical in that they provide no notion of
engagement with history. There is no sense of involvement in the
process of becoming (history). The revolutionary, in being
in-volved in a process of change, enters into a relationship
between self and history where it is understood that self can
make-a-difference, and that the product of this interaction - the
historical individual - exists not in a state of being, but
exists in and through a process of dialectical movement: the
movement of change. All of this brings to mind our prior notion
of reformism and terrorism as im-personal modes of theorising.
The tendencies' lack of involvement names the idea that they
require the work of externalisation of other, the work of
detachment to be what they are.
How can the terrorist and the reformist be conceived of as
achieving the "bowing" to spontaneity? Let's think about the
following: 9
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"...The economists and the terrorists merely
bow to different poles of spontaneity; the
economists merely bow to the spontaneity of
the labour movement, pure and simple, while
the terrorists bow to the passionaate
indignation of the intellectual."
Reformism (Economism) bows to spontaneity by failing to struggle
with the workers, and hence, Lenin's objections to the fact that
reformists are unwilling to tell the labour movement anything it
does not already know. The reformist sees the workers as a limit
to be accepted. In conceiving progress as a particular
relationship - adaptation between self and environment which
seeks to fit self to environment - the reformist shows
half-heartedness by refusing to struggle with, to change
environment. Through seeking to fit, neither to be ahead of nor
behind "progress", reformism shows its concern for survival. The
reformist is afraid that speed or slothfulness will destroy.
However, in electing for a nonproductive relationship between
self and environment, the reformist chooses stagnation (a slow
dying) to the other extreme - the fast dying of the terrorist.
Rather than struggle with environment, the reformist lets
environment produce his speech. The deep sense in which
reformism is conservative is its failure to engage with
environment, its understanding of environment as limit.
Reformism externalises environment as opposing force, rather than
reading it as a means of production (change). The reformist's
relationship to his environment is a nonproductive one.
Conceived in this way we can hear the reformist's retort to the
revolutionary, "Be realistic", as a request to let the
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environment produce one's speech. The reformist understands the
progress of adaptation as "gradualism". Gradualism is a way of
reading the transition to socialism as an accretion of things,
"palpables" - seeables (concessions). For the reformists the
good society is a state, and a state to which there can be an
approximation - recall the notion that a "mixed" economy is
"half-way to socialism".
If the reformist allows the environment to rule him, then the
terrorist can be conceived of as allowing the impulses of self,
(desire, passionate indignation) to produce his action. The
terrorist, though conscious of the need to make a change, is as
half-hearted as the reformist in merely wanting to act on the
environment. In his half-heartedness the terrorist fails to
struggle with self. The terrorist capitulates to impulse, fails
to discipline desire. Better, the terrorist conceives of self as
desire and experiences desire as an urge. Note the discord here
with the commonplace idea that the terrorist is self-less, ie
sacrifices self in the service of a cause. Note too that it is
not being said that impulses are bad. Everyone needs impulse,
and urge is a human possibility. However, although impulse
belongs with the self, it does not exhaust the idea of self.
Impulse provides energy, but whether energy is used wisely or
foolishly is a matter of election. How can we read the
impulsiveness of the terrorist? Consider how the terrorist
conceives of change. How can change be conceived of such that
urge is acted out in the environment? The terrorist conceives of
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the environment as a universe of observables. Target implies the
objectification of what is desired. Therefore, showing
commitment as a terrorist means making seeable one's urges
acting. The action of the terrorist's urge is the impulse to
obliterate themselves - to destroy targets. In so doing,
terrorism fails to distinguish surface features from essence and
destruction from production. The terrorist is impelled to
destroy the topography of the objects of his urges - his targets.
Peformism and terrorism make available one mode of relationship
to desire. The tendencies re-experience the strength of desire
as an urge and their reaction to their urge is to satisfy it, ie
to succumb to it. The temptation of reformism and terrorism is
their here and nowness, ie their immediacy. Eoth can bring to
appearance the palpable in their action - concessions and
destroyed targets. What is tempting is their guest to react
spontaneously out of the urge to do something. The
revolutionary experiences the same urge, the same temptation, but
his response is not the reaction of succumbing to urge, rather he
moderates it, transforms his urges into desire. The
revolutionary experiences urgency not as the need to give in to
impulse (thus temporarily satisfying urge) but as the necessity
for constant work. Given the strength of urge, relief is a human
possibility, but the revolutionary resists and moderates his
temptations. Hence Lenin shows us what he knows in the very
title "What Is to be Cone?". Reformists and terrorists cannot
respond to the struggle that is this question. Cne avoids the
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question by doing anything (impulsiveness); the other by doing
nothing (using the environment as an excuse for no action).
Neither is willing to do the work of revolving. What this means
is that terrorism and reformism display a tempting but excessive
relationship to desire. Both seek relief from this pressure.
While the reformist succumbs by suffering, the terrorist succumbs
by experiencing agitation - the need to excite. The
revolutionary, though experiencing the good of the same desire
(something must be done), resists the temptation of both poles.
The revolutionary moderates both the excesses of suffering which
externalises desire and engenders the feeling that nothing can be
done about the pain of the urge (self can not make-a-difference),
and excitement which implies externalisation of the object of
desire, experiencing a disembodiment of self from other.
In succumbing to temptations, the tendencies fail to show the
labour of transformation, the labour of making-a-difference. The
work of reformism and terrorism is not that of the revolutionary,
they do not display what is to be done. Although terrorism
appears to be the tendency most conscious of the need to do, the
terrorist merely enacts his wishes thereby reproducing the urge
in desire. Cn the one hand, the terrorist wants to be a god. He
wants to have (enact) his wishes. Cn the other hand, the
revolutionary shows his knowledge of the distinction between man
and god through his recognition of the place of labour. The
revolutionary knows that the desire to change requires the work
of transformative labour: man cannot just have his wishes.
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All the motion of reformism and terrorism is the attempt to make
a state. In seeking relief from urge, they seek the state of
rest. They seek the state of being there the action they take
now will be unnecessary (will satisfy their needs). Analytically
reformism and terrorism represent inaction. Terrorism and
reformism fail to see that desire necessitates constant,
continuous labour. If revolution is a struggle, then the
engagement of struggle is perpetual and ongoing.
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Section III
At this juncture it is appropriate to take stock of what v/e have
learned of Lenin's conception of the ralationship of theory to
practice, of language to speech at the early phase of its
development in his thought, ie in 'What Is to be Done?'
Firstly, the revolutionary is to be distinguished from its
extremes - reformism and terrorism - to the extent that it has a
stronger version of theory's place in relation to practice. Thus
far, however, theory is to be seen by Lenin as valuable in so far
as it represents a most' powerful practice. Lenin shows us the
power of theory as a mover - as a form of practice.
Secondly, we have argued that while reformism and terrorism
display an excessive relation to desire - they capitulate to urge
- the revolutionary shows his discipline (his struggle) by
moderating the excesses of his impulses. Now, if revolutionary
moderation is thoroughgoing, we have argued that the
revolutionary struggles not just with other, but also with self.
Thus revolutionary theory, in orienting to principle, sees the
futility of siezing any or every opportunity to act (in
contradistinction to the terrorist). In moderating his own
excesses, the revolutionary requires respect for the idea of
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patience. Now in Lenin's theorising in 'What Is to be Done?'
there is a partial recognition of the virtue of patience. For
example Lenin argues that it is particularly foolish for the
Pussian revolutionary movement to resort to acts of 'excitative
terror' because this gives the Tsarist regime 'carte blanche' for
an increase in repression. Thus patience is viewed here in a
technical sense, ie with respect to tactics. However what we
have to ask is does his subsequent theorising allow us to develop
respect for the idea of patience, rather than leave us with a
concrete or technical version.
If patience is integrated into revolutionary theory in a deep
sense (as we have argued it should be) then Lenin will allow us
to see patience as more than a technical feature of tactics. If
theory and practice are genuinely integrated, then rules
(tactics) can be changed, while preserving an orientation to
principle. Since patience is a feature of revolutionary theory,
then practice should embody that virtue. A failure to link
theory and practice will ultimately result in an im-patient, and
opportunistic practice. We shall be concerned to investigate
whether the development of Lenin's theorising respects the idea
of patience.
Having argued that patience is a virtue, we must further develop
the sense in which patience can be understood not just as one of
a number of virtues, but one which the revolutionary requires to
develop a particular awareness of. While patience is commonly
understood of as passivity, we have shown that it is not to be
confussed with inaction. Patience does something positive to
urges - it transforms urge into desire. Patience, then, requires
an educated actor. It implies the good of suffering. So what
does patience suffer? Patience suffers (transforms) the
temptation to do something (when tactically it may be possible to
do so) in the service of embodying a principle. What patience
displays is an all-round vision which respects action or practice
in a particular way. Patience is a virtue which helps us to
understand the distinction between timely or decisive action and
action which does not display these characteristics. The only
truly decisive intervention (revolutionary practice) is that
which is timely - neither late nor premature. Patience names the
suffering of the revolutionary actor whose all-round vision of
stages of development allows him to act decisively.
The idea of patience furthermore allows us to provide a link with
Marx's concept of universalism in revolution. Patience describes
the kind of learning necessary for the production of the
universal individual. An impatient or one-sided mode of learning
is displayed by the rebel whose version of educating himself is
to break a rule, yet remain ignorant of principle. The
revolutionary (all-sided) mode of self-education implies
suffering the temptations of conformity/deviance in favour of
learning how to be strong - learning how to violate a rule which
preserves principle. Patience is deeply the opposite of
passivity and quiescence. Patience requires the generative power
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of self-control and self-consciousness characteristic of the
universal individual. The universalism of the revolutionary is
not abstract or Utopian. Universalism is not a vision of
everyone becoming equally talented polymaths (though impatience
can convert universalism into overambition). Marx's slogan 'from
each according to ability' recognises an inequality of potential
talent. The idea of patience shows us that the all-roundedness
of universalism in revolution connotes the self-conscious,
self-controlled character of maturity. Patience works on
developing the potential of real as opposed to spurious
strengths. In so doing the revolutionary violates rule, not
wilfully or blindly, but in a way which preserves its orientation
to principle.
By the stage of "What Is to be Done?" Lenin has so far sought
only to distinguish actions which can or cannot lead to a siezure
of state power by revolutionaries. The task of learning the
virtue of patience - of integrating theory and practice - of




In this chapter we will be concerned to continue our analysis of
the development of Lenin's thought on revolution in terms of the
relationship of speech to language, theory to practice. The
dominant theme of this chapter is an investigation of this
development as it manifests itself in the relation of rule to
principle. There are two central texts which we shall consider
in detail. These are the immediately pre-revolutionary text, 1
'The State and Revolution' and the post-revolutionary text, 2
'Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder'. We begin by
considering the place of 'State and Revolution' in this process
of development.
It is a striking feature of almost all analyses of Lenin's work
that 'The State and Revolution' is regarded as a unique text, as
something special, even pivotal. What is the Character of this
uniqueness? In the rule-bound conception of revolution there is
a particular view of this uniqueness. A good example of the
rule-bound tradition's view of the place of 'The State and
Revolution' in Lenin's thought is given by Conquest 3
_i nn_
x wz.
"Coining when it does, it is one of the most
extraordinary and revealing of all his
writings. It is not (as much of his earlier
work had been) any sort of guide to political
tactics, but an expression of the most purely
Utopian and theoretical side of the Marxist
doctrine of society."
This version of 'State and Revolution' sees a fundamental
division between theory and practice. Lenin viewed as permanent
revolutionary (tactician) has become a temporary philosopher
(theorist). In the rule-bound conception, 'State and Revolution'
becomes less than intelligible since, for them, it has nothing to
say of rule (tactics). Therefore it is not so much that 'State
and Revolution' is seen as unique, as it is seen as a temporary
aberration. The strongest version of the 'aberration' view of
'State and Revolution' is provided by Kolakowski, 4 who argues
that
"State and Revolution' says nothing whatever
about the party."
Thus the technical version of Lenin sees 'State and Revolution'
as quixotic and problematical in that it supposedly has no
relationship to rule, nor to the main agency of
violating/recreating rule, ie the party.
The principled conception of revolution also sees 'The State and
Revolution' as unicrue. However the principled version sees this
uniqueness not as an aberration, nor fundamentally incompatible
with all his other work (ie not as hypocrisy). We see the
uniqueness of this text as the clearest highlighting of a tension
or ambivalence which is present throughout his work. 'State and
Revolution' brings into sharpest focus an issue of central
importance to the development of Lenin's theorising.
In order to situate 'State and Revolution' we must begin by
recognising a continuity of interest with his earlier work. What
Lenin is attempting in this work is a struggle with his
extremes-reformists ('opportunists' - exemplified by Kautsky) and
anarcho-terrorists. He argues that both extremes avoid a key
question - that of the State - which a revolutionary has to face
up to. While the revolutionary treats the question of the state
seriously, 'opportunists' and 'anarchists' shy away from the
implications of answering the question fully. What Lenin
articulates is a view that the revolutionary gives thorough-going
answers to the serious questions (ie the question of the state)
while the extremes stop short of a full answer. For Lenin, the
terrorist stops-short, in the sense that while he argues that the
state must be smashed, he has no answer to what should take the
place of the state. 5 In a similar way opportunism 6 argues
that state power should be siezed, but has no firm answer to the
question of what should succeed this situation (for Lenin, the
opportunists fear smashing the state even in the long run because
they have no developed view of what should replace the state).
It would be tempting to say here that what Lenin has sought to
demonstrate is the universal, or all-round character of a
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revolutionary attitude to the state as opposed to the one-sided
or partial view of opportunists and anarchists. However we ought
to restrain that temptation until we have evaluated the character
of Lenin's version of universalism. Critically (as we argue
below) this will involve questioning whether Lenin's thought is
congizant of the relevance of patience to universalism, of the
distinction between premature action and decisive intervention.
The long-view of 'State and Revolution' is that a socialist
society can only be achieved in Russia by a series of three
stages of development. Firstly, the bourgeois state must be
smashed. Secondly the bourgeois state is to be replaced by a
proletarian state (the 'dictatorship' of the proletariat).
Thirdly, with the consolidation of the revolution, and the
universalisation of production relationships, the state would
'wither away'. Thus there are two interlinked themes in this
process. Firstly the indispensability of a strongly disciplined
and centralised state apparatus used by the proletariat to
consolidate its leadership. Secondly the long term nature of
participation and organisation which would characterise socialist
society.
What provides the link between these two themes, and what
provides the motive power for the drive through the three stages
of development toward socialism is Lenin's view of universalism.
From the point of view of a principled account what is
significant about Lenin's discussion of universalism in 'State
and Revolution' is that it is an occasion for Lenin to directly
confront his relationship to Marx (and also Engels). The
argument Lenin puts forward is that capitalism has itself created
many of the pre-conditions for the transition to the
universal-man of the higher stages of socialist development.
Thus he argues.... 7
"Capitalist culture has created large-scale
production, factories, railways, the postal
service, telephones, etc., and on this basis
the great majority of the functions of the old
'state power' have become so simplified, and
can be reduced to such exceedingly simple
operations of registration, filing and
checking that they can be easily performed by
every literate person, can quite easily be
performed for ordinary 'workmen's wages', and
that these function can (and must) be stripped
of every shadow of privilege, of every
semblance of 'offical grandeur'.
One aspect of capitalist universalisation is then the
simplification and routinisation of the tasks of administration.
According to Lenin this simplification will, in the long run,
allow rule to become participative such that....8
"Under socialism, all will govern in turn, and
will soon become accustomed to no-one
governing."
If we recall Marx's discussion of alienated universalism within
capitalism, the most obvious reaction to Lenin's analysis is that
he is glossing Marx's discussion. There is little of the sense
of the force necessary for a dialectical (decisive) intervention
which is necessary to transform the distorted (negative)
universalism of capitalism into the genuine (positive)
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universalism of socialism, in Lenin's discussion.
Lenin is nevertheless sensitive to the charge that his analysis
is simplistic and Utopian. He makes this clear in the following
extract... .9
"We are not Utopians, we do not 'dream' of
dispensing at once with all administration,
with all subordination. These anarchist
dreams, based upon incomprehension of the
tasks of the proletarian dictatorship, are
totally alien to Marxism, and, as a matter of
fact, serve only to postpone the socialist
revolution until people are different. No, we
want the socialist revolution with people as
they are now, with people who cannot dispense
with subordination, control, and 'foremen and
accountants.'
So Lenin's reply to the charges of over-simplicity and Utopianism
is to say that the revolution will proceed in stages, and that it
is to be achieved with 'people as they are now'. However this
would be Utopian if 'people as they are now' ie the people of
Russia did not display the characteristics or pre-conditions for
a transition to universalism. In other words the big issue here
is one of prematurity. In beginning to investigate the issue of
0
whether Lenin integrates patience into his vision of
universalism, of whether he repects the distinction between
premature action and decisive intervention, we can consider the
following development of his argument in 'State and
Revolution'...10
"The development of capitalism, in turn,
creates the preconditions that enable really
'all' to take oart in the administration of
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the state. Some of these preconditions are:
universal literacy, which has already been
achieved in a number of the most advanced
capitalist countries, then the 'training and
disciplining' of millions of workers by the
huge, complex, socialised apparatus of the
postal service, railways, big factories,
large-scale commerce, banking, etc. etc.
Given these economic preconditions, it is
quite possible, after the overthrow of the
capitalisits and the bureaucrats, to proceed
immediately, overnight, to replace them in the
control over production and distribution, in
the work of keeping account of labour and
products, by the armed workers, by the whole
of the armed population."
The significance of this discussion is that it is really an
analysis of the conditions for a successful transition to
socialism, not in Russia at all, but in 'the most advanced
capitalist countries'. Furthermore, by his own admission, the
'backward' Russian proletariat (in relation to the proletariats
of Western Europe) fulfils none of the preconditions eg universal
literacy he mentions. *
In this section of the chapter we have made a small beginning to
conceiving of Lenin's theorising as premature. We develop this
concept by looking at the significance of prematurity as it
surfaces as an idea with respect to the tension and ambivalence
inherent in Lenin's theorising.
* Lenin's optimism in respect of 'backward' Russia is related to




At the beginning of this chapter we argued that a rule-bound
conception of revolution sees 'State and Revolution' as an
aberration in Lenin's thought. Furthermore, we saw that
Kolakowski charged that in 'State and Revolution' by contrast
with all the rest of Lenin's work, he has 'nothing whaatever to
say about the party'. The rule-bound reading of Lenin sees the
centrality of party in Lenin's thought as the dominant focus of
Lenin's analysis. This argument is developed to suggest that the
main difference between Marx and Lenin is that, to use the words
of E. H. Carr, we see in Lenin....11
"the substitution of party for class as the
motive force of revolution"
The 'substitution' argument is one which unites a broad range of
critics of Lenin, both Marxist and non-Marxist alike. Writers
such as Rosa Luxemburg argued that Lenin's emphasis upon the
centralisation of power in the party robbed the proletariat of
its initiative and independence. In the pre-revolutionary period
* Trotsky was to take this argument to its logical conclusion
* Trotsky eventually (prior to the October revolution) changed
his mind concerning the leading role of the party, and was
eventually to advocate the necessity of the party as the
'vanguard' of the proletariat.
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when he asserted that the result of this substitution would be
that...12
"...the organisation of the Party takes the
place of the party itself; the Central
Coinmittee takes the place of the organisation;
and finally the dictator takes the place of
the Central Committee."
We can begin to develop a principled account by recalling Section
I of this chapter where we saw that 'State and Revolution'
neither ignores the orocess of centralisation nor the place of
mass participation in revolution, but rather looks at the
relationship of one to the other. Kolakcwski is wrong when he
claims that 'State and Revolution' has 'nothing whatever to say
of the Party'. The party is referred to at various points as
'guide', 'teacher' and 'leader'. 'State and Revolution' is
concerned with the relationship between the twin forces of
centralisation (the leading role of the party) and participation
(mass involvement in administration via the agency of the
Soviets). In the principled account 'State and Revolution's
uniqueness is to be seen not as deviation, aberration nor
hypocrisy, but as the clearest possible focussing upon a tension
or ambivalence concerning the relationship of these two forces.
The tension between centralisation of party power and the
development of mass participation is referred to in Adam Ulam's
work. 13 Ulam indicates that there is an anarchistic
(participatory) element in Lenin's thought which is most
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articulately expressed in 'State and Revolution'. Lane's 14
work is the most highly-developed in this context. He points out
that, while Lenin saw the cetralised power of the party as
crucial, this centralised power was not conceived of as autocracy
in the sense that Lenin intended this power as leaving room for
the independent initiative (participation) of the masses. In
spite of this, Lane concedes 15 that while centralisation of
power was achieved, participation remained a programmatic
objective. This failure is something for which Lane has no
explanation. * For us, this is explainable in terms of a
tension between an engaged concept of centralisation and an
abstract concept of participation. The failure to transform the
abstraction of his concept of participation is a failure v/hich is
linked to his abstracted (premature) concept of universalism.
* Despite the fact that Lane has a conception of Lenin's
premature concept of revolution, he fails to connect this with




We ought now to consider what fuels the premature optimism of
'The State and Revolution'. The intellectual grounding of this
optimism in Lenin's perspective is to be traced to his theory of
the combined and uneven development of capitalism. This aspect
of Lenin's theorising is developed in two texts, namely 16 'The
Development of Capitalism in Russia' and 17 'Imperialism, the
Highest Stage of Capitalism'.
There are two principal aspects of the process of development of
capitalism internationally for Lenin. In the first place,
capitalism develops internationally as an integrated system.
Secondly the rate of development of capitalist societies is
variable or uneven, producing 'advanced' and 'retarded'
capitalisms. This development occurs in a period when the
advanced capitalisms generate empires which they exploit as
sources of cheap raw materials and new markets. The development
of these forces has certain consequences for the relationship
between capitalist classes and various national proletariats. In
the advanced capitalist societies, the 'super-profits' gained
from imperial expansion allow the potential for capital to bribe
or buy-off their proletariats (or more accurately the leaders of
the organised sectors of the proletariat - the trade union
leadership) of these advanced societies. Capitalism's
development in Russia is however retarded and it does not develop
a strong domestic bourgeoisie. Furthermore, while the retarded
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development of capitalism in Russia creates a minority
proletariat, the vestiges of a quasi-feudal social structure are
to be found in both the peasantry (which constitutes by far the
majority of the population before, during and for many years
after the October Revolution) and a Tsarist monarchy which clung
to political power. Socially and economically, Russia was
backward, but most importantly for Lenin, this backward society
was politically unstable. This political instability was not due
to the strength of the fledgling proletariat, but to the weakness
of the Russian bourgeoisie combined with the inflexibility of the
Russian Tsardom.
For Lenin the most important implication of the theory of
combined and uneven development is the claim that the chain of
capitalist societies can be 'smashed at its weakest link' ie in
Russia. In seeking to analyse this version of revolution we
ought to recall certain fundamental differences between a
principled and a rule-bound conceptionn of revolution in relation
to the making of the first revolution.
In the principled account we argued that Marx saw revolution as
orienting to principle, as the development of man's universal
essence. The first revolution is crucial in terms of orientation
to principle. Not any beginning will suffice in the conception
of revolution as orientation to principle, only a beginning which
can lead to the dialectical transformation of man's universal
potential. This is the root of Marx's view that the revolution,
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to be successful, had to involve a transformation of one of the
most advanced capitalist societies where the (albeit distorted)
forms of universalism had already begun to have been developed.
As we saw in Chapter II, Marx only considered Russia as a society
which might aid the process of revolution where it mattered - in
the advanced societies with the most advanced proletariats.
In the rule-bound conception, revolution as a process is confused
with the achievement of an event - the siezure of state power.
Here, any beginning will do - the nature of society initiating
the process is of, at best, peripheral importance. Siezure of
any favourable opportunity to snatch (political) power is the
keynote. Success is understood of in terms of the ability to
hold on to (political) power, rather than orientation to the
principle of which revolution is an expression.
At first sight, the theory of uneven development seems to be
different from the rule-bound conception of revolution in the
sense that uneven development does have a conception of a likely
and desirable society for the first revolution ie a society
(weakest link) like Russia. However this choice is informed not
by principle (which would consider how fruitful a society is for
the development of universal/socialist man) but by primarily
political considerations. Russia is a society which presents
opportunities ,for the siezure of state power because of the
weakness of its bourgeoisie and the inflexibility of Tsardom in
transition. As we saw in Chapter 2 Marx argued against the
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Jacobin error of attempting to force through a political
revolution (even where tactically this is possible - even where
it is possible to sieze state power) when the social conditions
do not permit of a genuine (universal) transformation. Lenin's
theory of uneven development amounts to an advocacy of
establishing what is, and what he admits is, a 'backward'
proletariat in the vanguard of world revolution. *
'State and Revolution', informed as it is by Lenin's theory of
uneven development, represents on the one hand a development of
his view of tactics and on the other hand an ambivalent vision of
revolution - a vision flawed by its prematurity. In one sense,
'State and Revolution' is a development upon 'What is to be
Done?'. While 'What is to be Done?' establishes appropriate
tactics for (establishing an organisation capable of) siezing
state power, 'State and Revolution' indicates appropriate tactics
for both siezing and holding on to state power. It is not so
much that 'State and Revolution' orients to revolution in terms
* This is the case, even if we accept the caveat which Lenin
makes, that this will only 'temporarily' be the case, ie that the
centre of revolutionary gravity could be moved to an advanced
society. The view that the Russian Revolution could 'spark'
revolutions in the advanced capitalist world is a feature of this
perspective to which we return below.
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of tactics rather than principle, as much 'State and Revolution'
demonstrates that Lenin has learned something about tactics, but
not the best tactics (not tactics which can lead to the
development of the all-round man required in Marx's vision), ie
tactics which can help him orient to principle). Lenin's view of
revolution is flawed by its inability to recognise the
distinction between premature action and decisive intervention.
Theory becomes detached from practice and speech becomes
unconscious of its indebtedness to theory. We now examine the
character of Lenin's prematurity in relation to universalism.
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Section IV
In chapter one we saw that Marx had a vision of a universal
(revolutionary) actor. One aspect of the universal actor, we
recall, is that he is conceived of as a conscious and
self-responsible being. The revolutionary actor is seen as one
who initiates and controls his relationship to history. The
(self-responsible) activism of the revolutionary is echoed in
Lenin's discussion of the relation of revolutionary to reformist
in 'What is to be Done?'. In that early text Lenin argues that
the revolutionary engages (acts self-resonsibly upon) his
environment, while the reformist allows environment to rule him.
Thus the revolutionary seeks to shape history while the reformist
accommodates himself within the pressure of its flow.
Having initiated the October Revolution, Lenin's response to his
critics is particularly revealing. He claims....18
"...our efforts....have been justified. They
have turned out not to be an adventure..., but
a necessary transition to the international
revolution, through which a country must pass
which has been placed in a position of
leadership in spite of its undeveloped and
backward state."
This reply to his critics is interesting not so much in its
indication of the Russian Revolution's dependence upon an
immediately ensuing international (European) revolution, which is
discussed below, as its conception of what the action of the
Russian Revolution itself represents. To say that the Russian
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proletariat has 'been placed in a position of leadership' is to
view the revolutionary actor as being ruled by conditions
(favourable) 'in spite of its underdeveloped and backward state'.
This is to see the rule of conditions as decisive and the
development of the proletariat as secondary. A principled
account, on the contrary, sees the self-responsibility (activism)
of the revolutionary as being dependent upon maturity,
development and progressiveness. To take an opportunity, even
where conditions rule favourably, _is premature 'adventurism', if
the motive force (the proletariat) has not generated the
self-education to transform opportunity into a genuine
(universal) achievement. In short, to see maturity as secondary
is to advocate prematurity, to invite the ultimate rule of
conditions.
In Lenin's later work (see especially the evaluation of 'Left
Wing Communism - An Infantile Disorder) there is a painful and
only partially developed recognition of the prematurity of his
theorising. As we indicated in section one of this chapter,
Lenin presents an optimistically premature vision of the
development of universal (socialist) man in State and revolution.
We may remember that he argued that capitalist culture had
'simplified' the tasks of administration to such an extent that
they 'could be performed by every literate person', such that, in
the long run, 'really all' could participate in the process of
rule. As early as 1918, he was to see that this was to
over-anticipate what could be achieved....19
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"Our work of organising proletarian accounting
and control has obviously....lagged behind the
work of directly expropriating the
expropriators....The art of administration is
not an art that one is born to, it is acquired
by experience....Without the guidance of
specialists in the various fields of
knowledge, technology and experience, the
transition to socialism will be
impossible....Because of the indispensability
of the specialists we have had to resort to
the old bourgeois method and to agree to pay a
very high price for the 'services' of the
biggest bourgeois specialists. Clearly, such
a measure is a compromise, a departure from
the principles of the Paris Commune...a step
backward on the part of our Socialist Soviet
state power, which from the very outset
proclaimed and pursued the policy of reducing
high level salaries to the level of the wages
of the average worker."
The 'step backwards' is only peripherally related to a reliance
upon bourgeois methods of payment, ie a reinstatement of income
inequality. Essentially this step-backwards indicates that one
of the universal skills - 'the art of administration' has not
been acquired by the experience of the Russian proletariat.
Prematurity results in dependence not upon universal, but upon
one-sided actors - specialists.
One feature of Lenin's theorising which appears to establish a
commonality with Marx is the view that universalism necessitates
revolution be seen as irrevocably international rather than
national in its nature. This stress upon internationalism is
something we can trace throughout the development of Lenin's
work. We have seen (chapter 3) that the early work 'What is to
be Done?' emphasised the indispensability of revolution moving
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beyond national boundaries, and how this theme is developed in
'State and Revolution'. In the post-revolutionary period this
insistence becomes even more pronounced. In 1918, Lenin argues
against Kautsky that.... 20
"To count on a European revolution is
obligatory for a Marxist."
There is, therefore, no question that Lenin did understand that a
revolution in Europe, ie in an advanced society, was necessary,
if communism was to be firmly established at all. However, if we
wish to investigate Lenin's relation to Marx's theorising, the
really important question is not the abstract question - did they
share a common interest in internationalism? - but the question
did they share a common view of the movement from national to
international in revolution?, ie does Lenin have a principled
conception of the movement from partial (national) to universal
(international)?.
In Lenin, the transitional movement of revolution is analysed
within his theory of uneven development. There are two aspects
concerning the theorisation of transition in this perspective.
The first aspect concerns the possibility of Russia 'skipping a
stage of development'. Russia can take the lead by skipping a
capitalistic phase of development. There is no conception of
there either being a cost to be paid for this leap, nor of the
leap itself being premature. In the later work, the prematurity
of the leap is conceded. Lenin summarises the course of the
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Russian revolution in 1921 by saying....21
"Borne along on the crest of a wave of
enthusiasm...we reckoned...on being able to
organise the state production and state
distribution of products on communist lines in
a small peasant country by order of the
proletarian state. Experience proved that we
were wrong. It transpires that a number of
transitional stages are necessary - state
capitalism and socialism in order to prepare
by many years of effort for the transition to
communism.. .We must first set to work in this
small peasant country to build solid little
gangways to socialism by way of state
capitalism. Otherwise we shall never get to
conmunism: we will never bring these scores
of millions of people to communism. That is
what experience, what the objective course of
development of the revolution has taught us.
Skipping a stage is, therefore, seen for what it is -
prematurity. Capitalism has not been skipped at all, as it is
recognised that a period of 'state' capitalism is required to
build the conditions for transition to socialism and communism.
The second aspect of the version of transition developed in the
theory of uneven development is the notion that the Russian
revolution can 'spark' an international revolution, ie
revolutions in Western Europe. New, the notion that the Russian
revolution can 'spark' an international revolution is somewhat
unusual. In Lenin, it was intended to suggest that a national
revolution (Russia) could ignite an already potentially explosive
mixture (European states). However, this form of analysis is
quite close to that which he repeatedly seeks to criticise - the
'spontaneity' of the anarchists. It is almost as though the
Russian revolution is being seen as mechanically setting off a
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chain reaction. Perhaps this is to develop too negative a view
of Lenin if what we have said is that he presents transition
(learning) as stimulus - response.
A more positive and developed view of Lenin's concept of
transition would ask of him, how does the theory of uneven
development expect to inspire the international proletariat? Now
we should ask what is Lenin's concept of the Russian revolution's
lesson/inspiration? Here we may recall a passage 22 in which
Lenin talks of this.
"...the Russian proletariat can win a second
victory. The cause is no longer hopless. The
second victory will be the socialist victory
in Europe. The European workers will show us
'how to do it', and then, in conjunction with
them, we shall bring about a socialist
revolution."
Inspiration is conceived of as example. One (national)
proletariat serves as an example for another. The Russian
proletariat inspires the European proletariat and vice versa. We
must now, however, consider what kind of an example does the
Russian revolution serve to provide by way of a 'spark', by way
of inspiration? To serve as a genuine exemplar, ie as an
inspiration, any example would not do. As we here begin to see,
the theory of uneven development is a bad example in that it does
not teach or exemplify the fundamental difference between
premature action and timely intervention. The theory of uneven
development places the most backward proletariat in the vanguard.
Premature action forces one national proletariat to stand alone.
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Instead of transition, prematurity invites isolation and
stagnation: instead of progression it invites regression. In
short, a bad example serves as no inspiration.
What we have been seeking to investigate is the cost to
universalism of ignoring the virtue of patience. Our principled
reading of Marx shows that it is sometimes necessary to take the
long road to revolution even when the short route is tempting (a
lesson which some versions of modernism seem to have learned -
see Chapter 7). We may recall from Chapter 2 Marx's
interpretation of the failings of Jacobin prematurity - the folly
of forcing through a revolution when the political opportunity to
sieze state power is present, but the social conditions are
inappropriate for a transition to universalism. Lenin failed to
learn this lesson, and both advocated and produced a premature
revolution. We argued in Chapters one and two that the movement
of the proletariat towards universalism was the decisive force
bringing about revolution. The development of a universal
consciousness and culture amongst the proletariat is a stage
which cannot be 'skipped'. Furthermore, the development of this
aspect of universalism, the all-round consciousness and culture
of the proletariat, is something (even if it develops in
different ways in various societies) which does not occur
spontaneously, mechanically nor inevitably. This development
cannot be presupposed nor forced forward prematurely. In common
with all forms of learning this development requires to be
inspired by nothing short of the best examples for its direction.
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Bearing this in mind, consider the following statement made by
Lenin in the post-revolutionary period....23 (in one of his last
articles)
"...we lack sufficinet civilisation to enable
us to pass straight on to Socialism, although
we have the political requisites."
Lenin, then, recognises that his prematurity has left us with a
bad, ie underdeveloped, 'uncivilised' example. Nonetheless,
though a bad example cannot inspire, it is something we can begin
to learn from (as we see below with respect to 'Left-Wing
Communism - An Infantile Disorder').
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Section V
The focus of our analysis has been fixed upon Lenin's failure to
distinguish premature action from decisive intervention. There
are numerous accounts of Lenin which attempt to provide a version
of his prematurity (Carr 24 and Pethybridge 25 come to mind
here). However, the most articulate and developed reading of
Lenin's prematurity is provided by Lane 26.
Lane attempts to utilise a modification 27 of Talcott Parsons'
theory of the social system to analyse Lenin's attempt to
institute a communist revolution in Russia in 1917. While it
would be unwise to attempt any kind of detailed exposition of
Parsons, for the purposes of this discussion we can recall the
bacis elements of Parsons' characterisation. Parsons views the
social system as being composed of four functionally
inter-related sub-systems (the so-called A G I L model), the
Adaptive sub-system (A), the Goal-Attainment sub-system (G), the
Integrative sub-system (I) , and the Pattern-Maintenance
sub-system (L). Each sub-system is involved in reciprocal
exchange transactions with other sub-systems, and these
transactions 'balance' such that the social-system as a whole
tends towards equilibrium.
Lane's version of Lenin's prematurity argues that it was
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impossible to build socialism in Russia in 1917 because the
structural 'supports' - or functional pre-requisites - necessary
for socialism did not exist. Thus there was no sufficient 'stock
of socialist personalities' (sub-system 'L') nor 'a developed and
dominant working-class' (sub-system 'I' as modified by Lane - cf
note 27), nor 'an advanced political system' (sub-system 'G'),
nor finally 'an equivalently developed economy' (sub-system 'A').
The interchanges between the sub-systems were not reciprocal, and
thus the system as a whole could not exist in equilibrium.
How are we to respond to Lane's reading? Firstly we ought to
recognise an irony of which Lane appears to be ignorant. Lane's
analysis is intended to present a case for Lenin to be regarded
as an important (hitherto 'unsung' - at least by
philosophers/sociologists) - social theorist. Yet the impact of
Lane's account 28 is to show not what social theory can learn
from Lenin, but what Lenin can learn from social theory
(Parsons). However we have a different conception of what Lenin
can learn from social theory. While, for Lane, Lenin's
prematurity is to be understood as inappropriate strategy in
relation to the opportunities afforded by (an underdeveloped)
social structure, we say Lenin's prematurity is an inability to
orient to principle universally. Our account sees Lenin's
deficiency as an inability to draw the distinction, which informs
the principled reading of Marx, between decisive intervention and
premature action.
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Secondly, our relationship to Lane's reading can be exemplified
if we consider the following extract from his work where he is
attempting to summarise the lessons we should learn from
Leninism... .29
"Finally, a third objective of this approach
is to point to the structural limitations of
revolution. Men do not make their history as
they please, but under constraints given by
the level of productive forces, by the
;stocks' of personality with given class
orientations and the cultural conditions they
inherit. Many explanations of the
'degeneration' of the Soviet Union emphasise
'external' constraints - the hostile
capitalist world framework. These factors are
no doubt important, but much more emphasis
must be placed on other conditioning factors
if the impact and course of revolutionary
seizures of power are to be understood.
Lane poses the question of 'degeneration' in terms of either the
popular view that this is to be accounted for in terms of
'external' constraints (eg the 'capitalist encirclement'
argument), ie external to the Russian social system, or Lane's
own view, that this degeneration is related to the internal
structure of that system. In our view neither Lane's
perspective, nor the alternative view are adequate. We see
revolution as orientation to principle in a universal sense.
Each of the perspectives referred to by Lane is one-sided whereas
a universal, or all-sided, perspective, looks at the relationship
of the external to the internal. We argue that Lenin's failure
is a failure to orient to principle universally. Lenin's version
of the internationalist aspect of revolutionary universalism -
the theory of uneven development - is flawed. In Lenin the
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internal (Russia) is incapable of relating to (inspiring) the
external (other societies, ie especially the societies of Western
Europe).
Thirdly, we ought to consider Lane's view that one of the
'achievements' of Lenin is the shift in focus of revolutionaries
from the advanced societies to the developing societies. This is
emphasised in the following way....30
"Lenin emphasised the capitalist process on a
world scale. In considering the impact of the
advanced countries on others he turned the
centre of gravity in Marxist thought from
Europe to the colonial and oppressed peoples;
and unlike the introspective, impotent and
pessimistic development of most Marxist
thought in Western Europe it opened up a new
perspective on socialism and revolutionary
change in the Third World."
Lane's view here is fundamentally contradictory. While he
charges Western European Marxists with introversion, it is
precisely introversion which he argues Lenin lacks. Lane's use
of Parsons is an attempt to teach Lenin that he was not
sufficiently conscious of the internal structure of his own
society. Again Lane leaves us with an unpalatable choice between
introversion or extraversion. The principled version of
revolution requires neither an introverted not an extraverted
actor; each is equally partial. In place of these extremes the
principled version advocates the mature, all-round actor. For us
there is a difference between 'advocating the revolution on a
world scale', ie the theory of uneven development, and an
understanding of revolution as orientation to principle in a
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universal way. Lane's typification of the extraverted actor
(Lenin) is probably apt in the sense that the extravert could be
expected to act prematurely. We understand revolution not as the
premature action of the extravert who wants to run before he can
walk, nor the action of the introvert who is reluctant to
intervene and acts late, if at all. The only action which can be
called revolutionary is the timely (neither premature nor late)
intervention of the decisive actor. Decisive intervention can
only be represented by the mature or universally conscious actor.
The fourth and final aspect of our relationship to Lane concerns
his reading of Parsons. While we may agree with Lane that
Parsons is an important contemporary theorist who is unjustly
disdained by some sectors of the sociological community, this
does not mean that we share his reading of Parsons. Lane's
imaginative and insightful account seeks to show the relevance of
Parsons' perspective, both to an understanding of the prematurity
of Lenin's October revolution, and to the 'functional
pre-requisites' for the successful development of a socialist
society. However, what Lane fails to pay attention to is the
importance of the view developed by Parsons himself concerning
not just the actual development of communism from Leninism
through Stalinism to the present day but also the possibility of
the principles of Marxism ever being embodied in a concrete
social system. Parsons' attitude to Marxism qua Marxism is
instructive...31
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"There are strong forces in all social systems
making for commitment to 'Utopian' patterns of
value-orientation, that is, patterns which are
incompatible with the known conditions of
effective long-run institutionalisation. Thus
it seems fair to say that in contemporary
society advocacy of complete abolition of the
family, of absolute egalitarianism or of
absolute repudiation of coercion, can be
placed in this category."
For Parsons, 'complete abolition of the family', 'absolute
egalitarianism' and 'absolute repudiation of coercion' are the
value-patterns which are to characterise the actor in a communist
social system. Thus, irrespective of the prematurity of the
October revolution, Parsons finds it difficult to conceive of a
social system organised around socialist values (or what he reads
as socialist values) being realisable 'in the long run'. Parsons
is careful not to make a final judgement on this matter, but the
best that can be said is that he is highly sceptical of the
search for the 'functional alternatives' necessary to sustain a
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(genuinely) socialist systems. In our reading, * Parsons
transforms the universalism of Marx into its extreme, ie into
absolutism, or totalitarianism. Parsons' view is linked to the
'perfectability of man' attitude to socialism. While Parsons
regards Marxism as eliding the distinction between man and an
absolute or total being, ie god, we argue that Marxism requires
respect for that distinction. In the principled account,
'universal man' is not 'perfect' but is conceived of as mature,
developed, and an 'all-round' being.
* I am not here offering anything which aspires to a serious
attempt at a fully-blown reading of Parsons which lies outside of
the scope of this analysis.
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Section VI
The problem of prematurity is partially recognised and
elliptically confronted in the later, post-revolutionary phase of
Lenin's writing. 'Left-Wing Communism - An Infantile Disorder'
32 occupies an important position with respect to this partial
recognition. I shall seek to show that this text is a belated
call for the viture of patience in respect of the self-education
of the proletariat.
One of the primary concerns of Lenin, in this text, is to
evaluate the necessity of compromise. This is accomplished by
investigating the relationship between good and bad compromises.
A 'bad' conception of compromise is one which permits of
compromises on any and every issue. Thus an 'opportunist' has a
'bad' conception of compromise because he is willing to
compromise on everything, ie even on issues of principle.
However, there is a second, and equally one-sided view of
compromise which rejects all compromises on any issue. In
opposing/transforming the extremes of compromise is everything
and compromise is nothing, Lenin attempts to see the place of
compromise, ie to investigate the good of compromise.
Essentially, Lenin seeks to distinguish between permissible and
necessary compromises (compromises with respect to tactics) and
illegitimate and undesirable compromises (compromises on
principle).
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Lenin sees the impatience of the 'left-wing' communist who is
unwilling to make any compromise as the greatest danger to the
development of revolution internationally. This tendency is to
be viewed in the following way: 38
"The conclusion is clear: to reject
compromises 'on principle', to reject the
admissibility of compromises in general, no
matter of what kind, is childishness, which it
is difficult even to take seriously."
Thus, at the point of development in his theorising, when he
finds it necessary to review the history of (his) revolution, the
big issue is seen as the problem of the lack of patience of the
child. What Lenin attempts to do in 'Left-Wing Communism' is to
exemplify the work - the patience - which is necessary to
transform the impetuous one-sidedness of the child into the
all-round maturity of the adult. This text then is really
concerned with the necessity of education. The process concerned
is the unavoidable lengthy self-education of the proletariat.
What the 'left-wing' communist lacks is patience. He fails to
understand the need to recognise the difference between a
developed and an underdevloped proletariat. The left-wing
communist's basic mistake is to treat the child (underdeveloped
proletariat) as though he were an adult (mature proletariat). A
genuine revolutionary recognises that tactics have to be changed
(compromises made) depending upon the level of development of the
proletariat. Maturity, or all-round development, cannot be
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assumed, it has to be produced.
We must consider, then, what is the character of the patience
required to educate the proletariat? Firstly, the revolutionary
has to be a timely actor, in the sense that he is conscious of
the stage of development of the proletariat. Thus 34
"To attempt in practice today to anticipate
this future result of a fully developed, fully
stabilised and formed, fully expanded and
mature Communism would be like trying to teach
higher mathematics to a four-year-old child."
Secondly, the revolutionary has to be aware of the necessity of
and desirability of stages of development. Thus the
'backwardness' of the child or the youth in relation to the adult
is both inevitable and positive. For the left-wing communist
backwardness is something entirely negative, to be rejected, eg
as with respect to their attitude to 'reactionariness' in trade
unions at phases in their development. Consider Lenin's attitude
to youth. The youth is possessed of passionate qualities, of the
desire to make a beginning. Youth's vision is however partial,
and requires the kind of moderation which can preserve the origin
of the youth's passion. This is clarified with respect to
Lenin's view of the revolutionary movement in Scotland. 35
"This expresses excellently the temper and
point of view of young Communists. This
temper is highly gratifying and valuable; we
must learn to value it and support it, for
without it, it would be hopeless to expect the
victory of the proletarian revolution in Great
Britain, or in any other country for that
matter. People who can give expression to
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this temper of the masses, who can rouse such
a temper (which is very often dormant,
unrealised and unaroused) among the masses,
must be valued and every assistance must be
given them. And at the same time we must
openly and frankly tell them that temper alone
is not enough to lead the masses in a great
revolutionary struggle, and that such and such
mistakes that very loyal adherents of the
cause of the revolution are about to commit,
or are committing, may damage the cause of the
revolution."
So youthfulness is to be neither rejected nor ignored, but
transformed and developed. The youth requires training to
harness his passion, ie to make desire serve him rather than vice
versa. In this context youth requires the patience to learn the
strengths of his enemy as a preliminary to confronting him.
Youth has to suffer the temptation of (premature) action in order
to become strong enough to act decisively.
Thirdly, patience teaches the revolutionary the necessity of
developing an engaged rather than an abstracted relationship to
conditions. The adolescent displays an abstracted relation to
conditions through his impetuousness. Impetuousness, while it
correctly sees that self can be a force, presents an unmoderated
version of self which is detached from conditions. Patience
teaches youth that decisive (really forceful) action requires a
version of self which is engaged with other (conditions). Self
is a force, yet self exists only in relationship with other
forces. Thus, in order to change the world, self also has to
change. Self has to flex itself in relation to other if
principle is to be enacted - if a revolution is to be created.
Patience teaches the revolutionary that tactics must be flexible
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in relation to the conditions in the conception of revolution as
orientation to principle.
'Left-Wing Communism - An Infantile Disorder' demonstrates that
Lenin has begun to consider the place of patience, and that he is
aware of the necessity of learning the lessons of the first (his)
revolution. There is a glimmer of recognition of his own
prematurity when he acknowledges that 36
" it was easy for Russia, in the specific,
historically very unique situation of 1917, to
start the socialist revolution, but it will be
more difficult for Russia than for the
European countries to continue the revolution
and bring it to its consummation."
However if we genuinely learn the virtue of patience, then we
acknowledge that not only do others have to learn from our
experience (ie Western Europeans, North Americans learning from
the experience of the Bolshevik revolution) but essentially that
the initiator acknowledges and learns from his own mistakes. We
can begin to see that this text (Left-wing Communism) does not
represent more than a partially developed recognition of the need
for patience if we consider the following....37
"That is why it will be more difficult for
Western Europe to start a socialist revolution
than it was for us. To attempt to
'circumvent' this difficulty by 'skipping' the
difficult job of utilising reactionary
parliaments for revolutionary purposes is
absolutely childish."
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The irony of this observation lies in the fact that this fails to
recognise that Lenin's prematurity itself amounted to
'circumventing a difficult job'. The theory of uneven
development does indeed itself amount to a rationalisation for
'skipping' a difficult job, ie a stage of development.
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Section VII
To conclude this chapter it is appropriate to gather together
what we have learned of Lenin's version of the relationship of
speech to language, theory to practice, and to consider not just
the origins of this analysis, but also its consequences.
We have attempted to trace Lenin's relationship to his tradition.
We can develop this by considering the following extract where
Lenin attempts to encapsulate the meaning of Marxism 38
"There is no trace of an attempt on Marx's
part to make up a Utopia, to indulge in idle
guess-work about what cannot be known. Marx
treated the question of communism in the same
way as a naturalist would treat the question
of the development of, say, a new biological
variety, once he knew that it had originated
in such and such a way and was changing in
such and such a definite direction."
Thus, for Lenin, there are only two choices, utopianism and
science. This reading of theory (Marx) displays a tendency to
transform theory into a method (a method which can be applied to
any topic). However, the problem of method is that it risks
forgetting theory's (Marx's) vision. Converting theory into
method fails to preserve what inspired Marx's analysis. To see
Marxism as method is to (see?) speech as soul-less - to see
theory as uncentred or spurious. Lenin thus courts the
possibility of producing speech which cannot recapture that for
the sake of which it speaks - nihilistic theorising.
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One way to focus upon Lenin's tendency to transform theory
(marxism) into method is to consider his well-known advocacy of
'Scientific Management' in the post-revolutionary period.
'Scientific Management' refers to the body of ideas developed by
the American work-study engineer, Frederick Taylor, hence the
synonym 'Taylorism'. Taylorism combined an analysis of
ergonomics with a theory of management - the linking of wages to
individual rates of production. Lenin called Taylorism 'the last
word in capitalism' and argued that....39
"..its greatest scientific achievements (lie)
in the field of analysing mechanical motions
during work, in the elimination of superfluous
and awkward motions, in the working out of
correct methods of work, and in the
introduction of the best system of accounting
and control, etc."
If we evaluate Lenin's views here in the context of the
transformation of Marxism into method - into a set of rules,
where Marxism 'allies itself with the most progressive methods
available' we can begin to investigate his problem. We have
argued above (Chapter 3) that a 'good' rule is one which enables
us to embody or enact principle. What, then, does Lenin's
attitude to 'Scientific Management' tell us of his conception of
the relation of rule to principle, of speech to language? Does
Taylorism embody (the spirit of) principle (Marxism) or does it
violate principle? The answer to this question can only be that
Taylorism violates principle decisively. If we return to Marx's
view of man (see Chapter 1) as a universal producer - the
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inspiration of Marx's theorising - we can see that there are a
number of respects in which 'Taylorism' is an explicit violation
of Marx's vision of man.
1. While the actor in Marx's vision of man is seen as
an oriented, ie other-oriented, or SOCIAL being,
Taylorism views the worker in explicilty
individualistic terms. This is reflected in
Tylor's view of an appropriate wages system
necessitating individual wages being directly tied
to individual rate of production. The worker is
treated as though he exists in a social vacuum by
this perspective.
2. While the actor in Marx's vision is conceived of
as an all-round or universal producer, Taylorism
insists upon the maximum degree of specialisation,
or fragmentation, of work.
3. While Marx views man the producer as a conscious,
self-creative, self-reflective being who initiates
and controls his history, Taylorism advocates that
the initiative and self-control of the worker's
activity be ceded to specialists - managers,
engineers and economists. Taylorism minimises the
extent to which the worker can control the work
process.
Lenin's views here indicate that rule has become detached from
principle in his theorising. By offering science as the only
alternative to utopianism, Lenin has forgotten the force of
Marx's vision which shows us a universal view of man which is not
abstract (Utopian).
-140-
We can further develop our investigation of Lenin's concept of
the relation of theory to practice when we consider his
'Philosophical Notebooks' where he argues that....40
"Practice is higher than theoretical
knowledge, for it has....the dignity
of...immediate actuality."
So what theory lacks in relation to practice is immediacy. If,
as we recalled in Chapter 3, 'there can be no revolutionary
movement without revolutionary theory', then Lenin's theorising
must be seen as an attempt to remedy its lack of immediacy, ie to
make his theory represent a powerful practice. That Lenin should
argue that the international revolution would be 'sparked' by the
Russian revolution goes further to underscore the importance of
immediacy. However we must recall firstly that immediate action
is not to be confused with decisive intervention. An immediate
or spontaneous response cannot guarantee a real change.
Secondly, immediacy resonates with the kind of spontaneity which
Lenin so roundly criticised in terrorism and reformism.
Significantly immediacy as a criterion would tend to indicate a
preference for premature over timely action, since timely or
decisive intervention requires us to restrain the temptation of
the youth to make a spontaneous response.
Lenin's theorising has thus disengaged practice from theory. He
has a disembodied conception of practice, in the sense that
practice can no longer embody principle. We might then consider
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what are the consequences of detaching theory and practice.
There are two likely extremes given this disembodiment, this
/ »
\ »
failure to embody principle universally in practice. Firstly,
practice could be confused with (taken to equal) theory. In this
case? Stalin rule is confused with principle, is taken to equal
principle. Here rule is re-established in an unprincipled sense.
(This is obliquely grasped by Parsons who argues in 'The Social
System' 41 that Stalin represents the re-equilibration of
communism at the cost of socialist values.) The second extreme
(Trotsky) is the attempt to re-assert principle. This risks the
fetishisation of principle. Here the attempt to recapture
principle is likely to be abstracted, ie risks a Utopian
conception of universalism. Marx's vision of a revolutionary
movement which can be universal without being abstract is off the





In this chapter we shall be investigating the relationship of
Stalin and Trotsky to Lenin's redirection of Marx's principled
concept of revolution. In the preceding two chapters we have
argued that Lenin has detached theory (principle) from practice
(rule). This detachment, or disembodiment, is related to the
prematurity of Lenin's perspective upon revolution. While Lenin
acknowledged, with Marx, that the revolution had to be
international in its character if principle was to be embodied
universally, Lenin's theorising (the idea of the uneven
development of capitalism) failed to integrate the particular
(the Russian revolution) within the universal (the international
revolution). Lenin's prematurity thus made likely a further
bifurcation between elements which belong together in (Marx's)
principled account - the particular and universal moments in the
revolutionary process.
We shall argue that there are two extremes, two possibilities
dialectically related to the movement Lenin has created within
the revolutionary tradition.
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Firstly, (STALIN) rule, having become detached from principle,
could be confused with principle. Here rule is taken to be
equivalent to principle. As we shall see this version of
revolution converts principle into a dogma. This view represents
a particularisation of Marx's universal perspective upon
revolution.
Secondly, while Marx's conception of principle was an engaged and
dialectical one, Lenin's detachment of principle from rule
produces the possibility of an abstracted conception of
universalism (Trotsky). Here principle tends to become
fetishised. This version appears closer to the principled
tradition, yet the abstraction of its concept of universalism
tends towards the Utopian.
Both extremes are dialectically interconnected to Lenin's
prematurity. Each presents a different (and flawed) resolution
of Lenin's dis-integration of the particular and the universal in
revolution. Stalin tends towards particularism and Trotsky
towards an abstracted universalism.
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Section II
We commence our investigation of Stalin's relationship to the
revolutionary tradition by considering how this is viewed in the
extant literature. One striking feature of much of this
literature is that it tends to focus almost exclusively upon
Stalin's relationship to Lenin, and largely ignores Stalin's
relationship to Marx. (This point is of significance when we
come to consider the difference between a principled account and
conventional accounts of Stalin (see Section III of this
chapter). Marx is neutralised as a significant figure in
Stalin's tradition. This can be seen when we note that where
Marx is mentioned, it is within the context of the euphemistic
concept of 'Marxism-Leninism' which actually refers not to Marx
at all, but to Lenin's version of Marx.
While the literature evaluating Stalin's place in the
revolutionary tradition is extensive 1 and varied in its
assessment, all tend to concentrate on the extent to which Stalin
represents continuity or discontinuity with respect to Lenin.
Concretely, almost all versions recognise both continuities and
discontinuities with respect to detailed aspects of policy.
However what I am concerned with here is the extent to which
these interpretations view Stalin as representing a continuity or
discontinuity with the principle of Lenin's theorising.
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The continuity version of Stalin's relationship to Lenin's
theorising unifies writers who might be thought otherwise to
represent diverse political positions. Both critics of
'totalitarianism' and Stalinists (including the new apologists
for Stalin such as Elleinstein) are represented within this view.
A 'totalitarian' view of Lenin and Stalin argues that Stalin
simply extended what is originally attributable to Lenin. Here
Lenin is seen as having a repressive rather than a liberatory
concept of universalism which inevitably degenerates into total
control rather than total liberation of the people. Kolakowski,
for example, argues that 2
"Lenin was the creator of the totalitarian
doctrine and of the totalitariam state in
embryo."
Likewise, as we saw in Chapter 3, Robert Conquest viewed Lenin as
a totalitarian autocrat, and goes to some length to argue that
both Lenin and Stalin should be seen as 'monsters'. Perhaps the
most outspoken exponent of this perspective is Meyer who argues
that 3
"Stalin's way of looking at the world, his
professed aims, his conception of the tasks
facing the communist state....are entirely
Leninist....His stress on the primacy of the
party and the power struggle, his
preoccupation with problems of economic
construction and cultural transformation, his
readiness to manipulate men and institutions,
and his ruthlessness in implementing policies
- in all these traits Stalin had trod in
Lenin's footsteps."
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The continuity version of Stalin stresses that Stalin simply
developed the totalitarianism made manifest by Lenin. In this
perspective Stalin is seen as an extreme development of the
potential inherent in the autocracy imputed to Lenin. The
clearest statement of this aspect of Stalinism is made by Cohen
4
"...Stalinism was excess....It was not, for
example, merely coercive peasant policies, but
a virtual civil war against the peasantry;
not merely police repression, or even civil
war style terror, but a holocaust by terror
that victimised tens of millions of people for
twenty-five years; not merely a Thermidorian
revival of nationalistic tradition, but an
almost fascist-like chauvinism; not merely a
leader cult, but deification of a despot.
Excesses were the real essence of historical
Stalinism, and they are what really require
explanation."
So Stalin is viewed as an inevitable, and extreme, version of
Lenin. The best version of this is that it is arguing that
Stalin represents the excess of rule. In our perspective this
connotes rule which is arbitrary, ie rule which has become
detached from principle (see below). While we might agree that
Stalin represents the (un-principled) excess of rule, these
perspectives allow us little in the way of analysis of the
grounds of this extremeness. These perspectives tend to face
towards personality (in Conquest's case 'monstrous'
personalities) and away from Stalin's theorising.
A more sophisticated version of the continuity view of Stalin is
that of Gouldner 5. Gouldner stresses that what Lenin and
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Stalin shared was a 'voluntaristic' theory of politics combined
with a theory of economic development dependent upon
technological change. This perspective argues that Lenin created
a revolutionary party in a largely peasant society with the
result that Stalinism, as a development of this, effectively
represented the leadership of an 'urban-centred power elite' (the
party bureaucracy) over a hostile peasant community. Hence
Stalin's rule is to be seen as a form of 'internal colonialism'
created out of the Leninist conception of the centralised party.
Gouldner could have made a telling point about the connection
between Stalin's terror and the prematurity of the Russian
revolution (ie that the absence of an advanced, dominant and
conscious proletariat makes socialism impossible to achieve, and
encourages a revolutionary party to revert to force, as Marx had
pointed out with reference to the Jacobins). However Gouldner
concentrates instead upon rural/urban conflicts, and while he
sees the peasantry as the problem, he fails to see the (advanced)
proletariat as the solution. Gouldner's failure here is a
failure which looks exclusively at the relationship of Lenin to
Stalin in isolation from their relation to Marx.
Perhaps one of the most influential variants of the continuity
perspective emanates from a former (or someone who claims not now
to be) Stalinist, the French Communist Party theoretician, Jean
Elleinstein 6. Elleinstein seeks to replace the 'subjectivist'
explanations of Stalinism (ie the 'cult of personality' view of
writers such as Conquest) with an 'objectivist' account which
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stresses the role of historical conditions 'making Stalinism
objectively inevitable'. Elleinstein argues that the historical
conditions inherited from Lenin's October Revolution made
Stalinism the only possible outcome. These 'historical
conditions' were firstly and most importantly for Elleinstein the
'capitalist encirclement' of the Soviet Union, the economic
underdevelopment of that country, and the political and
industrial backwardness of its proletariat. Stalinism was the
inevitable outcome of 'objective conditions' - the standard view
of most Eurocommunist parties towards Stalininsm. We might first
note that this is a form of argument which does not resonate well
with Marx. To see conditions as 'ruling' or determining is
peculiarly un-dialectical and deterministic. No matter how
severely restrictive the objective conditions, Marx saw man as
active or engaged in his relationship to conditions.
Elleinstein sees Stalin as a true inheritor of the Leninist
tradition, thus....7
"
a socialist economy and society were
born of the October Revolution and of Stalin's
policy....At the same time totalitarian
methods were used."
Thus Stalin 'developed Socialism, even though he proceeded in a
despotic manner'. This nihilism towards means is something which
Stalinismm shares with Maoism (see Chapter 6). For Elleinstein,
then, Stalinism is in accord with the principles of Leninism; it
being simply the case that unfavourable 'historical conditions'
obliged Stalin to be barbarous in his methods. What seems to be
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lost in this version of continuity is Stalin himself as theorist
(although there is a reason for this distortion - see section III
of this chapter where we characterise Stalin as a repeater, ie as
someone who, on the surface, seeks simply to reflect Lenin's
speech, in which case, concretely, Stalin seems to lose his
distinctiveness).
What unites Stalinists' views (whether old or new, like
Elleinstein) of Stalin is their understanding of what socialism
is. They tend to understand socialism as a form of society where
private property is abolished within the means of production.
While this is an important precondition for the transition to
socialismm it is not sufficient on its own to bring about
socialism. If we recall Marx's discussion, production itself is
defined as being broader than a simply economic function. The
abolition of all forms of alienation, the development of a
universal consciousness among the proletariat are the dynamic
forces of revolution as developed in the principled account of
Marx. Despotism might conceivably bring about the abolition of
some (though not all) forms of private property within the means
of production, but it is incapable of producing a genuine
socialist revolution. An economic transformation (abolition of
private property in the means of production) or a partial change
is not the same as a universal or socialist transformation.
Within the discontinuity view of Stalin's relationship to Lenin,
the most widely known reading is that of Hoy Medvedev. As with
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some writers in the continuity tradition, Medvedev argues that
the origins of Stalinism are to be located in the 'perverted' and
'criminal' personality of Stalin. The distortions of the
Stalinist era are located, for Medvedev,, in the obsessive and
pathological personality of Stalin himself. However this is
precisely what accounts for Stalin's total discontinuity with
Lenin. Hence Medvedev argues that....8
"It was an historical accident that Stalin,
the embodiment of all the worst elements in
the Russian revolutionary movement, came to
power after Lenin, the embodiment of all that
was best."
Furthermore, if we were left in any doubt whatsoever as to where
Medvedev stands on this, he has the following to say in his
latest work, when evaluating the competing claims of the
continuity view 9
"....there is no continuity between Leninism
and Stalinism; they are essentially different
political phenomena sharing a common "Marxist"
terminology. Stalin's policies were in no way
a reflection of Lenin's objectives."
Many of the criticisms we made of Conquest apply with equal force
to Medvedev. His fixation upon Stalin's personality obliges us
to ignore what is essential - Stalin's theorising. Stalin's
barbarism does deserve to be thoroughly, and morally, condemned,
but it is just this excessiveness which places upon the analyst
of Stalinism the responsibility to concenrate upon the essential,
and not to be deflected by the spurious, no matter how
spectacular that spuriousness might be. That is, we ought to be
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able to show that his barbarism is grounded in his theorising,
and not simply be dazzled by his excesses.
The most sophisticated variant of the discontinuity view is
provided by the political economist, Ernest Mandel, whose
perspective is highly derivative of Trotsky's early critique of
Stalin 10. Mandel, citing Trotsky, argues that the sustained
degeneration of Russia in the Stalinist period was due to two
interlinked tendencies. Firstly, an underdevelopment of the
forces of production gave rise to a political and cultural
backwardness which encouraged Stalinism to reverse some of the
gains made by Lenin (eg the restoration of the family and the
renewal of sexual inequalities initiated by Stalin). Secondly
the growth of a bureaucratic stratum which controlled party,
state and society in this period. This second feature, the
growth of 'bureaucratic deformation' is the significant element
in this alanysis, as is indicated in the following extract....11
"Stalinism is the totality of political
institutions, structures of rule, methods of
governing and planning which secure the
monopoly of power of the Soviet bureaucracy
and which safeguards its privileges...This is
the only explanation of Stalinism that
conforms to the method of historical
materialism...the social category of the
bureaucracy is the key to explaining and
understanding the 'Stalinist' phenomenon."
While the Trotsky/Mandel perspective is undoubtedly the most
sophisticated variant of the discontinuity perspectives, it is
important to subject it to principled critique. We might begin
by noting that while Stalin may have been responsible for most of
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the rejections or inversions of Marxist principle, he was not the
initiator of all of them. We have already seen (see Chapter 4
above) how Lenin was forced to concede to the necessity of using
bureaucrats and specialists in science and administration, for
example. Most importantly we have to recognise that both the
low-level of productive forces and the dependence upon
bureaucracy (privileged specialists) are the outcome of, are the
degeneration of, Lenin's premature revolution. Both Trotsky and
Mandel stop short of this recognition. (Trotsky is particularly
obsessive about this - in this 'History of The Russian
Revolution' he goes at length to argue that the revolution in
Russia was not premature - supporting this argument with data
about the rapid growth in the aggregate numbers of the
proletariat. While this is 'spitting in the wind' on its own
terms, since at all times prior to 1917 the proletariat was a
tiny minority in relation to the peasantry, the more important
principled point is that the really significant force - the
development of a consciousness, a level of culture and awareness
of the proletariat - had not been developed.) To fail to
recognise that 'the low level of productive forces', the 'low
cultural level of the country', and 'the growth of the
bureaucratic stratum' are related to the prematurity of Lenin's
revolution is a serious error.
One of the most comprehensive views of Stalin's relation to Lenin
is to be found in the work of Lane, referred to in the previous
chapter. Lane's primary concern is to present a 'synthesis' of
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most of the major critiques of Stalin. However, as we shall see,
he has a somewhat peculiar version of what a synthesis is.
Basically, lane borrows elements of explanation from both the
continuity and discontinuity views of Stalin's relationship to
Lenin. Thus, Stalin shared much with Lenin, according to Lane,
as is evident in the following extract....12
"...Stalin's ideology and world view had an
affinity with Lenin's in method and
orientation. Both men shared a similar
appraoch to Marxism; they accepted Engels'
interpretation of historical and dialectical
materialism; they emphasised the constraining
effects of laws external to man; politically
they shared similar views - they saw Soviet
Russia as threatened by an international world
order of capitalism; and they recognised the
necessity for the dictatorship of the
proletariat; economically they both stressed
the importance of developing the level of
productive forces and the need to borrow and
copy the advanced techniques of the West...."
However Stalin differed from Lenin in that....13
"Lenin...advocated direct froms of political
participation and greater equality. These
were dropped under Stalin."
Lane's view is really not so much a synthesis as an eclectic
collection of continuities and discontinuities in Stalin's
relationship to Lenin, with the balance favouring the continuity
argument. While Lane is superior to many writers on the topic of
Stalin's relationship to Lenin, in that he sees the need to
include Trotsky as a significant theorist in that relationship,
his understanding of Stalin and Trotsky's relationship to Lenin's
redirection of the Marxist tradition is simplistic and eclectic.
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Thus he avers....14
"My argument has been to attempt to show a
continuity in some respects in policy running
from Lenin through Trotsky to Stalin. This
continuity is essentially the adaptation of
Marxism to be an ideology legitimating the
construction of a type of industrial and
'modern' society."
and furthermore....15
"While his critique of Stalin was penetrating,
Trotsky's own position when in power showed
many assumptions common to Lenin and Stalin."
How are we to view the literature concerning Stalin's
relationship to his tradition? Firstly we should recognise that
most of the material we have considered fails to consider in any
serious sense the relationship of both Lenin and Stalin to Marx.
As we have seen (Chapters 3 & 4) any simple identification of
Marx and Lenin's theorising is misplaced and I shall go on to
attempt to show that we must seek to relate Stalin to the
principled reading of Marx. The most serious attempt to ground
Stalin in an understanding not just of Lenin, but also of Marx,
is provided by the Trotsky/Mandel perspective. However I shall
seek to show below that Trotsky's perspective upon Marx does not
match up to a principled account, especially with regard to his
conception of universalism. Secondly, we must understand that
the continuity and discontinuity perspectives tend to represent
the weakness of a rule-bound conception of revolution. Thus the
contunuity version tends to convert Marxism into a more or less
inflexible method - into a dogma. This view tends to assume a
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dislocation between theory and practice (rather than investigate
that dislocation) and tends to transform language
'Marxism-Leninism' into speech. Therefore this perspective tends
to present a one-dimensional view of the theorising of Stalin and
Trotsky. This distraction from what is essential, ie primarily
their theorising and their praxis - takes various forms. In
relatively unrigorous variants (eg Conquest), Stalin's theorising
is effectively ignored by concentrating on his personality to the
exclusion of almost all else. In the sophisticated variants of
the continuity view (eg Lane) theory is downgraded by considering
practice as both isolated from and more significant than theory.
As we have seen (citations 14 & 15) Lane is arguing that
Marxism/Leninism seen as dogma, or as rule, produces a linearity
or congruence in practice/policy despite detailed disagreements
upon the interpretation of Marxism/Leninism. The continuity view
of Stalin either ignores Trotsky (Conquest) or presents us with a
one-dimensional view of his relationship to the Marxist tradition
(Lane).
On the other hand, the discontinuity view of Stalin simply
presents a different sort of rule-bound reading. The
unsophisticated variants of this view (Medvedev) seek to turn
away from Stalin's theorising, out of a sense of outrage at his
practice. Stalin becomes a featureless theorist - he is reduced
to sheer contingency - a horrendous 'historical accident' to
quote Medvedev. More sophisticated variants of the discontinuity
perspective (eg Trotsky/Mandel) while not ignoring Stalin
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effectively produce a one-dimensional view of his theorising in
the sense that they fail to see that Stalin's theorising and his
praxis is connected not just to conditions (the burgeoning party
bureaucracy) but also that Stalin's excesses do have a
relationship to the potential inherent in Lenin's prematurity.
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Section III
To begin to develop a principled account of Stalin's place in the
revolutionary tradition we can proceed by first making a critique
of an element of the continuity perspective, as it is developed
by one of its most able exponents - Lane. We may recall
(citation 12) that Lane argues that, despite certain differences
between Lenin and Stalin, on balance there is a greater area of
continuity and agreement between the two. Thus Lane goes on to
catalogue a long list of political, economic and philosophical
areas upon which he asserts we can observe 'agreement' between
Lenin and Stalin. However what is glossed, or taken for granted
in Lane's discussion is just what is the character of Stalin's
'agreement' with Lenin. Unless we know the character of this
'agreement' we are in no position to make any sound judgement
about Stalin's relation to Lenin, or the revolutionary
tradition. What does it mean to say that Stalin's theorising is
basically in agreement with that of Lenin? We should here direct
our attention to two texts where more than anywhere else Stalin
confronts his relationship to the tradition of Leninism, ie to
16 "The Foundations of Leninism" and 17 'Problems of Leninism'.
These writings stand out from most of the rest of Stalin's work
in a number of ways. For example, while Stalin (unlike Lenin and
Trotsky) has a somewhat wooden and uninspiring style, and a
heavy-handed sense of polemic, 'The Foundations of Leninism' has
a certain superficial sparkle which is lacking when compared
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with, say, his 'Economic Problems of the USSR* or 'Marxism and
Linguistics'. These former texts which are concerned ostensibly
with understanding the principles of Leninism appear to be much
more impressive than they actually are. What is crucial here is
to recognise that 'Foundations of Leninism' simply rephrases
large tracts from Lenin's writing. They amount to bare-faced
repetition and plagiarism. (This does not mean to say that all
of Stalin's work is a repetition of all of Lenin's. There is an
important area - the idea of 'socialism in one countnry' - where
despite the pretence of repetition, repetition is not possible -
see below.) Consider, for example, what Stalin has to say of the
role of the Party in 'Foundations of Leninism' (Section VIII of
that work 18). This section simply rephrases what Lenin has to
say in 'What is to be Done?', 'State and Revolution' and
'Left-Wing Communism - an Infantile Disorder'.
So 'agreement' between Stalin and Lenin really means that Stalin
repeats Lenin's speech. Thus Stalin's version of embodying the
principle of Leninism is simply to repeat what Lenin had to say -
to reflect Lenin's speech. Repetition as a mode of orientation
to tradition implies a preference for rule over principle.
Stalin confuses Lenin's speech with language (principle). What
Stalin has effected is a distortion which treats rule as though
it were principle. Stalin's mode of orientation to tradition is
in contradistinction to the genuinely revolutionary, or
principled, mode of orientation. The principled mode of
orientation requires dialectic rather than rule. Dialectic
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provides a mode of orientation to tradition which recognises that
the theorist speaking at a later period in the development of
revolution (ie Stalin with respect to the communist revolution)
has to find new ways (new speech) which can preserve orientation
to principle. Repetition simply converts principle into a dogma
- the inevitable result of a view which confuses principle with
rule.
Seeing his theorising in terms of the idea of repetition makes
certain features of the literature on Stalin more comprehensible.
With regard to the discontinuity perspective we can begin to see
the sense of Medvedev's notion (citation 9) that Lenin and Stalin
share a 'common Marxist terminology'. What this really means is
that Stalin's speech seeks to be a mirror-image of that of Lenin.
Thus a rule-bound comception of orientation to tradition (Stalin)
fails to see a fundamental distinction between the original and
its image.
With regard to the continuity perspective, one can understand the
ease (too great an ease) with which writers like Elleinstein can
point to what looks like a fundamental commonality of
understanding between Lenin and Stalin. Stalin's repetition
casts'a surface reflection of its object (Lenin) which presents a
concretely impressive correspondence. The task of a principled
analysis is to investigate the distortion introduced by
repetition while attempting to conceive of the desire which can
produce repetition as a mode of orientation to tradition.
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Furthermore we can provide some conception for a phenomenon noted
by both continuity and discontinuity perspectives - the seeming
randomness or arbitrariness of Stalinist brutality. In both
perspectives this randomness is attributed to the vicissitudes of
Stalin's quasi-schizophrenic personality (compare the accounts,
already referred to, of Conquest and Medvedev). We see this
arbitrariness as an outcome, not of personality, but of the fact
that Stalin's theorising represents the (re-)assertion of rule
in isolation from principle. Arbitrary rule is, in a sense, an
uncentred, unprincipled, and hence volatile concept of
governance/rule.
Stalin's arbitrariness - the lack of connectedness to principle
of his theorising throws some light upon what is regarded as
Stalin's major theoretical innovation - the doctrine of
'Socialism in One Country'. Initially Stalin's attitude to
internationalism seeks to mirror that of Lenin, as this extract
from the first edition (1924) of 'Problems of Leninism' 19
indicates....
"To overthrow the bourgeoisie, the efforts of
a single country suffice; the history of our
own revolution attests to this. For the
definitive victory of socialism, for the
organisation of socialist production, the
efforts of a single country, especially a
peasant country like Russia, are no longer
sufficient; the efforts of the proletarians
of several advanced countries are required.
Such are in general the characteristic
features of the Leninist theory of the
proletarian revolution."
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Significantly, this passage was summarily excluded in all
subsequent editions of the work. The arbitrariness of Stalin's
concept to repetition allows him, comfortably, to ignore what is
inconvenient. Because rule lacks a centre - because it is
unprincipled - rule change becomes less than problematic.
The doctrine of 'socialism in one country' in essence argues that
socialism can be completely achieved within the walls of one
nation. We shall argue that this is a clear violation or
abandonment of the concept of universal/socialist transformation.
However let it suffice to note here one consequence of the
ideology of 'socialism in one country'; 'Internationalism' is
reduced to the defence of one national proletariat - the
proletariat of the Soviet Union. The concept of socialism in one
country reduced the task of all other national proletariats to
the role of aiding the 'embattled' and 'encircled' 'bastion of
communism', ie the Soviet Union. In short, internationalism is
aborted, is transformed into a narrowly focussed nationalism.
What Stalin has achieved is a particularlisation of the concept
of revolution.
Let us now consider Stalin's particularisation of the idea of
revolution in relation to the tradition of revolutionary
theorising.
We can begin by locating Stalin's particularisation with respect
to Marx. In Chapters One and Two we argued that the principled
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reading of Marx revealed that socialism was fundamentally based
upon the development of a 'positive' universalism - the creation
of the universal individual. Thus any conception of the
revolution which is based upon a narrow nationalism is absurd,
unprincipled and self-defeating. Just as capitalism creates a
'negative' universalism in the sense that it creates an
international and finally world-based proletariat, so the
'positive' universalism of communism is unthinkable and
unattainable if confined within the walls of one nation - however
'embattled', 'encircled' and 'central' that nation-state might
be. Here we might simply recall Marx's insistence upon the
internationalist character of universalism 20
"....communism is only possible as the act of
the dominant people 'all at once' and
simultaneously, which presupposes thae
universal development of productive forces and
the world intercourse bound up with
communism....
The proletariat can thus only exist
world-historically, just as communism: its
activity can only have a 'world-historical'
existence. This is the world-historical
existence of individuals, ie existence of
individuals which is directly linked up with
world history."
Far from representing a progression, the particularisation of the
revolution amounts to a regression. Stalin's regression amounts
to a de-humanisation of the revolution in the sense that the
creation of the universal individual is replaced by the
preservation of the Soviet state. Thus the state itself - its
preservation and ossification - becomes the principle in the
Stalinist concept of praxis. Repetition in Stalin is thus deeply
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an inversion - replacing or substituting an orientation to the
image (speech) for an orientation to the original (language).
If we now turn to Stalin's relationship to Lenin's redirection of
the principled view of revolution, it is necessary firstly to
indicate Stalin's extremeness in relation to Lenin. While
Lenin's prematurity dislocated the integrity of the particular
(Russian revolution) with the universal (world revolution), Lenin
never lost sight of internationalism of the revolution as an
aspiration. At all times he was aware that the Russian
revolution could never produce soicalism particularistically.
Nowhere is there evidence to suggest that he conceived that
socialism could be completed in one nation. Furthermore he had a
fundamentally different notion of teaching/inspiration to Stalin.
As we saw in chapter 4, Lenin considered that although all
national communist parties could learn something from the
experience of the Russian revolution, he recognised that
different lessons could be learned depending upon the conditions
of the specific national proletariat. That is, Lenin was not
abstract in this sense - that he recognised that revolution as
principle had to be oriented to in different ways depending upon
the development of forces in different nations. Stalin, however,
is utterly abstract with regard to his concept of
teaching/inspiration. In 'Problems of Leninism' he argues that
the Soviet form of party organisation ('dictatorship of the
proletariat') should be seen as....21
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"....the international doctrine of the
proletarians of all lands which is suitable
and obligatory for all countries without
exception, including those where capitalism is
developed."
What Stalin is recommending again is repetition, imitation,
reflection.
A further aspect of Stalin's abstraction lies in the consequence
of the doctrine of 'socialism in one country'. If socialism can
be completed within one country, and if it can be completed in
backward Russia, why not all the more so in 'advanced' Britain,
or 'advanced' Germany, or in the USA and so on? Stalin's
abstraction atomises the universalism of the principled account
of revolution. Revolution seems to have no connection with the
state of development of the proletariat, or with conditions. The
doctrine that socialism can be constructed and completed within
any one society makes socialism itself an abstraction
disconnected from possibility.
Stalin is best characterised as one extreme or one excess of
Lenin. The abstracted particularism of Stalin is rooted in
Lenin's premature concept of revolution which failed to integrate
the particular (Russian) within the universal (world) revolution.
However in contradistinction to both the continuity and
discontinuity views we view Stalin dialectically in relation to
his tradition. Stalin displays but one (abstracted
particularism) extreme response to the prematurity of Leninism,




There is a strong concrete sense in which Trotsky appears almost
as personal embodiment of universal, or all-round development.
All commentators on Trotsky - even his sternest critics -
recognise an element of Faustian genuis in the range of talent he
displays. Perhaps even more that Lenin, and certainly much more
so than Stalin (who appears philistine by comparison), Trotsky
applied his communism thoroughly to a spectacularly broad range
of issues.
Trotsky is probably best known for his massively detailed and
impressively argued 3-volume 'History of the Russian Revolution'.
Of this work, a not always sympathetic critic, Irving Howe, has
the following to say: 23
" 'The History of the Russian Revolution"...is
surely Trotsky's masterpiece, the single
greatest work of history in the Marxist vein."
Yet Trotsky also produced biographies of Lenin (uncompleted),
Stalin 24, and, of course, his own autobiography. 25 (The real
significance of Trotsky's felt need - which Lenin did not share -
be
to both historian and biographer of the revolution - guardian of
t\
its tradtion - is discussed below. The current discussion serves
merely to underscore the apparent all-round range of Trotsky's
talents.) Furthermore Trotsky was both a gifted theorist of
literature and a literary critic. His view of art is most
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coherently expressed in 'Literature and Revolution' 26. Trotsky
sees art and culture as having a degree of autonomy and
independence from material conditions - the best art 'does not
copy reality in empirical detail'. His view of art has a verve,
wit and soul fulness which contrasts with the deadeningly
mechanical view of art imposed by Stalin - who sees art - as he
consistently sees everything else - as a repetition or reflection
or copy of material reality - with a heroic gloss. In addition
to these skills, Trotsky was a gifted strategist who first
organised the Red Army and then led it to victory in the civil
war. Such was the multiplicity of his talents.
In order to deepen our understanding of Trotsky's version of
universalism, we ought to recall from Chapters one and two that
Marx's principled understanding of revolution required a
dialectically engaged concept of universal.ism. Any concept of
universalism which existed 'solely in the mind', ie abstracted
universalism was to be rejected as Utopian. So how does
Trotsky's universalism relate to Marx's understanding?
Vie can begin by noting that there is a strong sense of Trotsky's
theorising being 'ahead of its time'. This is a difficult
concept to be previse about, though many of the critiques of
Trotsky, especially those of Howe already referred to, and the
most developed, that of Knei-Paz, allude to this in an elliptical
way. If we consider two brief examples which are icons of the
notion of Trotsky's being 'ahead of his time' perhaps we can
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advance our analysis.
The first example I wish to consider is Trotsky's set of essays
published under the title 'Problems of Everyday Life'. 28 In
essence these essays address the notion that socialism should be
more advanced than capitalism not just in a material and
political sense, but also in a moral sense. Whilst some of the
discussion in this text is hectoring or patronising in tone,
important issues are analysed. Most importantly the debates of
modernists are pre-figured (especially feminists) in this text.
Thus, Trotsky opens up the debate about the relationship between
the personal and the political - arguing that the two ought to
stand not as totally distinct spheres, but as mutually reciprocal
and self-reinforcing. In particular he raises the issue of the
necessity for a socialist revolution to aid the liberation of
women. Thus he argues that 29
"The revolution would be no revolution...if it
did not help women, doubly and triply
enslaved, on to the path of personal and
social devlopment."
Now I am not making over-ambitious claims for Trotsky being
totally pro-feminist, and I do recognise that there are
contradictions in his espousal of female emancipation. The key
point, though, is to recognise that more than anyone else,
Trotsky is pre-figuring the debate of modernists. However we
ought to make two points about this example. Firstly, although
he attempts to open up a discussion about the relation between
the personal and the political, he has almost nothing to say
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about his own personal life, ie this is largely an impersonal
text. (For a more detailed view of Trotsky's impersonality see
below). Secondly, although he sees female emancipation as a
desirable aspiration for the socialist revolution, he provides no
praxis for this discussion, ie he gives us no means of seeing how
the principle he is discussing can be embodied; ie in short we
can begin to see that this aspect of his universalism remains
abstract rather than engaged.
The second example I wish to consider is his 'Transitional
Programme for Socialist Revolution', 30 written towards the end
point of his career. In this text he considers a particularly
difficult problem - the problem of developing a movement from
reformist politics to revolutionary politics within an advanced
capitalist society (the Uniteed States) which possessed
nevertheless one of the most weakly organised and internally
divided proletariats. What is striking about his analysis is
that it seems much more relevant to the situation of advanced
capitalist societies with relatively strongly developed
proletariats TODAY rather than to the United States in the
thirties. Thus Trotsky assumes a relatively high level of
consciousness amongst the US proletariat, overestimates the
degree of trade union organisation and solidarity and
underestimates (though partially acknowledging) the force of
racial, regional and political differences within that
proletariat. His suggestions about the movement from a strong
reformist party (what he calls a 'Labour Party') to a
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revolutionary communist party (what he calls a 'Socialist
Workers' Party) seem to me to be more appropriate to a situation
such as exists in France at the moment where there exists a
relatively strongly organised proletariat with a reformist
socialist party in power and greater potential for the
advanceability of militant transitional demands. The important
point, however, about this example is to show that he
over-anticipates in his analysis. His discussion in the
'Transitional Programme' is abstract, both with respect to time
and with respect to place. His theorising here is not engaged.
To say that he is 'ahead of his time' is really to say that he is
abstract with repect to history. Ironically, this is recognised
by certain modernists with respect to sectarian Trotskyists, who
a leading socialist-feminist, Juliet Mitchell, describes as being
characterised by....31
"a gray timelessness"
What is being referred to here is a kind of extreme Trotskyism
which considers that objective conditions are over-ripe for
revolution - hence committing the familiar abstract error of
considering that a revolution is permanently available.
One common view which seems to unite critics of many different
perspectives is that Trotsky was prone to 'oscillations' in his
perspective. Irving Howe, for example, argues that....
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"Grand theories, extreme oscillations...were
temptations that Trotsky could not always
resist."
Oscillating between extreme positions is indicative of the
indecisiveness of the vacillator - who has an abstracted - not
fully engaged - relationship to principle. A good example of
Trotsky's vacillation can be identified in his view of what
attitude the Bolshevik Party should take to the War with Germany
when the Party came to power in 1917. A group called the
'Internationalist Bolsheviks' supported continuing the war in
order to aid the internationalisation of the revolution -
particularly aiding the German proletariat. The other extreme
was Lenin's position which favoured ending the war in order to
prevent the Russian revolution from becoming crushed. Trotsky -
attracted by both extremes - argued in favour of the slogan
'neither war nor peace'. 33 Since Russia was at war already,
Trotsky's vacillation is absurd - there were only two
alternatives and decisiveness is what was required. Furthermore,
as we saw in Chapter 4, Trotsky vacillated on the question of the
role of the party in relation to the proletariat. In his early
work Trotsky argues that Lenin's insistence upon centralisation
of power and the vanguard role of the party would deprive the
Russian proletariat of its initiative. He claimed that the
unwelcome result of this process would be the substitution of
party for proletariat, central committee for party, and finally
dictator for central committee. Yet, as Knei-Paz 34 has
pointed out, by 1917 Lenin had accepted the vanguard role of the
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party and the fact that the party 'must continue substituting
itself (ie for the proletariat) in the economic and social
revolution1.
If abstraction is an excessive form of generality, then one risk
of abstracted universalism is the failure to recognise the place
of the particular or the specific (to fail to place or unify the
particular within the universal). Abstracted universalism risks
glossing real difference. This is precisely what we see at
various points in Trotsky's theorising.
One example of Trotsky's abstracted universalism is his
analogical comparison of the French and Russian revolutions.
Trotsky used the term 'Thermidor' to descrive the 'hijacking' of
the soviet state by the Stalinist bureaucracy. The term
Thermidor refers back to the month in the new French calendar
when the Jacobins were overthrown by a reactionary section of the
revolutionary movement. Evidently Trotsky learned different
lessons about the French revolution than Marx did. For Marx the
revolutionary terror and the Thermidorian reaction were a result
of the prematurity of the Jacobins - the attempt to make a social
(universal) revolution simply by grabbing state (partial) power.
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Had he learned the lesson that Marx drew he would have seen more
than heroes (Jacobins and Lenin) and villains (Thermidor and
Stalin.) In each case reaction was brought about by premature
action. Trotsky was never able to trace the decline of Stalinism
to Lenin's prematurity. To fail to recognise real difference -
to be abstract - is to make principle into rule. The important
lesson, here, could be that different conditions require
different modes of orientation to principle.
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Section V
To see Stalin and Trotsky as extremes - as extreme responses to
Lenin's prematurity which failed to integrate the particular
(Russian) within the universal (international) revolution is not
to imply a spurious moral equality between Stalin and Trotsky.
Trotsky's theorising displays a nobility entirely absent in
Stalin. It is an understanding of this nobility - the positive
side of his abstraction with which I seek to conclude this
section of the analysis.
Trotsky's nobility is manifested concretely in his albeit flawed
(abstracted), yet unstinting defence of the internationalist
character of revolutionary (universal) principle. This had a
dual character. On the one hand he provided a trenchant
critique of Stalin's abandonment of principle - of Stalin's
particularism. On the other he sought (again albeit in a flawed
way) to show the proletariats of nations other than the Soviet
Union how they could begin to orient to the story of the
revolution.
At all times Trotsky treated his task - of telling the story of
the revolution - nobly. He was even willing to stand trial at an
international commission of inquiry comrnposed of non-Trotskyists
to refute the slanders which Stalinists were accusing him of (eg
that he was an 'agent of fascism'). 35 In some way this is
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reminiscent of Socrates' decision to choose a noble death over a
dishonest life. Yet this does not quite capture Trotsky's
nobility (nor does the comparison do justice to Socrates) in the
sense that Trotsky's desire to tell the story of Lenin is more
reminiscent of Plato (Plato's need to tell the story of Socrates'
life) than of Socrates. Even as an outcast in permanent exile
(he was rejected not just by Stalinist Russia, but also moved
from country to country by fearful bourgeois governments) he
continued to attempt to articulate the international interests of
the proletariat. In short the positive side of his
impersonality, referred to above, was his noble capacity to be
un-selfish in his desire to orient to principle. It is almost as
though he sees his history as his fate - and refuses to allow
self to intervene in his destiny. The abstract theorist has to
treat him-self as any self ie as no self or impersonally.
Therefore being forced to confront history as a conjunction of
events and personalities ie of decisive selves is both painful
and surprising for the abstract theorist.
Perhaps we can best conceive of Trotsky's understanding of (his
and the revolution's history) if we contrast it with that of
Lenin. A common gloss in the critical literature on Lenin is
that he had a 'voluntaristic' view of history. This means that
the basis of Lenin's view of history is that people (actively)
create events. In Trotsky the opposite is the case, there is a
strong sense in which (almost fatalistically) he sees events and
conditions creating and pushing along people. Thus when the
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abstract theorist of history comes into contact with personality
(evidence of decisive selfhood) the result is paradox and
contradiction. We can see this if we consider Trotsky's
following views from his 'History of the Russian Revolution' 36
"A failure of correspondence between the
subjective and objective is generally
speaking, the fountain source of the comic as
also the tragic, in both life and art. The
sphere of politics less than any other is
exempt from the action of this law. People
and parties are heroic or comic not in
themselves but in their relation to
circumstances. When the French revolution
entered its decisive stage the most eminent of
Girondists became pitiful and ludicrous
Jean-Marie Rolland, a respected figure as
Factory Inspector of Lyons, looks like a
living caricature against the background of
1792."
In short personality produces surprise and wonderment - is an
impulse to theorising in Trotsky.
It is necessary to recognise that there is a high degree of
complementarity between Trotsky and Lenin. While Lenin (subject)
is more personal and relaxed in his theorising - seeing no need
to describe himself (no desire for example to write an
autobiography), Trotsky (object) - always surprised by
personality - continually regenerates his sense of impersonality.
Lenin's strength is his personal dynamism - his energy, yet the
danger of this dynamism is that energy eventually runs out -
personality deceases. Trotsky's task is (unlike Stalin who
simply seeks to repeat Lenin) to transfrom Lenin's energy.
Trotsky's service is to give Lenin his place - to give the
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revolution a context by relating its history.
The irony of Trotsky's story is that he never generates an
adequate sense of him-self (he sacrifices him-self) in his
history. As we have noted this is manifestly the case in his
"History of the Revolution'. Even more so is it the case in his
autobiography. 'My Life' succeeds in being impersonal. It tells
very little about what was personal to him. The 'news' of 'My
Life' is contained in what it says of his public roles - as
literary critic, as pre-revolutionary orator, etc., yet
personality is more than the sum of an individual's public roles.
Let me conclude this section by noting a sense in which Trotsky
falls short in his noble task of preserving the revolutionary
energy of Lenin, of orienting to revolution as principle. I have
argued that Trotsky always stopped short of locating the failure
of the Russian revolution and the decline into Stalinism in
Lenin's prematurity. This can be concretely observed if we
consider that his "History of the Russian Revolution' is a heroic
tale (Knei-Paz and Howe call it ' epic' in form). That is
Trotsky's story of the revolution stops short of an analysis and
critique of the emergence of Stalinism. Trotsky's critique of
Stalin is left to a separate work as if to underline the fact
that he fails to see Stalinism as grounded in Lenin's
prematurity. Trotsky, then, gives Lenin a place, a context, but




There is a curious paradox in the attitude of Western social
theory to Mao. On the one hand all agree, Marxists and
non-Marxists alike, (see especially the discussion of Kolakowski
below) that the Chinese revolution was itself the most
significant revolutionary upheaval in recent history. On the
other hand the theorist, mentor and guide of this revolution -
Mao Tse Tung - is largely ignored. This is not to say that there
has been no interest in Mao's work - the works of Bettelheim 1
in political economy and Schram 2 in political theory (two
writers selected at random) testify to a degree of interest in
Mao's theorising. What is significant is that no revolutionary
figure of comparable stature has attracted so little attention
from social and political theorists. There is a paucity of
rigorous analysis with respect to Mao that allows a recent (1979)
group of commentators when surveying the available literature to
say that the context in which they wrote was one characterised
by 3
"...a background of plain ignorance (of Mao)."
The question thus raised is whether or not Mao's relative
anonymity is deserved? What can we learn from Mao about the
revolutionary tradition?
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Consideration of the extant literature on Mao reveals that there
are two dominant types of perspective. The first kind of view
typifies Mao as one who represents a regression within the
Marxist tradition, or worse (see especially the analysis below of
Kolakowski) that Mao represents an aspect of the terminal decline
of that tradition. A second perspective, almost polarly opposed
to the first, argues that Mao represents a progression (a genuine
development of and re-orientation to Marxist principle) of the
Marxist tradition. This second perspective sees Mao as the
modern Marxist par excellence.
An exemplar of the first style of perspective is Leszek
Kolakowski whose massive three volume work 4 attempts an
encyclopaedic conspectus of varieties of Marxist philosophy.
Kolakowski's discussion of Mao occupies a relatively small
section at the very end of his analysis of Marxism - it is
appended almost as an afterthought. 5 While recognising that
the Chinese revolution is....'indisputably one of the most
important events of 20th century history', he has this to say of
Mao: 6
"Measured by European standards the
ideological documents of Maoism, and
especially the theoretical writings of Mao
himself, appear, in fact, extremely primitive
and clumsy, sometimes even childish; in
comparison even Stalin gives the impression of
a powerful theorist."
Anyone who has read Kolakowski's stunning denunciation of Stalin
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will understand how negative a judgement this is of Mao. As
though he needed to re-emphasise the judgement, Kolakowski adds
by way of observation on Mao's philosophical works ('On Practice'
and 'On Contradiction' - which we discuss at a later juncture in
this chapter)....6
"to put it mildly, much good will is needed to
perceive any deep theoretical significance in
these texts."
However it is not so important to recognise that this perspective
has a low opinion of the intellectual worth of Mao's theorising
as to recognise how Mao is evaluated by writers such as
Kolakowski in relation to the development of the Marxist
tradition. Here Kolakowski argues: 7
"Maoism in its final shape is a radical
peasant Utopia in which Marxist phraseology is
much in evidence but whose dominant values
seem completely alien to Marxism."
What Kolakowski is signalling here is that his seeming reluctance
to treat Maoism seriously at all is grounded in his uncertainty
about whether Mao's writing really deserves to be understood -
except on the most superficial level - the level of speech - as
Marxism at all. If we consider his writing on Mao in the context
of the argument of his work as a whole, Kolakowski is using Mao
as an index of what he sees as the degeneration or death throes
of Marxism. Kolakowski's perspective is summarised in the
following terse way: 8
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"Such is the gist of Mao's philosophy. It is,
as may be seen, a naive repetition of a few
commonplaces of Leninist-Stalinist Marxism."
This statement is problematic in a number of ways. Firstly, it
fails to establish the uniqueness of Mao's theorising. Secondly
there are significant ways in which Mao is to be distinguished
from Lenin and Stalin as well as Marx. However, this statement
serves to review what this perspective intends as an
understanding of Mao. Firstly Mao's theorising is to be regarded
as secondary rather than essential, and to be fundamentally
facile - a mere 'repetition' of the work of others. Secondly,
and more importantly, Kolakowski is arguing that Mao's practice
cannot be understood in relation to his theorising, ie that Mao
has a flawed praxis. This really amounts to a charge of
opportunism - Mao is seen as a mere phrasemonger whose
unprincipled pragmatism, whose actions, bear only the slightest
relationship to his theorising. This is a view which emerges
clearly in Kolakowski's evaluation of Mao's attitude to foreign
relations. I shall attempt to submit the view that Mao's
theorising and his practice are largely unrelated to a sustained
critique when I discuss this aspect of his work below.
A prime example of the second type of perspective which regards
Mao as the epitome of modern Marxism is the work of Corrigan et
al. At this stage of the chapter we will concentrate on one of
their two main texts, ie 'For Mao'. In responding to the view
that Mao is an insignificant theorist who lacks originality, they
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argue that he is 'a far from mediocre philosopher'; indeed they
rank Mao with Gramsci as one of the most important modernists.
Instead of viewing Mao's philosophy as simplistic and naive they
argue that....9
"...he wrote simply and directly on purpose
because theory should be available to a wide
audience."
We ought to think seriously about this claim of simplicity and
directness in relation to the audience in view of Corrigan et
al's main contention that Marx and Mao are deeply unified. If we
consider Marx, he did not see the need to be simple and direct
all of the time. Nor did he consider that all of his theorising
should be ruled by the need to reach 'directly' as wide an
audience as possible. It is true that some of Marx's work ('The
Communist Manifesto' 10 and 'Wages, Prices and Profits' 11)
is simple and direct and is intended for as wide an audience as
possible, However this could surely not be said of 'The
Grundrisse', nor could it be said of 'Capital'. What Marx
recognised was the need not to be abstract about his audience
(not to regard his audience as an undifferentiated, homogeneous
mass). Marx was engaged with his audience in the sense that he
saw that different audiences required more or less complexity, or
more or less simplicity. Furthermore, he was unwilling to let
considerations of the risk of a small audience rule his
theorising. Mao, however, is abstract in relation to his
audience, He shows his abstraction by treating every audience as
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though it were the same. This abstraction creates a certain
linearity, flatness or featurelessness in Mao's theorising; a
topic to which we shall return.
In place of the view that Mao is either not a Marxist, or not a
significant figure in the tradition, Corrigan et al offer the
view that he is 'thoroughly Marxist'. Thus Corrigan et al
provide a somewhat eclectic list of ways in which Mao can be
considered a Marxist, viz:
1. He has a practical conception of theory.
2. His theorising is historical.
3. His theorising requires a materialist view of philosophy.
4. He recognises the importance of seeing philosophy as a site
for the class struggle.
Now, while these proffered points of contact between Mao and Marx
may be apposite, they certainly do not allow us to see Mao's
uniqueness as a Marxist, and it is the attempt to generate a
sense of Mao as an original Marxist thinker which informs the
whole of Corrigan et al's perspective. Corrigan et al see a
revolution as 'socialist construction', and what they see Marx
and Mao sharing 'above all' is a conception of revolutionary
theory as 'method'. 12 What is really unique about Mao in this
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perspective is that he makes available new methods - new rules-
for the production of a revolution. What Corrigan et al seek,
and what Mao provides, amounts to new rules for the revolution.
'Socialist Construction' for them implies the correct application
of appropriate rules for revolutionary change. We argued in an
earlier chapter that a rule-bound view of revolution as method
risks forgetting its inspiration - that for the sake of which
revolutionary theorising is expressed - and this is a theme to
which we return below.
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Section II
The principled account we shall seek to develop will seek to
moderate the extremeness of Kolakowski (Mao is an irrelevancy to
the Marxist tradition) and Corrigan et all (Mao is the strongest
possible version of an orientation to Marx).
With regard to Kolakowski's extremeness we shall recommend that
Mao does represent one mode of orientation (albeit converting
principle into rule) to the Marxist tradition. Additionally we
shall seek to show that a disjunction between theory and practice
- opportunism - is not Mao's problem. There is a connectedness
between his theory and practice, but his problem is a failure to
orient to principle in his theorising.
Turning to Corrigan et al, we will argue that Mao's method (his
insistence upon 'correct rules') is a weakness rather than a
strength. Furthermore we will develop the view that Mao does not
match up to the strongest possible version of Marx (the concept
of revolution as universal and engaged orientation to principle).
The basis of Mao's perspective is developed in his essays on
philosophy - two of which, 'On Practice' 13 and 'On
Contradiction' 14 are generally recognised as being fundamental
to his thought. It is likely in my view that the general
weakness of the literature on Mao (a weakness remedied by neither
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Kolakowski nor Corrigan et al) is largely attributable to a
failure to generate a developed understanding of these texts.
In 'On Practice" Mao is really seeking to present an
understanding of the relationship of theory to practice, of
saying to doing. Here he argues that theory and practice, as
extremes, as opposites, belong together. The two poles - theory
and practice - are seen as necessarily mutually integrated. Thus
there are two great 'errors' - failures to integrate theory and
practice. On the one hand 'dogmatism' is 'incorrect' in the
sense that it represents the excess of theory expressed in
isolation from the moderating influence of practice. At the
other pole, 'empiricism' is an error because it represents a
'blind' practice - ie practice which is ignorant of theory,
practice which is fragmentary and isolated from theoretical
knowledge. Both dogmatism and empiricism suffer from the same
error - that of abstraction - for Mao - in the sense that each
abstracts or disintegrates the necessary mutuality of theory and
practice.
Thus far, however, we have no real insight into Mao's theorising
since we have not yet investigated the character of the
'mutuality' or 'integration' between theory and practice. The
critical literature on Mao is, in this respect, imprecise and
offers little more than a gloss of Mao's praxis. Kolakowski's
view, which is particularly disdainful, is that Mao's theorising
is disconnected from his practice. At a deep level, Kolakowski
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considers there is little connection between the two in Mao's
work. Mao's theorising is seen here as opportunistic - an
example of ideological posturing which vacillates between
extremes, functioning merely to serve as a justification for the
whims of the leadership. However Corrigan et al argue that
Mao...15
"does not see practice as simply the
'opposite' of theory."
Thus Corrigan et al go on to argue that Mao integrates theory and
practice in such a way that one compliments and reinforces the
other. Accordingly the only adequate (Maoist) conception of
theory is one that allows us 'to engage in practical
transformation' and the only adequate practice is that which is
informed by 'correct theoretical knowledge'. This version seems
simply to repeat Mao's view of the mutuality of theory and
practice without attempting to submit Mao's version of that
relationship to ctitical analysis.
How can we advance upon the versions of Mao's praxis offered by
Kolakowski and Corrigan et al? The most important aspect of an
advance would be to question Mao's view of the reciprocity
between, or mutuality of, theory and practice. It is indeed
true, as Corrigan et al point out, that Mao sees theory and
practice as necessarily integral moments in a unified
revolutionary praxis. However we have to ask whether this
implies a relationship of equality between theory and practice.
The answer to that question must be decisively negative. If
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theory's relation to practice is a mutual or self-reinforcing
one, then it is a relationship between unequals. For Mao,
theorising is unequivocally subordinate to practice. How can we
begin to justify this assertion? Firstly, at a concrete level,
we can note that of the two great errors referred to in 'On
Practice' - ie 'dogmatism' and 'empiricism' - it is dogmatism-
the excess of theory (theory abstracted from practice) - which is
seen as the greatest danger. 16 This is no accidnet, nor
merely a feature of the vagaries of ideological struggle within
the Chinese Communist Party, but an outcome of a fundamental
element of Mao's philosophy. In 'On Practice' Mao warmly
endorses a view, we noted earlier (Chapter 4), expressed by Lenin
that....17
"Practice is higher than theoretical
knowledge...for it has the dignity
of...immediate actuality."
Thus, for Mao, Marxism 'emphasises the dependence of theory upon
practice' and asserts that 'theory is based upon practice', and
finally, theory's only function is 'to serve practice'. In this
way theory is decisively subordinated to practice such that
theory's only role is as 'a guide to action'. We might then ask
what is the link between theory and practice such that theory can
act as a guide? This question is to be understood in terms of
Mao's view of contradiction.
'Cn Contradiction' is a work of central importance to Mao's
philosophy. In this text he develops the themes initiated in 'On
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Practice' - primarily the question of the relationship of theory
to praxis, and the nature of a revolutionary praxis. Most
importantly, from our point of view, this text addresses the
question of how Mao conceives of dialectic - his version of
revolutionary transformation.
For Mao, contradiction is the essence of the methodicity of
dialectics (materialist dialectics) and Marxism. Thus Mao
argues....18
"The law of contradiction in things, that is
the law of the unity of opposites, is the
basic law of materialist dialectics....Lenin
often called this law...the kernel of
dialectics."
To understand Marxism as method, for Mao, means understanding
dialectic as rule. So what is the methodical character of
contradiction such that dialectic-as-rule becomes the mode of
resolution - the mode of revolutionary transformation of
contradiction? The most important aspect of contradiction, for
Mao, is its universality. This universality has two aspects.
Contradiction is to be seen as universal with respect to both
time and place. Thus contradiction is both ubiquitous and
permanent. Let us deal firstly with the conception of the
ubiquitous character of contradiction. This is intended to
connote that the whole of existence can be summarised in terms of
contradiction. There is no process at all which cannot be said
to be determined by the 'law' of contradiction. The natural
world as well as the social world, objects and organisms , are
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all to be seen as ruled by contradiction. Mao asserts...19
"...Contradiction is present in the process of
development of all things; it permeates the
process of development of each thing from
beginning to end. This is...the absoluteness
of contradiction."
Contradiction is thus to be understood as a 'law of motion' of
the universe. Dialectic, then, becomes a set of 'correct' rules
for both interpreting and transforming the world. Turning to the
second aspect of contradiction's universality - its permanence -
Mao argues that contradictions rule the whole of human history
and the whole of man's future. This contention is directly
related to Mao's view that the revolution has to be 'permanent'
(since contradictions are permanent) - a view which we subject to
critique below.
Since contradiction is universal ('absolutely universal'),
dialectical intervention has to show its awareness of the
'all-sided' character of the reality it seeks to transform. An
example of this 'all-sideaness' would be, say, understanding the
bourgeoisie. The position of the bourgeoisie in any capitalist
society could not, for Mao, be understood out of the context of
the position of the proletariat. Each pole or extreme is the
condition of the other's existence, and transformation
(resolution) of the contradiction between the two implies whole
recognition of the mutuality of that relationship. Failure to be
'all-sided' results in an 'incorrect' praxis. Thus Mao
claims....20
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"Know the enemy, and know yourself, and you
can fight a hundred battles with no danger of
defeat".
and furthermore... 21
"Listen to both sides and you will be
enlightened, heed only one side and you will
be benighted."
As Corrigan et al have pointed out Mao's stress upon absolute
universalism is the basis of his critique of Stalinsim. When Mao
argues that 'Stalinism walks on one leg', 22 he is arguing
against Stalin's limitation of revolution to the economic and
industrial sphere. Mao on the other hand argues that the
revolution has to invade all spheres - the political and cultural
rather than simply the economic. The Chinese Revolution, it
appears, walks on both legs.
We ought to be careful of making too simple extrapolations from
Mao's argument about the universality of contradiction (a mistake
which Corrigan et al perpetrate). Firstly it is important to
recognise that while Mao criticised the 'partial' nature of
Stalin's revolution, Stalin and Mao are unified in certain
significant ways (see below, espeically the discussion of a
shared nihilism towards means). Secondly, we shall see in the
discussion below concerning the relation of Mao's theorising to
that of Marx, that Mao's rule-bound 'absolute' conception of
universalism (revolution is everything) is to be distinguished
from Marx's principled concept of universalism (the revolution
-191-
has a place).
We should now ask how does Mao conceive of revolutionary
transformation - what is the movement of dialectic for Mao? It
is instructive to consider in this context the following
well-known aphorism from his 'Little Red Book' 23
"We should support whatever the enemy opposes
and oppose whatever the enemy supports."
Kolakowski cryptically asserts that this is a sentence that 'no
European Marxist would have written'. The point should be to
attempt to understand what this tells us of Mao's theorising and
to generate a sense of his uniqueness, rather than merely
stipulating this - as Kolakowski seems content to do. What Mao
conceives of as dialectic is a movement of contradiction or
opposition. The rule of dialectic is confrontation - meeting an
enemy head-on. Dialectic for Mao requires self to generate its
strength in direct opposition to other. The attraction of
confrontation for Mao is its here and now immediacy - its
concreteness is his remedy for the abstraction of the 'two great
errors' of dogmatism and empiricism.
In order to deepen our understanding of Mao's conception of
dialectic as confrontation/opposition of self to other, we must
examine a refinement he makes to his theory of contradiction.
Since the whole world is dominated by a multiplicity of
contradictions it is important to be able to distinguish priority
amongst contradictions, given a concern for strategy - correct
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rules. Thus Mao attempts to develop a distinction between
'principal' and 'secondary' contradiction as a rule of
dialectical intervention. The principal contradiction is the
dominant contradiction in any process - that which influences and
shapes the nature of all other ('secondary') contradictions. For
example the 'principal' contradiction in a capitalist society is
that between capital and labour. All other contradictions within
capitalism, eg the contradiction between petty bourgeois and
bourgeoisie, are secondary to the principal contradiction. The
important point to grasp about this distinction is that it
clearly demonstrates the character of Mao's methodic conception
of revolution - revolution as orientation to rule.
It is Mao's commitment to (principal) contradiction as rule which
enables us to interpret his version of China's relationship
(self) to the foreigner (other). In Mao's conception of foreign
policy there are two great enemies. On the one hand there exists
the contradiction of China with the imperialism of the capitalist
United States, and on the other the 'expansionism' and 'hegemony'
of the revisionist Soviet Union.
Mao's view is that China's (self's) principal contradiction is
with the 'revisionist' Soviet Union. Therefore the commitment to
orient to contradiction as rule obliges China to 'support
whatever the enemy (Soviet Union) opposes, and oppose whatever
the enemy (Soviet Union) supports'.
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If we understand contradiction as orientation to rule, we
illuminate what is a lacuna for Maoists and non-Maoists alike -
the seemingly impenetrable nature of Mao's conception of
'correct' foreign policy. Even the most dedicated Maoists who
fully support Mao's domestic policy (or China's 'alternative path
to Socialist Construction') find his attitude to international
relations difficult to accept. While a few have had the courage
to criticise this aspect of Maoism, the standard version of this
among Western Maoists is to regard it as an aberration which is
related to the border disputes between China and Russia.
Corrigan et al have strangely very little to say about Mao's
conception of foreign policy. Kolakowski regards Mao's foreign
policy as final confirmation of the disjunction between Mao's
conception of theory and practice, as is indicated in the
following citation where he describes the course of action in
Mao's foreign policy as....24
"...a straightforward political one and not a
matter of Maoist ideology; as far as Marxist
language is still used in prosecuting this
policy, it is decorative rather than
essential."
In short, Kolakowski considers Mao's foreign policy as
opportunistic and deeply unrelated to his theorising. For us,
neither the view of foreign policy as aberration (Western Maoist
view) nor as opportunism (Kolakowski) are appropriate. Mao's
foreign policy is deeply embedded in his theorising. What we
ought to consdier is the relationship of Mao's linear, mechanical
and rule-bound concept of the character of revolution to Marx's
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principled and engaged universalism.
We have noted that Mao's conception of the rule of (principal)
contradiction obliges China to ally itself with reactionary and
autocratic regimes with the aim of defeating the number one enemy
of revisionism and eventually establishing world socialism.
(Examples of the distortions introduced by orienting to the rule
of principal contradiction are Maoist opposition to revolutionary
forces in Angola, Zaire, Oman, Chile, and support for (from 1970)
autocrats such as the Shah of Iran.)
How consistent is this view with the principled account of Marx?
Firstly we ought to note that Mao's willingness to 'kiss the
devil' establishes a congruence with Stalin's nihilism towards
the means of producing socialism. Corrigan et al's unwillingness
to acknowledge what is manifestly evident in Mao's writing (an
expressed - though not completely uncritical - admiration for
Stalin) can now begin to be seen as a failure to engage with
Mao's theorising at a deep level. Secondly the principled
account of Marx recognises that an alliance with reactionary
forces is likely to stifle the development of the 'progressive'
forces which are necessary for the creation of socialist or
universal man. This was at the root of Marx's critique of the
Lassalean socialists in Germany. 25 In this instance Marx
argued against Lassalle's view that socialism could be
established in Germmany by socialists aligning themselves with
the Prussian autocracy to defeat the 'bourgeois-liberals'. Both
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Lassalle and Mao fail to match up to the principled version in
two ways. Firstly, since allies must always influence each
other, socialism is likely to be adversely affected by its
harnessing of reaction. Secondly and more importantly the
destruction of progressive movements with the aid of reactionary
forces can only prematurely obliterate the potential necessary
(the 'negative universalism' of capitalism, for example, which we
discussed in chapters 1 and 2) for the transformation to the
'positive universalism' of socialism.
At this juncture it is appropriate to anticipate an objection
that might be raised concerning my perspective upon Mao. Some
Western Marxists might simply seek to amend Mao's version of
foreign policy by arguing that if Mao saw the contradiction with
capitalist (United States) imperialism as the principal
contradiction, then his perspective would be acceptable. This is
not what I am arguing. The proposed amendment simply changes the
rule, or re-orientates to the rule. My objection is to any
version of revolution as orientation to rule rather than to
principle. Changing the rule, or re-orientating to rule is no
genuine change - no real form of self-education.
In seeking to demonstrate that Mao presents a version of
revolution as orientation to rule we must be conscious that Mao
was not unaware of the problem of conceiving of revolution in
terms of rule. It has frequently been pointed out (for example
by Schram and Corrigan et al) that Mao was acutely sensitive to
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the problem of the growth of bureaucracy, and of a 'privileged'
class of 'capitalist roaders' within the Chinese Communist Party.
Stabilisation of the revolution seemed to Mao to produce not
consolidation but degeneration - a move away from socialist
principle. However the question then arises of how we are to
evaluate his responses to the problem of rule (in disjunction
from principle).
Mao argues in 'The Important Thing is to be Good at Learning'
26 that the emphasis upon 'social practice' in his philosophy
means that, to make a successful revolution, we must be prepared
to risk making mistakes, and to learn from and correct our
errors. Now, it would appear that Mao does display what he
recommends. In order to correct the error of 'capitalist
roading' he was willing to take the very pronounced risk of
unleashing the 'Cultural Revolution'. Likewise, he was willing
to alter course with respect to the early attempt to copy
Stalinist industrialisation.
How are we to interpret these recognitions of the problem of rule
becoming detached from principle - these attempts to 'correct
errors'? The views of Corrigan et al and Kolakowski seem not to
advance out understanding too far. For Kolakowski, these changes
are simply to be understood as vacillations which reflect the
desire of a leadership to maintain its power. For Corrigan et
al, the 'correction of errors' is to be understood as good
experimental practice - the necessary methodicity of a scientific
-197-
socialist seeking an alternative (to the Soviet model) path of
'socialist construction'. We can develop our view if we compare
Mao's solutions, or 'corrections', to Marx's principled
perspective.
One of the fundamental problems of Maoism concerns the advocacy
of permanent revolution. Since contradictions are seen as
universal with respect to history, ie as eternal, then revolution
has to be continually re-achieved. Mao argues that classes and
class conflict as social contradictions do not disappear with the
advent of socialism. The solution to this problem (the problem
of the growth of a privileged class of bureaucrats and
specialists) is to be found in a cultural revolution. However
one cultural revolution would not suffice - since contradictions
are eternal, the socialist revolution will have to be
periodically re-run. Thus Mao asserts that....26
"Two or three cultural revolutions should be
carried out every hundred years."
This amounts to an absolute conception of the universal/permanent
nature of socialist revolution. The revolution is seen as
everything, rather than as having a place in relation to other
processes. Furthermore we might begin to question whether Mao
has a developed and principled vision of socialism. The
linearity, or featurelessness, of Mao's theorising reduces
socialism to contradiction. Socialism loses its uniqueness - its
special character - in relation to the development of universal
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man, and becomes seen as just another stage in the endless
evolution of contradiction. This failure to see the (unique)
place of communism and socialism is betrayed in the following
passage.... 27
"Capitalism leads to socialism, socialism
leads to communism and communist
society.. .will also have a beginning and an
end. There is nothing in the world that does
not arise, develop and disappear. Monkeys
turned into men, mankind arose; in the end
the whole human race will disappear; it may
turn into something else; the earth itself
will also cease to exist."
So how does Mao's perspective with respect to permanent
revolution relate to the principled account of Marx? Firstly,
class conflict is not eternal for Marx. Communist society is
literally class-less (for Marx) (this does not mean that all
human conflict ends with communism, simply that conflicts no
longer have a class character). Secondly, communism is not just
another stage of historical development in the principled
account. As we argued in chapters one and two, genuine communism
is the first form of society of create the universal, conscious
and freely-associating individual. For Marx, the history of
mankind properly begins only with communism in the sense that
this is the first society in which man can collectively control
his destiny. Someone (Mao) who wants to make a revolution after
the revolution has been achieved either has not produced a
genuinely communist revolution in the first place, or cannot see
the place of revolution. Consolidating a genuine (universal)
revolution is not to be confused with stagnation.
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Section ill
We can, perhaps, best understand the relationship of Mao's
rule-bound concept of revolution to the principled understanding
of Marx if we consider the way in which Mao is seen as unique as
a revolutionary innovator. In 'Socialist Construction and
Marxist Theory' 28, Corrigan et al put forward the view that
Mao is unique in the sense that he provided new rules for the
construction of socialism. Mao's main innovation is to replace
the peasantry for the proletariat as the motive force of
revolutionary transformation. Thus Corrigan et al criticise the
'economismm' of Lenin and Stalin. They argue that transforming
the economic base (supposedly the Lenin/Stalin or 'Bolshevik'
method) is not as appropriate as Mao's method which concentrates
upon transforming the social relationships between producers. In
short Maoists see socialism as the extension of the social
relationships of the peasant commune (the 'mir' or 'obshchina')
to the level of society as a whole. The primitive communism of
the peasant commune is to be seen as the basis for future
'socialist construction'. Corrigan et al's Maoist perspective is
intended especially as a critique of Lenin. However I wish to
consider this perspective in relation not just to Lenin but also
to Marx.
There are two important issues which are not addressed in the
'revolution as orientation to ('new') rule', offered by Corrigan
\
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et al. Firstly, Mao's perspective is not entirely original or
unique, and secondly it is clearly at variance with Marx's
principled conception of revolution.
Let us firstly consider the originality of Mao's substitution of
peasantry for proletariat and advocacy of the peasant commune as
the method of 'socialist construction'. The notion that
communism can be based upon the social relationships of the
peasant commune is a view which was advocated by many theorists
whom Marx described as 'primitive communists' - most notably the
Russian 'Populists' whose views were subjected to critique by
both Lenin 29 and Marx 30. For Lenin, the peasant communism
of the Populists was literally reactionary in the sense that it
advocated a regression - turning the clock back - whereas
socialism is necessarily progressive.
If we now turn to the second issue - the relation of Mao's
peasant communism to Marx's principled concept of revolution - we
can see that there are several ways in which Mao is at variance
with Marx. The contrast between the two approaches is brought
clearly into focus if we consider the strongest argument
developed in the 'peasant communism' alternative. For Corrigan
et al (as with the Russian Populists) the social relationships of
the peasant commune are a good model of socialism in the sense
that this form provides a concept of the ' total', ' complete' or
'universal' man required in any socialist vision. This is
especially the case because the peasantry has not suffered the
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fragmentation and alienation brought about by the division of
labour within capitalism.
The view developed above is in flat contradiction to Marx. As we
argued at length in chapters one and two, the alienation of the
division of labour within capitalism is not seen as being
entirely negative. The alienation of relations of production
within capitalism contains within itself a tendency towards
universalism (albiet a deformed universalism) ie alienation
provides the conditions for its own dialectical transformation.
There is all the difference in the world between primitive
communism (which is localised in its nature) and Marx's universal
concept of communism (which is necessarily international and
'advanced', ie advanced in terms of man's capacity to control his
history, in its nature). If we fail to consider that there is a
cost to be paid in trying to 'leap' from primitive to genuine
communism we commit a serious error. What is weak about
primitive communism, for Marx, is its prematurity - the notion
that one can transform something without first having produced
what it is we are seeking to transform. Thus hew can primitive
communism (Mao) seek to transform private property, or the
division of labour, when these forms themselves have not first





We do not have to probe too deeply to identify negative views of
modernist versions of revolution. Indeed there appears to be a
strong, perhaps dominant, current of thought amongst both
Marxists and non-Marxists alike that perceives modernism as a
degeneration of the Marxist tradition. Thus, amongst
non-Marxists, Kolakowski entitles the third volume 1 of his
history of Marxist thought, which considers the post-Stalin era,
'The Breakdown of Marxism'. In this volume Kolakowski describes
modern Marxism as 'fantasy' and as revealing itself (almost as
though it had stepped out of Samuel Beckett's play, 'Waiting for
Godot') as 2 'the farcical aspect of human bondage'.
Amongst Marxists, likewise, there is a great deal of antipathy to
dominant forms of modernism, especially to the Western European
exemplars of contemporary Marxism. The most articulate
pro-Marxist critic of modernism is Perry Anderson 3. In his
analysis Anderson argues that the dominant imagery (or
'fundamental emblem') of post-Stalin Western Marxist thought has
been that of pessimism 4. Anderson traces the roots of this
pessimism to reactions to both the distortion of the Marxist
tradition by Stalinism and the failure of Western Marxism to
achieve a socialist transformation of any advanced capitalist
society. This pessimism, even despair, is accompanied by what
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for him are distortions of the Marxist tradition, viz:
1. A lack of articulation between theory and practice.
The notion that there is no developed praxis in
much of modernism. This particular barb is clearly
aimed at critical theory and the same charge has
been repeated by numerous other critics of this
perspective. See for example Jay 5 and Bottomore
6. We might begin to see how shallow a conception
of practice is implicit in some of this criticism
when we note that Bottomore considers that a theory
can only be said to have a satisfactory praxis if
its practitioners are active members of a political
party.
2. The concentration of Marxist theorists into
'professional philosophy' which resulted in a
turning away frrom an analysis of the economic and
a facing toward culture, which is, for Anderson, a
reversal of the proper priorities of Marxist
theory.
3. Finally, for Anderson and for many other
conventional Marxist critics of modernism, this
pessimism generates a form of introversion, an
impotence and inability of effect any serious
transformation of the advanced capitalist
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transformation of the advanced capitalist
societies.
How are we to understand the kind of critique presented by
Anderson? We might begin by noting that it accounts for an
'excessive' or 'extreme' aspect of modernism. Modern Marxism, at
its worst, can display a narrow introversion, and can appear as
alternately quiescent and nihilistically directionless. However,
ought we not to look for the good in modernism, see what it
offers at its best as well as at its worst? Furthermore we ought
to go further than Anderson and Bottomore in attempting to
account for the grounds of the pessimism displayed by modernists.
Firstly we should recognise more candidly than Anderson does that
what he sees as the origin of this pessimism is indeed two very
real failures of Marxism. Thus Stalinism does represent a
degeneration of the Marxist tradition, and the inability to
produce a socialist revolution in an advanced capitalist society
is too a failure. Modernists are correct to seek to call the
tradition to account in striving for an understanding of these
failures. There is therefore a second extreme which Anderson
fails to consider, that of ignoring or glossing (as with
apologists for Stalin) the failures of the tradition. Neither
seeking to ignore failure (apologetics) nor a numbed introversion
(the excess of modernism) are appropriate responses to failure.
However, what modernism does show an awareness of is the need to
take responsibility for what has been done (Stalinism) and what
-205-
has not been achieved (a socialist revolution in an advanced
society). Modernism sees the need for Marxism to suffer what are
the consequences of its actions. If we fear to suffer (Anderson)
what we have done, or what has been done in the name of our
tradition, then we fail to educate ourselves, and feel the force
of our actions. Avoiding the necessary suffering implicated in
failure is to produce an irresponsible practice, rather than what
Marxism requires - a responsible practice. If we are willing to
be patient, to suffer, then we can see that pessimism is only one
possibility in modernism. Instead of the negativity of
pessimism, it is my argument that there is latent within some
forms of modernism a positive and liberating theorising.
In my investigation of modernism I shall contradict flatly some
of the main elements of the critique presented by writers such as
Bottomore and Anderson. Thus I see the analysis of culture as a
necessity rather than a luxury. Viewing production as a wider
process than the narrowly economic likewise is to be viewed as
progressive. Finally, the rediscovery of basic philosophical
questions in Marx is to be regarded as a strength rather than a
weakness in modernism.
In the following discussion I look at two exemplars of modernism
(Gramsci, and socialist feminism) which preserve the conception
of Marxism as a moral enterprise - Marxism as a universal and
engaged mode of orientation to principle.
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Section II
What is immediately impressive about Gramsci is the extent to
which even the sternest critics of Marxism are willing to
acknowledge that his theorising is fresh, unencumbered by dogma
and unique in its approach. An example of this response to
Gramsci is Kolakowski, who as we have seen does not have a high
regard for modernist Marxism in general. However of Gramsci he
has the following to say....7
"(Gramsci) is probably the most original
political writer among the post-Lenin
generation of Communists."
Likewise the French Marxist, Louis Althusser, who writes from a
different viewpoint to Gramsci within the Marxist tradition,
states 8
"Who has really tried to follow up the
explorations of Marx and Engels? I can only
think of Gramsci."
The originality of Gramsci from our point of view is attributable
to his attempt to suffer the failures of Marxism - to ask the
really difficult questions, and further to learn from the
suffering of failure, in a way which shows how revolutionary
theorising can re-orient to principle in a universal way.
Gramsci is one of the few theorists who is willing to engage
seriously, firstly with the failure to transform capitalism in
the advanced societies, and secondly with the bureaucratic
degeneration of Soviet communism.
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We argued in Chapters 1 and 2 that a distinguishing feature of
the principled account of Marx's concept of revolution is the
primacy of an investigation of the nature of man, and the place
of revolution in relation to the development of man's essence.
What I wish to demonstrate about Gramsci's theorising is not so
much that an investigation of the essence of what it is to be man
is at the centre of Gramsci's philosophy (though recognition of
this is important since it is most frequently either ignored, eg
by Althusser, or glossed over, as in the pieces on Gramsci by
Kolakowski already referred to, and Joll 9 and Anderson 10),
as that he develops this question, ie that he does not simply
repeat Marx here. What is original about Gramsci is that he
allows us to see ways in which it is possible, within the modern
period, to re-orient to principle in a universal and engaged
fashion.
We can begin to understand the centrality of questions on the
nature of man to Gramsci's thought if we consider the following
typification of Marxism offered by Gramsci 11
"This philosophy (Marxism) always regards as
the major factor in history not crude economic
facts but man, men in society, men who
interact with each other, who develop through
these contacts...a collective social will."
Furthermore if we consider Gramsci's 'Prison Notebooks' which is
the essential part of his work, we can note that a whole section
is devoted to and entitled 'What is Man?'. In this important
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(though much ignored by conventional critics of Gramsci) section,
Gramsci says of the question 'What is Man?' 12
"This is the primary and principal question
that philosophy asks."
In this sense Marxism, or 'the philosophy of praxis' shares
something with all other forms of philosophy. What is
distinctive about Marxist philosophy is its mode of response to
this question. Hence 13
"Reflecting on it, we can see that in putting
the question 'what is man?' what we mean is:
what can man become?. That is, can man
dominate his own destiny, can he 'make
himself', can he create his own life?. We
maintain therefore that man is a process, and,
more exactly, the process of his actions. If
you think about it, the question itself 'what
is man?' is not an abstract question. It is
born of our reflection about ourselves and
about others, and we want to know, in relation
to what we have thought and seen, what we are
and what we can become; whether we really
are, and if so to what extent, 'makers of our
own selves', of our life and of our destiny."
Gramsci's perspective upon Marxism indicates a view of man as an
active producer, with the history of man seen as the story of
the development of man's essence in the world. The production of
conscious, active and universal, freely-associating individuals
is the aim of the 'philosophy of praxis'.
We ought to stress the importance of universalism to Gramsci's
philosophy and view of man. The production of a universal and
all-round individual can only be achieved by a philosophy which
is universal and revolutionary in its outlook. Accordingly it is
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not accidental that Gramsci often referred to his journalism
(Gramsci was a founding editor of the Italian Communist Party
(PCI) newspaper 'L'Unita, and had earlier been a leading writer
in the socialist newspapers 'Avanti' and 'L'Ordine Nuovo') as an
'integrated' jouranlism. Revolutionary writing, according to
Gramsci, had to touch every sphere of existence. Likewise
Marxism, as a dialectical philosophy, had to seek to present an
all-round understanding of the development of man. This is
discussed at length in his major theoretical work, the 'Prison
Notebooks', where Gramsci argues that....14
"The true fundamental function and
significance of the dialectic can only be
grasped if the philosophy of praxis is
conceived as an integral and original
philosophy which opens up a new stage of
history, and a new phase in the development of
world thought."
The 'integral' character of Marxist philosophy is reflected in
the fact that it can only be a world-based philosophy. Any
attempt to produce a Marxism which falls short of an all-round
view of man is a perversion of the character of the Marxian
vision, and to be condemned as one-sided. An example of this
form of distortion would be to view the concept of 'man as a
producer1 in uniquely economic terms, which would turn production
into a one-sided, rather than universal, concept. Thus Gramsci
argues that 15
"It may be said that the economic factor
(understood in the immediate, Judaic sense of
historical economism) is only one of several
ways in which the basic historical process
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manifests itself."
Even though Gramsci does argue that the economic factor is only
one of several ways in which the basic historical process
manifests itself, he is not attempting to displace a naive
economic determinism with an equally naive pluralist view of
social forces. We can grasp this if we understand how he views
the relationship between base (economy) and superstructure ( of
which the ideological, political and cultural form a part). It
makes no sense to Gramsci to talk of a relationship of
determination (which seems to him 'mechanical') between base and
superstructure. The two parts each influence the other and are
constitutive of an integrated totality, ie their relationship is
one of dialectic rather than determination. Gramsci referred to
base and superstructure forming a 'historical bloc'. This does
not, however, negate priority, since the basic, or initial, or
defining, feature of man is his productive practice, his work on
nature. Nevertheless this basic activity is inconceivable except
within a social context which constitutes that practice. This
seems to me to be thoroughly grounded in Marx, viewed in terms of
orientation to principle. Gramsci is orienting to Marx's dictum
that....16
"It is not man's consciousness which
determines his being, but on the contrary his
social being which determines his
consciousness."
Productive practice is decisive, but only where this is viewed as
other-oriented, ie social and conscious.
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It is important to note that Gramsci's universalism is not an
abstract concept (remember that [citation 13] 'the question "What
is Man?" is not an abstract question'). Gramsci's universalism
is an engaged rather than an abstract conception of man. Indeed
the originality of Gramsci is attributable to the extent that his
vision of universal development was engaged with the conditions,
ie the potential and resistances of modern capitalism.
Gramsci more than any other contemporary Marxist understood the
force of recognising that the universalising and rationalising
potential of capitalism was not exhausted. This is one of the
dominant themes of 'The Prison Notebooks' where Gramsci argues
that capitalism as a 'social formation' is unlikely to disappear
as long as the universalising forces within it find the power for
further forward movement. There are two consequences of this
insight. Firstly, the final victory of socialism will require a
victory in an 'advanced' capitalist society. Because the
universalising momentum in advanced capitalism is still a vital
force, and equally because the culture and consciousness of the
proletariats of these societies are insufficiently developed in
relation to that force, the socialist transformation is likely to
involve what will be literally a 'long revolution'. Secondly,
since Gramsci's view of universalism is an engaged rather than an
abstract view of man, universal modes of production relationships
will not appear ex nihilo, but, as in Marx's vision, 'out of the
womb of capitalism'. Here Gramsci asserts that....17
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"The socialist state already exists
potentially in the institutions of social life
characteristic of the exploited labouring
class1.
We might ask a number of questions of Gramsci's engaged concept
of universalism. Firstly, we might ask what are the embryonic
forms within modern capitalism which can be transformed into the
'positive' universalism of socialism - where is the potential
which offers the possibility of a dialectical change? For
Gramsci, one answer to this question is to be found in the
development of workers' councils. We can perhaps best understand
the positive universalising potential of the workers' councils if
we compare Gramsci's view of them in relation to the trade union
as an institution. To begin with, the concept of a workers'
council is more comprehensive than that of the trade union.
Within an enterprise, the trade union can be a sectional force in
the sense that it tends to represent some, eg especially skilled
workers), but not all employees. The workers' council organises
all of the workers within any given factory, irrespective of
level, skill, creed, political affiliation, etc. However the
most important sense in which the workers' council represents an
advance towards universalism is with regard to its function. The
trade union as an institution, according to Gramsci, is one-sided
in the sense that it can only (at best) modify or reform
capitalism. In that sense the trade union is a bargaining
institution which is self-limiting in its relation to the control
of production. Typically the trade union will seek to improve
wages and conditions for some of the workforce, but will cede the
strategic (ie the really important) decisions to capital or, more
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precisely, the representatives of capital. (This is not to say
that the trade union is a useless form from a revolutionary's
standpoint. Thus even limited bargaining can underscore
contradictions between labour and capital.) The function of the
factory council represents more the potential for a complete ie
qualitative rather than quantitative turn in the nature of work,
ie represents genuine revolutionary potential. In concept, the
workers' council represents not the limited economistic
aspirations of the trade union but the comprehensive control of
all spheres of production by the whole of a work force. Clearly,
the councils represented a stage in the revolutionary process, ie
they were transitional forms, and their internal structures would
have to be extended beyond the limits of individual workplaces.
However the universalising potential which they represented is
fundamental to Gramsci's thought.
We can further our understanding of Gramsci's principled view of
revolution - his universal and engaged view, if we consider this
in relation to a version of revolution which falls short of the
principled view and offers a rule-bound alternative. In this
context Gramsci's polemical interchanges with Bordiga (who was a
rival leader of an 'ultra-left' wing within the PCI) is
instructive. Bordiga was notoriously anti-theoretical, and
fundamentally disagreed with Gramsci's view that the development
of the culture and consciousness of the proletariat is a decisive
force in the revolutionary struggle. Thus Bordiga claimed 18
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"The necessity of study is something
proclaimed by a congress of schoolteachers and
not of socialists."
For Bordiga, grabbing state-power via the agency of a strictly
disciplined revolutionary vanguard was what mattered. In this
version there is no difference between a coup d'etat and a
revolution. As we have argued before, this is a one-sided view
of revolution, in the sense that it fails to integrate the
political with the social and economic dimensions of
revolutionary struggle. However, this one-sidedness is brought
out more starkly if we compare Bordiga with Gramsci in terms of
their view of fascism. For Bordiga ( .
), there was no real difference between the Fascists of
Mussolini and the bourgeois parliamentarians such as the
Socialist Party of Serrati. Gramsci, seeing that Fascism was not
just a threat to 'bourgeois-democratic' institutions, but also to
the proletarian movement as a whole, argued that a policy of
'broad alliances' with progressives, eg the Socialist Party etc.,
was necesssary. Bordiga's failure is the failure (see Chapter 4,
especially the discussion of Lenin's 'Left-Wing Communism - An
Infantile Disorder') to distinguish compromises on principle from
tactical compromises, ie rejection of compromise in toto, or
confusion of principle and rule. Bordiga's one-sided
abstraction prevents him from seeing any place for compromise (ie
alliance with non-communist 'progressives'). Bordiga's
maximalism - 'all or nothing' - displays the kind of impetuous
disregard for the state of development of proletarian
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consciousness in relation to the forces opposing it,
characteristic of the rebel who has not learned the virtue of
patience, necessary for the transition from the sheer rebel to
the revolutionary. Unsurprisingly, although the Comintern backed
Gramsci's policy on fascism in the early twenties, by the time
Stalin had consolidated his rule, the policy of 'popular fronts'
against Fascism in Europe was abandoned and the socialists/social
democrats were labelled a la Bordiga "Social Fascists'.
Gramsci's antipathy to a one-sided and abstract concept of
revolution and his advocacy, in its place, of a universal and
engaged concept of revolution is reflected in his view of the
role of the intellectual in encouraging the growth of proletarian
culture and consciousness. He always opposed the notion of an
intellectual elite which ' was segregated from the mass of the
population. The term 'organic intellectual' connotes Gramsci's
view that the intellectuals had to become active and engaged with
the proletariat. Any disengaged concept of the revolutionary
intellectual would produce a 'vanguard with no army to support
it'. In Gramsci's view the intellectual must be intimately and
dialectically interconnected with the masses; his role is that
of generating the momentum for a movement forward in the
consciousness of the proletariat. This process he designates as
a catharsis. Hence....19
"The term catharsis can be employed to
indicate the passage from the purely economic
to the ethico-political moment. This also
means the passage from 'objective to
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subjective' and from 'necessity to freedom'.
Structure ceases to be an external force which
crushes man, assimilates him to itself, and
makes him passive; and is transformed into a
means of freedom, an instrument to create a
new ethico-political from, and a source of new
initiatives."
Thus the engaged, or 'organic' intellectual functions to inspire
the consciousness and active confidence of the proletariat,
thereby creating the opportunity for transforming the objective
world (what appears like ineluctable fate) into the subject of
conscious control, ie the intellectual makes available to the
masses awareness of the contingency of the objective world - that
it could be other than it is.
As we have argued the 'organic' intellectuals, engaged with the
proletariat, serve the function of aiding the development of a
revolutionary culture within that class. The concept, for which
Gramsci is perhaps best known, of hegemony refers to the process
by which a class develops and asserts its moral and intellectual,
ie cultural, leadership in advance of actually assuming political
power. Any group which fails to establish this form of cultural
hegemony before taking political power (eg the insurrectionist)
is liable to be unable to sustain a genuinely revolutionary
impetus. In short the cultural, political and economic forms of
socialist society have to be prefigured within the constricting
limits of capitalism. However we might ask what is distinctive
about the hegemony of the proletariat, since the concept of
hegemony relates to the process by which all ruling classes
within history have aspired to and maintained their dominance.
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From the point of view of this discussion (which is in no way
intended as a comprehensive discursive account of the topic of
hegemony) what is fundamental and unique to the proletarian from
of hegemony is its universalism. Proletarian hegemony will have
to transform and extend the already international character of
capitalist hegemony into a world-wide system of cultural
leadership. Thus he argued that....20
"....hegemony is necessarily an educational
relationship and occurs not only within a
nation, but in the international and
world-wide field, between complexes of
national and continental civilisations."
Yet further, proletarian culture would be universal to the extent
that it would open up broader areas of human existence to the
potential of human control - areas which were considered to be
mechanically determined (independent of human intervention) would
be transformed and seen for what they are - processes which offer
the possibility of 'organic' or dialectical intervention.
Gramsci's discussion of catharsis and hegemony has much in cormvon
with the aporia evident in Marx's writing (especially in 'The
Grundrisse' and in 'Capital') where appearance - the seemingly
law-like, mechanically caused structure of the capitalist social
and economic system is subverted and seen for what it is - the
product of human interaction, offering up the possibility of its
own transformation by man. (This seems to me to be the real
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sense in which 'catharsis' marks the movement from the 'purely
economic' to the ethico-political moment.
It is evident from the 'Prison Notebooks' that, by that period in
the development of his thought, Gramsci consdiered the socialist
revolution would be a 'long revolution'. That is, the creation
of a proletarian culture which could exercise moral and
intellectual leaadership prior to the period of revolutionary
crisis was something which would require long and painstaking
effort on the part of revolutionaries. Accordingly he developed
a view of historial development which argues that revolution is
not a smoothly continuous (nor permanent, in Trotsky's sense)
proocess but one marked by a distinction between 'passive' and
'active' phasess. It is important to consider these phases as an
integrated totality - they cannot be seen in isolation (this is
significant in assessing the relationship of Gramsci to
Eurocommunism - see below). Gramsci explains the relationship
between 'active' and 'passive' phases of revolution in terms of a
military analogy. Hence he argues that....21
"The war of movement becomes increasingly a
warr of position and one can say that a state
wins a war according to low far it prrepares
it minutely....in the time of peace."
What he is saying is that the force required (the hegemony
established) for the turn, for the 'active' phase of revolution
has to be generated within a 'passive' phase or war of position.
The establishment of hegemony in the passive phase has to be
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thoroughgoing - has to affect every sphere is the proletariat's
existence if the turn is too be achieved, ie it is is to be a
genuine revolution - a turn of the whole man in his nature or
essence.
We ought now to consider how Gramsci views the Party in relation
to the development of the revolutionary struggle. The following
extract should serve to focus our thoughts....22
"We have maintained:
1. that the rrevolution is not necessarily
proletarian and communist simply because
it proposes and achieves the overthrow of
the bourgeois state;
2. nor is it proletarian and communist
simply because it proposes and achieves
the destruction of the representative
institutions and administrative machinery
through which central government
exercises the political power of the
bourgeoisie.
3. it is not proletarian and communist even
if the wave of popular insurrection
places power in the hands of men who call
themselves communists, The revolution is
proletarian and communist only to the
extent that is a liberation of the
proletarian and communist forces that
were developing within the very heart of
the society dominated by the capitalist
class."
This indicates how clearly Gramsci rejects a partial (purely
political) concept of revolution. Gramsci well understands that
grabbing state power from the grasp of the bourgeoisie (a coup
d'etat) is to be distinguished from a revolutionary
transformation which is necessarily universal in its scope. A
genuinely revolutionary Communist Party seeks to guide the
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liberation of social and economic forms already developing
amongst the proletariat - universalising the consciousness of the
proletariat, training for future socialist forms of power by
participation in the workers' councils, etc. Any attempt to
sieze political power before the social forces have developed
sufficient momentum to carry through a universal transformation
is premature and tantamount to opportunism. Like Marx, but
unlike Bordiga, Gramsci was cautious of the dangers of
Jacobinism.
If the party itself is to have an engaged relationship with the
proletariat, then the party itself needs the spontaneity and
dynamic provided by the proletarian mass moving towards a
universal consciousness. Likewise the party seeks to guids and
channel this force in a direction which will amplify its effect
in transforming capitalistic social relations. Thus the party is
not conceived, of as autonomous from the proletariat. Neither is
the party thought to mechanically dispense 'correct' ideas to a
subordinate and externalised proletariat. Party and proletariat
are conceived as having an 'organic' relationship. Each is
dialectically interconnected to the other. Proletarian force and
spontaneity is ineffective (can burn itself out) unless it
harnesses itself with a guiding and organising influence which
can preserve rather than repress the origin of that inspiration.
Similarly the structure provided by the party will cease to be
enabling and liberatory, instead ossifying and repressive, should
it fail to engage with the driving force of proletarian
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spontaneity.
Gramsci was remarkably prescient about the dangers of the failure
of a party to maintain an 'organic', ie vital and engaged,
intimate relationship to the proletariat. Should (communist)
rule become detached from principle (should rule be confused
with, or mistaken for, principle) the result would be a
bureaucratic deformation of the party and an ossification of the
revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Consider the
following warning....23
"Woe betide us if, through a sectarian
conception of the Party's function in the
revolution, we should try to turn it into a
material hierarchy, to fix in mechanical forms
of immediate power the governing apparatus of
the moving masses, to constrict the
revolutionary process into Party forms. If
that happens we may succeed in diverting part
of mankind from its course and in 'dominating'
history, but the true revolutionary process
will escape from the control and influence of
the Party, which will unconsciously become an
organ of conservatism."
Bureaucracy - conceiving of revolution as orientation to rule
(the 'correct' rules) in ignoring principle treats the
proletariat's initiative and force as a threat. The rule-bound
conception of party sees only two (unprincipled) alternative
mc)3es of orientation to (its) rule - either conformity or
deviation, either predictability or chaos. In this view mass
initiative appears unpredictable and threatening. What should be
seen as an opportunity is seen as a threat, with the only
possible solution being seen as that of repression and resolute
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(but unprincipled) enforcement of rule. In the alternative or
principled account of Gramsci, the party, as guide, requires to
be engaged with the masses in the sense of being attuned to the
all-round development of the proletariat. While there might be
one and only one best way to enact a rule, a conception of
revolution as orientation to principle requires the party to flex
in relation to the proletariat - to change/violate rule in
relation to the development of the proletariat. In the
principled version the party (self) leaves the proletariat
(other) with something to do - the party treats the energy and
initiative as an opportunity to violate rule in the service of
principle. Failure to orient to principle would inevitably lead
to a rule-bound, ie bureaucratic, conception of the party.
Hence....24
"The predominance of bureaucratic centralism
in the state is a sign that the governing
group .is saturated and is turning into a
narrow clique whose object is to safeguard its
own petty privileges, restraining or even
stifling the development of opposing forces,
even when those forces are in accord with the
basic interests of the ruling elements...The
pathological manifestations of bureaucratic
centralism are due to a lack of initiative and
responsibility at the base, that is to say
political backwardness."
The bureaucratic conception of the party is thus one-sided and
abstract in the sense that it is fixated upon its own development
in isolation from the proletariat. Bureaucratic revolutionaries
(see the discussion of Stalin in Chapter 5) do not see the
contradiction of having an 'advanced' party vanguard leading a
'backward' proletariat. Gramsci's view of the role of the party
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as guide and teacher shows his awareness that the teacher cannot
advance unless he is aware of the level of development of his
pupil (of the level of consciousness of the proletariat). The
party exercises guidance by orienting not to itself, but to the
potential for the all-round development of the proletariat in any
given set of conditions. The only 'cure* for bureaucratic
deformation is the development of the culture and consciousness
of the proletariat, ie 'at the base".
Having attempted to give Gramsci a place within the principled
tradition of revolutionary thought, we ought to seek to deepen
cur analysis by considering the available critiques of Gramsci.
One important strand of thought argues that while Gramsci
displayed originality and incisiveness, his theorising is both
fundamentally contradictory and lacking in sufficient clarity and
precision to be an effective guide for modern revolutionary
movements in the West. This is the position adopted in yet
another piece by Perry Anderson 25 who argues that Gramsci's
concept of hegemony is ambiguous and ill-defined. Now, we do
have to recognise that there is a certain force to these
criticisms. Gramsci's work is often apparently vague and
'unfinished'. Likewise we have to be aware that the basis of his
theorising, ie 'The Prison Notebooks' is just that - notebooks,
rather than fully developed analysis. However I wish to take
issue with the essence of the conventional critique of Gramsci.
What actually underpins the view that Gramsci's praxis if flawed
because of imprecise definition of his basic concepts (such as
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'hegemony') is the notion that we can read off rules of
revolutionary practice from 'correct' theoretical perspectives.
If revolution is conceived of in a rule-bound way, then the best
that can be said of Gramsci's theorising is that it is indecisive
or ambivalent. However, our alternative - seeing revolution as
engaged and universal orientation to principle - necessitates
that theorising be flexible - recognises that if theory and
practice are to be unified principle has to be seen as something
which can be oriented to in a variety of ways within the
constraints of universalism and an engaged antipathy to
abstraction. Now, for the rule-bound, this would seem like
nihilism. Intelligibility, for them, means the presence of
(adequately) correct rules. It is the absence of rule conceived
in this way which makes Gramsci seem problematic. To the
rule-bound perspective,•the principled version of Gramsci appears
to amount to 'anything goes' in relation to revolutionary praxis.
No rules, in short, equals dis-orientation for them. We can
counter this by demonstrating that, while principle can be
embodied universally and non-abstractly in a variety of ways,
flexibility is not to be confused with indifference.
What we shall seek to demonstrate is that flexibility requires
discipline, rather than indifference, and an all-round, rather
than (what the rule-bound view produces) a partial conception of
revolution. In this context it is instructive to examine
critically the claim made by the theorists of Eurocommunism to be
the true inheritors of Gramsci's legacy 26. Put very baldly,
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Eurocommunist theories attempt to put forward a view of creeping
revolution being appropriate to the advanced capitalist
societies. They interpret Gramsci's concept of 'passive'
revolution to suggest that revolution can proceed by the
proletariat attaining 'the gradual conquest of some powers'
within capitalism; thus almost by sleight of hand changing the
nature of capitalism. Now our objection to this view is not that
it is tactically incorrect ('the wrong rules'), though this
argument has been advanced. 27 What we argue is that this is a
one-sided violation of Gramsci understood as a principled
theorist. The crucial issue is understanding that Gramsci never
saw 'passive' stages of revolution in isolation from the
ultimately 'active* stages that they would assume. The 'passive'
stage is always a preparation for a period when a revolutionary
crisis would occur, necessitating an 'active' stage of direct and
decisive confrontation with the boureoisie. Thus Eurocommunism
falls short of being genuinely revolutionary in a principled
sense. Firstly it has no place (no stomach for confronting the
necessity) for a 'turn', ie a qualitative rather than
quantitative change (a revolution might require the accretion of
'concessions' from the bourgeoisie, but this does not exhause the
concept of a revolutionary praxis). Secondly, as Marx and Lenin
knew, the extent of development of proletarian culture and
consciousness required the test of its maturity in a period of
revolutionary crisis, ie in what Gramsci calls the 'active' phase
of revolution. Recognising the all-round integrity of active and
passive phases, and generating the self-consciousness and
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cultural strength of the proletariat for the thorough test that
will inevitably be applied of its maturity in the active phase is
a fundamental feature of Gramsci's theorising.
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Section III
In seeking to deepen our critique of Grarasci we ought to confront
directly an important question which has, thus far, only been
addressed in an oblique manner. The question we should focus on
is why is . Gramsci a good exemplar of modernism? What is
specifically modernist about Gramsci's perspective? In order to
begin to answer this question we should consider the following
sorts of issues in our analysis:
1. What is Gramsci's relationship to both Marx and Lenin? Does
Gramsci merely repeat Marx, or docs he genuinely re-orient, in a
principled way to Marx? Given Gramsci's evident respect for
Lenin, what are the specific contrasts in the relationship of
their perspectives?
2. The view of Gramsci as a modernist might fruitfully be
compared with that of an alternative, incompatible image -
Gramsci as a 'traditionalist'.
3. What are some of the important elements of critique raised
by modernists themselves? Here we might look at the recent work
of a 'sympathetic' critic, Carl Boggs (28) whose "Gramsci's
Marxism' is frequently cited in the literature. Furthermore, we
might consider in greater detail one of the most advanced and
less 'sympathetic' critiques, Perry Anderson's work (see note 25)
'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci'.
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With respect to the first issue - that of Gramsci's relation to
Marx and Lenin- we may usefully consider the development of views
concerning the revolutionary transition from capitalism to
socialism. As we have already noted, (See Chapters 1 & 2), for
Marx, the transition to socialist (positive) universalism was
unlikely to be achieved until capitalist (negative) universalism
had been developed to its limit. Furthermore, as again we
indicated earlier, there are intimations in the 'Grundrisse' of
Marx glimpsing the long-term durability and elasticity of
capitalistic development, nothwithstanding the fundamental
contradictions within that system. For Marx, an important point
is that universal transformation - a real turn in man's nature or
essence - requires the transformation of every sphere of man's
social existence, not merely the economic or political dimensions
of that existence. Although it would be difficult to doubt that
Marx consistently underscores his analysis of the ultimate
failure of capitalism in terms of its fundamentally contradictory
development, there is an important sense in which he leaves the
question of the development of capitalism open. Thus, if
capitalism is to universalise 'every sphere of existence', this
leaves open the question of which spheres of social life remain
to be transformed in the course of capitalism's negative
universalism. Marx hints that capitalistic development will
involve more than the internationalisation of social relations of
production - that, for example, race will cease to be a barrier
to man's all-round development.
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Nonetheless, the story of the continuity of capitalistic
development remains contingent in important respects, ie requires
to be re-oriented to.
Recalling Lenin's attitude to the story of the continuity of
capitalism -in relation to the development of socialism, we can
see that he has a characteristically direct and relatively
unambiguous way of relating to this story. For Lenin, this story
is nearing an end point, or at least is in its final chapter. We
may recall that for Lenin, 'Imperialism' is the 'Highest Stage of
Capitalism'. In this analysis capitalism reaches a zenith point
when capital becomes effectively internationalised as a social
system through the agency of the market. The important
questions, for Lenin, refer- to the nature of the relationship
between 'advanced' and 'retarded' capitalisms, within the
frameworks of an international chain, which we may recall he has
'broken at its weakest link'. What interests Lenin is the
movement of large scale economic and material forces with respect
to the internationalisation of capital and the political risks
and opportunities which this affords revolutionaries. Insofar as
he analyses ideology with regard to the 'imperialism as the
highest stage' thesis, Lenin is content to note that the
super-profits obtained from imperial expansion enable the
bourgeoisie, in the advanced societies, to 'buy-off' the
militancy of their domestic proletariats. Here, Lenin is viewing
the attitudes and culture of the proletariat in exclusively
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conscious and 'rational' terms, ie the proletariat make a
conscious and 'rational' decision in relation to the level of
wages.
One way to understand Gramsci's originality is to examine his
analysis of the prolonged development of capitalism - of its
potential to extend the frontiers of (negative) universalism. We
have already discussed above, with respect to the concept of
hegemony, Gramsci's analysis of the way in which capitalist
universalism extends deeply into the culture and consciousness of
the proletariat in the advanced societies. However, perhaps one
Specific example will highlight the extent to which Gramsci is
aware of capitalism's continuing capacity to extend its locus of
control, to a much greater degree than Lenin.
The example we may consider is Gramsci's discussion of
developments within the most advanced capitalism of his times --
the United States. In the much-neglected section of 'The Prison
Notebooks' entitled 'Americanism and Fordism", Gramsci examines
ways in which both the state and private capital encroach upon
wider and wider areas of the everyday life of the American
proletariat. Thus Prohibition is seen as an attempt by the state
to regulate and discipline the behaviour of the proletariat to
fit in with the exigencies of manufacturing technology. More
interestingly, he goes on to discuss the activities of the
leading capitalist entrepreneurs in the following way 29
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"It is worth drawing attention to the way
industrialists (Ford in particular) have been
concerned with the sexual affairs of their
employees and with their family arrangements
in general. The truth is that the new type of
man demanded by the rationalisation of
production and work cannot be developed until
the sexual instinct has been suitably
regulated and until it too has been
rationalised."
and furthermore....30
"It seems clear that the new industrialism
wants monogamy: it wants the man as a worker
not to squander his nervous energies in the
disorderly and stimulating pursuit of
occasional sexual satisfaction. The employee
who goes to work after a night of 'excess' is
no good for his work."
These passages are indicative, not just of the fact that Gramsci
is sensitive to the extension of capitalistic universalism into
broader and broader areas of the conscious, everyday activities
of the proletariat, but that capitalists were just beginning to
move the site of class struggle into a qualitatively different
realm compared to that of the conscious. Gramsci is here
anticipating the invasion of capitalism beyond the conscious
activity of humans into the unconscious and the subconscious -
the realm of the instinctual. Thus, the intensification of
oppression and the stimulation of production are not just to be
achieved by the mechanisms identified by Marx and Lenin, such as
the 'reserve army of the unemployed' in times of crisis, or the
use of 'high wages' in times of boom, all of which act upon the
conscious, calculative rationality of the proletariat. (This is
not to say Gramsci ignores these mechanisms which were and remain
important levers to capital - for example he discusses the role
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important levers to capital - for example he discusses the role
of 'high wages' in Fordised industries in the USA.) The new
realm, which capital is beginning to invade, for Gramsci is the
psyche - trie potential for controlling the subconscious drives
and instincts of the proletariats of the advanced societies.
While Gramsci's observations here do not amount to a developed
theory of sexuality, they nonetheless anticipate many of the
concerns of modernists. In particular, Gramsci's linking of
sexual oppression to the demands of the new technological
rationality of modern capitalism is resonant of Herbert Marcuse's
discussion in 'Eros and Civilisation'. Similarly the North
American Marxist, Carl Boggs, argues that Gramsci....31
"produces some insights into the nexus
puritanism-capitalism-family that were
paralleled within Marxism only by the
pioneering work of Wiihelm Reich."
What is distinctly modernist in Gramsci's approach is that he
recognises that these observations concerning the invasion of the
psyche have consequences for a revolutionary praxis. This is
particularly significant with respect to Gramsci's relationship
to socialist feminism. Gramsci draws two conclusions from the
forced integration of the sexual, family and productive
dimensions in contemporary capitalism. Fristly, 32 he notes
that it is likely that the most progressive (in a liberated,
socialist sense) attitudes to sex and morality would be likely to
develop amongst those furthest removed from the production
process. Secondly, and most importantly, he observes that
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women's struggle against male domination is likely to trigger new
patterns of consciousness and action which may undermine
bourgeois hegemony within the production process itself. It is
important to see here that while Gramsci's stress is upon the
integrated, or organic nature of this struggle, he recognises
that feminist struggle will necessitate an important degree of
autonomy, as the following passage indicates....33
"The formation of a new feminine personality
is the most important question of an ethical
and civil order connected with the sexual
question. Until women can attain not only a
genuine independence in relation to men but
also a new way of conceiving themselves and
their role in sexual relations, the sexual
question will remain full of unhealthy
characteristics."
In other words, although female struggle will have consequences
for the whole structure of bourgeois life, the creation of a new
feminine personality and identity is necessarily the work of
women themselves.
We may now be in a better position to develop our understanding
of Gramsci's relation to Marx and Lenin. While Marx never
underestimated the elasticity of capitalism in his later
writings, (especially in "The Grundrisse"), his vision of the
development of capitalist (negative) universalisation left us
with only glimpses of that potential. Gramsci's analysis carries
forward Marx"s vision, and is essentially a development of it.
Where Marx tends to be abstract and cryptic in relation to the
potential of this development, Gramsci provides analysis of
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specific tendencies, ie more than glimpses. With respect to
Lenin, Gramsci sees that capitalism may not stop at the process
of internationalisation and the 'imperial stage'. If Lenin sees
a 'highest stage' or final chapter, what we have sought to show
is that Gramsci sees a continuing story, with the struggle
against bourgeois hegemony moving on to new dimensions.
There is one further area of Gramsci's relation to Lenin that I
wish to develop. This relates to their resepctive images of the
revolutionary actor. As we argued at an earlier point in this
chapter, Gramsci viewed the revolutionary party not as a separate
vanguard unit which dominated the proletariat, but as involved in
an 'organic' way with the broad cultural as well as political
dimensions of the life of the proletariat. Failure to develop
this broad counter-hegemonic strategy would lead to failure.
The image of the revolutionary actor which emerges from Gramsci's
discussion is to be distinguished from that of Lenin. The model
of a revolutionary made available by Gramsci is of an individual
who is firmly integrated into the social and cultural, as well as
political, life of the proletariat. This is in stark contrast to
the Leninist image of the revolutionary actor (discussed in
greater detail below in Section IV of this chapter); the
full-time professional of the vanguard party who concentrates all
of his energies on the political struggle. It follows from
Gramsci's discussion that in the 'organic' or 'war of position'
phase of transformation the extra-party structures such as
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educational groups, and the whole range of counter-hegemonic
bodies play an indispensable role. Furthermore, in the decisive
phase, ie "war of movement' phase of revolution these structures
are not abandoned as 'peripheral'.
In order to clarify our analysis of Gramsci's place in the
revolutionary enterprise we ought now to turn to available
critiques of Gramsci by modernists.
The first area of critique we may consider is the tension between
traditionalist and modernist tendencies within Gramsci's thought.
In this area I shall mainly be concerned with criticisms that may
be launched by socialist feminists, and the 'sympathetic'
critique of Carl Boggs. There is an important area of Gramsci's
thought that may be considered 'traditionalist', ie his advocacy
of 'workers' councils'. This is regarded as particularly
traditionalist by socialist feminists in the sense that it tends
to put the focus of political and social struggle firmly within
the context of the sphere of 'the point of production', thus
excluding large sections of women from participation in
revolutionary action. It is significant here that there is no
mention of the idea of 'workers' councils' in his final
theoretical work, "The Prison Notebooks'. Carl Boggs attempts to
provide some tentative answers to the question of why Gramsci
ignored the question che councils in 'The Prison Notebooks'.
Thus he argues that: (a) Gramsci may have felt he dealt
adequately with the councils in the pre-Notebooks period, and (b)
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Gramsci was now concerned with developing new methods by which
Fascism could be countered. These arguments seem a little weak
as well as contradictory in the sense that any investigation of
countering Fascism would necessitate investigating why prior
organisational forms, such as the 'councils', had failed to
prevent Fascism's growth. It is noteworthy that Boggs ends his
speculation■here by conceding that....34
"it is too bad that Gramsci never really took
up the problem of the councils in the
"Notebooks", since it leaves some important
strategic questions unanswered."
It might plausibly be argued that Gramsci abandoned the concept
of the councils because they were too partial or restricted a
form for mass struggle, ie too restricted to the 'point of
production' sphere. Indeed this view is implicit in an earlier
part of Boggs' discussion. 35 Gramsci's omission of what he
regarded as an important pre-figurative form from the discussion
of his developed vision may indeed be regarded as a serious
weakness.
The second critique I wish to consider is one of the most
sophisticated, that offered by Perry Anderson in his article,
'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci' which we have referred to
briefly earlier in this chapter. Anderson presents two main
elements of critique. Firstly, he suggests that Gramsci
overstresses the role of consensus in establishing and
maintaining hegemony, and that Gramsci tends to ignore the
importance of the use of force in revolutionary transformation.
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Anderson argues that Gramsci ignores the point that....36
"The coercive state machine is the ultimate
barrier to a workers' revolution and can only
be broken by pre-emptive counter coercion."
and, 37
"A revolution will only succeed if the
repressive apparatus of the state itself
divides and disintegrates as it did in Russia,
China or Cuba."
Now, it seems that while there may be some point to the charge
that Gramsci over-emphasised the role of consensus, the argument
that he ignored the role of force in the 'ultimate' phase of
revolution is less strong. We may only recall an earlier part of
this chapter (see note 29) where we noted Mandel's analysis
which showed clearly that Gramsci was well aware that the
consensual element dominant in the 'passive' phase of revolution
always was linked to the 'active' phase, or war of movement where
violence and force would predominate.
The second element of Anderson's critique is, however, more
probing of Gramsci. Here Anderson points out certain decisive
areas of vagueness in Gramsci's analysis. In particular he
points out there are three different and contradictory views of
the relationship between civil society and the state offered by
Gramsci in the 'Notebooks'. The significance of this observation
lies in the fact that these ambiguities make it difficult to see
clearly the process by which a bourgeois society reaches a
decisive phase of crisis. Here the point is not so much that
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Gramsci ignores the phase of confrontation with the bourgeoisie,
ie the active phase of revolution, as that he leaves obscured the
dynamics of the relationship between civil society and the state
which would allow us to understand the process of movement from
'passive' to 'active' phases of revolution. This presents
another serious flaw in Gramsci's overall, universal vision.
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Section IV
One of the main benefits of considering socialist feminism as a
mode of modernist theory on revolution is that this exemplifies
well the argument that modernism need not degenerate into a
visionless and masochistic pessimism. Socialist feminism
represents one of the main sources of dynamic activism in the
left in the advanced societies. Instead of quiescence socialist
feminists offer verve and a resurgence of innovative socialist
vision; instead of introversion they engage a broad audience -
above all they offer a challenge to revitalise the tradition
which we ignore at our cost. To write about modernist
conceptions of revolution without attempting to take up the
challenge of socialist feminism is to fail to come to terms with
the spirit of the age.
Although the socialist feminist literature is already voluminous
and growing, I wish to concentrate on two main texts; these are
Juliet Mitchell's 37 'Woman's Estate' and Sheila Rowbotham et
al's 38 'Beyond the Fragments'.
We can commence by considering the universal character of
socialist feminism's mode of orientation to principle. Here the
work of Juliet Mitchell is instructive. In 'Woman's Estate'
Mitchell argues against any partial analysis of the place of
women. Woman's position, for her, is defined in relation to four
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interlinked dimensions or 'structures' - namely production,
reproduction, socialisation of children and sexuality. While
production, defined broadly (she understands production as
'social-human activity), remains the basis of her analysis, as
with Marx, this dimension is seen as taking its meaning in terms
of its relation to the other three dimensions. Hence she argues
against an. abstract conception of production which would see
production in isolation from all other dimensions. Thus Mitchell
offers the following observations....39
'This is a reminder that while one structure
may be the weak link in a unity like that of
woman's condition, there can never be a
solution through it alone.
What, then, is a possible revolutionary
attitude? It must include both immediate and
fundamental demands, in a single critique of
the whole of women's situation, that does not
fetishise any dimension of it....
The four elements of women's condition form a
structure of specific inter-relations. The
contemporary family can be seen as a triptych
of sexual, reproductive and socialisatory
functions (the woman's world) embraced by
production (the man's world). The exclusion
of women from production - social human
acitivity - and their confinement to a
monolithic condensation of functions within a
unity - the family - which is precisely
unified in the natural part of each function,
is the root cause of the contemporary social
definition of women as natural beings
The error of the old socialists was to see the
other elements as reducible to the economic;
hence the call for the entry of women into
production was accompanied by the purely
abstract slogan of the abolition of the
family. Economic demands must be accompanied
by coherent policies for the other three
elements; policies which at particular
junctures may take over the primary role in
immediate action."
What Mitchell, as with Rowbotham, is offering amounts to a
principled account of the position of women, in the same way as
Marx had offered a principled account of the dialectical
development' of mankind as a whole. In each case the emphasis is
upon conceiving of existence as a totality, and human development
as the decisive transformation of the potential inherent in human
essence. Mankind's (and women's) relationship to the natural
world has to be seen not as it appears - as a 'natural'
relationship - as ineluctable fate, but as a social and
contingent relationship - offering up the possibility of decisive
intervention - revolutionary change.
In 'Beyond the Fragments - Feminism and the Making of Socialism',
Rowbotham et al make the observation that the main challenges to
advanced capitalism in recent years have come from the
'sectoral', 'partial' or fragmentary sources. Thus the women's
movement, the black movement, the anti-fascist movement, tenant
and community groups, local shop-stewards' committees have all
led more or less successful challenges to the dominance of the
capitalist state. In the context of fragmentary struggles the
women's movement has occupied a leading role. The strength of
these fragmentary movements is related to their specificty. The
particularity of each struggle implies a strength derived from
the fact that the struggle itself is directly engaged with the
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involved in the struggle. However this
.-ikness, a barrier in the sense that its
what cuts off the possibility of generating
v-od) response to oppression. Socialist
to totalise or universalise these partial
■tich preserves the autonomy, innovativeness
r ««- • *-■
tK^se partial projects - in short socialist
^ need to 'go beyond the fragments'. Thus they~,r'—
*
n,?ed a very flexible and yet
!;-.ited form of organisation. It needs
-■« .able to build on and make links bwteeen
■-r initiatives towards popular democracy
■rtrol which working people are already
nowever limited and fragmented these
* iUives may be."
-ryond the fragments means moderating the excesses of
io«-cificity or partiality (leaving the fragments as
, on the other hand, an abstract or totalitarian
in enforced or excessive unity which stunts the
' ° separate fragments.
•<*rstand the universal orientation of socialist
•' ask the question, Why go beyond the fragments?
^ a significant question, say, for 'life-style'
or radical (ie in the sense of 'separatist') feminists
could characterise as a thoroughgoing partiality in
the universalism of socialist feminists. The answer
is somewhat complex. However consideration of
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the following extract may help us to focus more clearly on the
question 41
"The problem is that of gathering together all
the different sources of strength, uniting the
social power of the community with the
industrial power of those in production, and
pitching this popular power against the
existing state. This requires a strategy
based on the ideas and experiences of each
movement, and drawing from the lessons of past
struggles and from international experiences."
There are two reasons why a partial, or piecemeal or fragmentary
response to the problems of oppression of each of these groups:
women, blacks, etc., is not appropriate. Firstly the sources of
each of the various forms of oppression are interconnected, ie
the oppressed face common enemies. So women do not just face the
sexual division of labour and a sexist culture; blacks do not
just face racial discrimination and exploitation; workers do not
just face the representatives of capital, as though each were an
entirely separate protagonist. The contemporary capitalist state
- through its control of an interlinked set of institutions, and
its control over production and culture - is a basic feature of
the reproduction of all forms of oppression.
Secondly the organising force of oppression, the contemporary
capitalist state, is itself a unified, integrated and
(negatively) universal form. This integration or universalising
tendency can be seen in a variety of concrete manifestations, for
example in the increasingly international character of the
organisation of both capital and state. Furthermore this process
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can be identified in the extension of social control into further
and further areas of the existence of the mass of the population
through such agencies as the media and so on. Thus any
successful attempt to transform any one element of oppression has
itself to become integrated, or universalised. What socialist
feminists are saying is that the universal character of a
socialist vision is a necessary feature of any successful
challenge to oppression within contemporary capitalism.
What is significant about socialist feminism is the way in which
it has opened up the universal character of the socialist vision;
indicating wider and wider areas which require to be transformed
if a genuine socialism is to be established in the advanced
societies. Accordingly Rowbotham argues that....42
"The women's movement has touched many areas
of politics socialists have neglected and its
hold goes deeper. It absorbs more of your
being."
and furthermore....43
"It has meant that the women's movement has
been able to grow organically in areas of life
in which it is difficult for Leninist groups
to 'inject' themselves into. It implies a
politics in which the very process of
radicalisation carries the necessity of taking
initiatives in many aspects of our lives. If
this is not to be an impossible and
soul-breaking idea it requires the conscious
creation of cultural forms and a personal
vision of politics."
In short, capitalism has to be transformed universally, all areas
of experience within capitalism including the personal are to be
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seen as sites of struggle - locations for the creation of free
and universally associating individuals. There are two
inter-related consequences of the observations of Rowbotham et
al. Firstly socialists require to learn from the values and mode
of engagement ('organisational form') of the women's movement.
Secondly, and equally important, the women's movement has to see
its own limits (something which not all feminists are willing to
acknowledge). Thus Rowbotham is wise and honest enough to
say....44
"But despite its creativity, feminism by
definition expresses the experience of one
sex. It is necessarily partial."
The women's movement requires to integrate, totalise or
universalise itself within a broader struggle. Rowbotham
attempts to develop a view which shows, despite the problems
inherent in such an enterprise, that socialism and feminism can
become mututally supportive, ie neither one being fully absorbed
into the other, nor remaining separate in a sterile dislocation.
As we have seen Rowbotham argues that socialist feminism requires
a 'personal vision of polities'. This can be seen as an outcome
of a principled committment to universalism. Because the
socialist vision is an all-round view of mankind, every sphere of
existence, including that of the personal, requires to be
transformed. Furthermore, the negative universality of
capitalism makes this an inevitable requirement, since capitalism
itself confronts us (alienatively) on personal terrain, in our
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everyday life. The commodity form of production within
capitalism invades every sphere of life, converting personal life
into an object for sale on a market, converting personal
interaction, human and social relationships into relationships
between objects. Socialist feminism points out that staking a
claim to the personal - reclaiming and re-defining the personal
is itself an action of revolutionary potential.
In a concrete sense, the committment to integrating the personal
into a revolutionary vision can be seen in terms of the felt need
of feminists to include their personal history as a moment in
their discussion of the history of feminism. Rowbotham is no
exception here, as she begins her analysis by saying" "I think it
helps to say how you've entered a particular train of thought"
and proceeds to discuss how her consciousness has altered as a
result of personal involvement with a variety of left groups. In
this process she reveals, for example, how she began to have a
clearer attitude to the death of her father through her
participation in consciousness-raising groups. How far removed
this is from the calculated distancing of Trotsky in his 'My
Life' referred to in Chapter Five. At a deeper level, then,
this stress upon the personal is an outcome of a committment to
the universal development of humanity.
We can deepen our understanding of the 'personal politics' of
socialist feminism if we compare it to an im-personal, or
abstract, alternative. For Rowbotham et al what is deficient
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about both reformist socialism and Leninist revolutionary
socialism is their dependence upon a partial view of politics.
Hence.... 45
"The flaw which they (reformism and Leninsim)
have in common is that they are both organised
in ways more appropriate to siezing power -
governmental power and state power
respectively - than to the necessary
preliminaries to raising and extending
socialist consciousness and grass-roots
consciousness among the majority of working
people."
Leninist groups, in particlar, are accused of being partial in
the sense that they are 'unable to contribute to and encourage
the many sources of socialist initiative and activity'. The
fundamental difference between a socialist revolution 'which is
universal in its scope and a partial revolution (siezure of
purely political power) is underlined.
Leninism's partiality is perceived as producing an exclusive view
of political organisation. Hence the characteristic Leninist
view that the revolutionary party be peopled by a (small) group
of professional revolutionaries, the sole bearers of 'correct'
theory. For Rowbotham this has a ring of Calvinism to it since
she argues of Leninists that....46
"Being an elect they can rely on no one and
being an elect they have to do everythin."
The exclusivity of contemporary Leninism is thus seen as a form
of abstraction - of impersonality. The modern Leninist is seen
as having no real sense of dialectic - self is conceived of
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excessively, such that there is no room for the place of other
except in a subordinate or rule-bound sense.
Modern Leninists might be tempted to reply to this that they have
'extended their areas of intervention to include women's, blacks'
and homosexuals' rights', and that they recognise that 'quality
of life' 'or cultural questions require attention. This is not
satisfactory as a response. Rowbotham argues that....47
"Presenting consciousness in the compartments
of political, economic, cultural, social,
personal, makes it impossible to see how the
different forms feed and sustain one another.
Feminism has shown how consciousness spills
over these boundaries."
So contemporary leninism remains partial (compartmentalised) in
failing to see that a mechanised extension of areas of activity
(adding to the list of potential contacts) is not to be confused
with a genuine integration - a geniune universalism. A
dialectical concept of integration recognises the place of a
qualitative rather than a quantitative change; and, further,
recognises the whole or totality as always more than the
aggregated sum of its parts. As with Gramsci's insistence upon
'organic' modes of orientation, socialist feminism recognises
that genuine intergration requires that the always newly
constituted relationship between the parts changes the
qualitative character of the totality.
What this discussion should begin to help us to realise is the
notion that socialist feminism is a moral enterprise in the sense
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that it never treats the question of the good of revolution as
secured (never fetishises theory - never orients to theory as
[pre-ordained] rule). Thus socialism itself is seen as something
which will always be at issue universally. The critique of
modern Leninism offered by Rowbotham is a moral critique - a
critique which asks Leninism to face up to the question (of the
good of revolution) which Leninists thought they had secured long
ago. Moreover, Rowbotham's critique amounts to a charge of
partiality or one-sidedness - pointing to a failure of Leninism
to orient universally to principle. Consider the following
statement from 'Beyond the Fragments': 48
"We need a form of organisation which can at
once allow for the open expression of conflict
between different groups and develop the
particular understandings which all these
differences bring to socialism. For if every
form of oppression has its own defensive
suspicions, all the movements in resistance to
humiliation and inequality also discover their
own wisdoms. We require a socialist movement
in which there is freedom for these
differences and nurture for these wisdoms.
This means that in the making of socialism
people can develop positively in their own
strengths and find ways of communicating to
one another what we have gained, without the
transcendent correctness which Leninism
fosters."
Leninism treats the question of the universality of struggle (the
relation of the separate struggles to the totality) in a
rule-bound way. Thus the response to the women's movement is to
add a 'line' on women to the party policies, and likewise for all
other separate struggles. The bite of Rowbotham's criticism of
this view is to show how it cannot aspire to a universal
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orientation to principle. A universal (principled) mode of
orientation to revolutionary struggle sees that it is just the
very interaction between separate sites of struggle out of which
the totality must emerge. The question to which an answer cannot
be presupposed, but which needs to be constantly raised, is the
question of the relationship of 'partial' struggles such as that
of women to the total struggle.
Tin important aspect of the force of Rowbotham's critique is that
she is able to bring contemporary hen in ism to face up to the
responsibility not just for its speech, but also for its
silences. Thus Rowbotham shows her committment to a moral
version of revolution by making Leninists confront the issue of
their silence concerning their own values. (This is an area of
interest shared with a thoughtful commentator on Rowbotham,
Richard Gunn.) 49 Rowbotham points out 50
"....the strange lack of self-consciousness
which the left has towards its own values."
This is indeed an acute observation since the left does
frequently display an ignorance of its own moral basis.
Characteristic responses to questions of value are either
literally silence, or what is grounded in silence - a form of
curt nihilism. This nihilism finds its expression in a variety
of coping tactics all of which orient to speech as rule, ie which
seek to ignore (fail to engage with) the grounds of Rowbotham's
speech. For example - a form of scientism is often brought in to
deflect this question - 'Marxism is a science: we are concerned
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with objective reality (what is); what ought to be is a question
that only non-scientists (metaphysicians) think they can answer.'
At best vague abstractions are offered concerning 'the liberation
of everyone'.
However, Rowbotham knows what we do, that the question of the
moral character of our conception of revolution cannot be evaded.
She shows that Leninists do display a conception of morality in
their image of what it means to be a socialist. The
characterisation of the professional revolutionary is painted in
the following way.... 51
"Values are carried not only in implicit
attitudes but through the dark shadow of the
individual revolutionary. This individual
militant appears as a lonely character without
ties, bereft of domestic emotions, who is
hard, erect, self-contained, controlled,
without the time or ability to express loving
passion, who cannot pause to nurture, and for
whom friendship is a diversion."
This is not just a caricature - the images are resonant enough
for anyone with experience of revolutionary organisations.
However it is intended to engage with the fantasies as well as
the conscious practices of part of the left. Questions of the
good of revolution cannot be postponed, because the future of
revolution itself is grounded in our success or failure in
orienting to questions of value.
We ought to be careful to note that Rowbotham's extension of the
concept of universalism produces not an abstract, but an engaged
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version of universal development. Indeed the whole focus of
Rowbotham's analysis is fixed upon a critique of the debilitating
impact of abstraction. (She is not so clear, however, on the
relationship between theory and abstraction - see below). The
engaged character of her vision of universalism can be grasped if
we consider her stress upon the creation of 'prefigurative forms'
and a 'pre-figurative politics*. The development of our
understanding of prefiguration is one of the main areas within
which socialist feminism can be seen to be a vital force.
Rowbotham herself acknowledges this when she says...52
"Feminism has been the main organisational
form through which the idea of prefigurative
politics has begun to influence the
contemporary left."
There are too senses in which Gramsci and Rowbotham share a
common and developed notion of an engaged universalism - of a
prefigurative politics. Firstly they both recognise the
necessity of beginning to create prefiguratively socialist modes
of association within capitalism. Secondly they both are well
aware of the limits of prefiguration within capitalism. Let us
deal with these points one by one.
The first aspect of commonality relates to the shared
understanding that socialist forms do not appear ex nihilo (nor
do they automatically appear as a result of a seizure of partial
[state] power). Rowbotham's theorising recognises the sense of
Gramsci's principled notion that socialist forms have to emerge
'from the womb of capitalism'. Much of Rowbotham's discussion of
the movement towards socialism concerns the attempt to create
(prefigurative) forms which anticipate the free and universal
mode of association characteristic of the society being striven
towards. Secondly, however, both Gramsci and Rowbotham recognise
the limits of prefigurative forms within capitalism - they
recognise that their theorising should be engaged rather than
abstract, Utopian or non-engaged. Gramsci realises that the
modes of association created within the passive phase of
revolution are both limited and essentially geared towards an
eventual active phase of confrontation with the bourgeois state.
Likewise Rowbotham's analysis of prefiguration is mindful of its
limits. Thus she argues that 53
"I am not suggesting that we can evolve
towards socialism thorugh self-help or that
all forms of self-help are necessarily radical
or that self-help cannot co-exist with a new
form of labour reformism. It is evident that
the coercive power of the state must be
contested."
and more pointedly 54
"In one sense there is no absolute solution
within capitalism."
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Thus pre-figuration would help to create some of the sources of
all-round strength required within socialism, but this strength
requires the test that will come in a head-on and unavoidable
confrontation with the negative universalism of the advanced
capitalist state.
We might ask, then, what are the prefigurative forms which are so
significant to the socialist-feminist vision? Rowbotham
discusses two forms in some detail - consciousness-raising groups
and rape crisis centres. I wish to focus upon the notion of the
rape crisis centre. To some, this would seem to be a form of
social-work rather than a pre-figurative form of socialism. This
is an understandable, but essentially philistine response. This
form of organisation is deeply socialist and revolutionary in
that it is oriented to the universal consciousness of all women.
Thus rape crisis centres are, as well as a response to the
immediate needs of some women - the raped - also engaged at a
deep level with the universal self-perception of all women. Rape
is the most violent end of a spectrum of oppression directed at
the entirety of women. Furthermore, rape crisis centres are an
essential feature of a spirited transformation of the status of
victim experienced by both proletariat and women as subordinate
classes. Thus Rowbotham argues....55
"The Rape Crisis Centre is....a collective
effort to overcome the fears within women and
a sense of ourselves as victims. They point
out that a raped woman has been victimised but
this is not her total identity , she does not
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remain the passive subject of attack as
implied by the word 'victim'. One of the aims
of the Centre is to help ourselves, as women,
to become aware that we do not have to accept
the identity given to us by society."
The Rape Crisis Centre, then, engages with the revolutionary
potential of women. Such a prefigurative form generates the
energy for a transformation from factual status (victim) to
potential status (free, conscious and universally associating
individual). As such, forms like the Rape Crisis Centre point to
the potential for human liberation immanent within the grossest
aspects of bondage and oppression.
Perhaps this is an appropriate moment to anticipate an objection
to my analysis of modernism. It could be objected that unifying
Gramsci and Rowbotham under the title of modernists (with a
principled and engaged concept of revolution) risks glossing
differences between the two. Does Rowbotham not criticise
Gramsci for being 'merely' a 'sophisticated Leninist'? We ought
to note, however, that Gramsci is exempted from the most serious
elements of criticism of Leninism - ie he is exempted from the
charge of 'utilitiarian narrowness'.
We ought, however, to do more than consider what Rowbotham says
of the relationship of socialist feminism to Gramsci. While
there are detailed differences (most importantly with respect to
whether or not a party is an appropriate organisational form
within which separate struggles can grow), their perspectives
have a great deal more in common than Rowbotham recognises. They
are unified at a deeper level. As we have already argued each
shows a principled commitment to a universal vision of revolution
m common recognition of;
1. Questions of the nature of man - basic philosophical
questions.
2. Culture as a site for the establishment of socialist forms
of struggle.
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3. The necessity to never lose sight of the question of the
moral character of revolution - the good of socialism.
4. The dialectical character of production. Production is seen
both as basic to mankind's essence, but is theorised in a
broad rather than a narrow and fetishised sense.
A conception of revolution as orientation to rule would see both
Gramsci and Rowbotham as fundamentally weak in the sense that
they either provide ambiguous rules (Gramsci) or no rules at all
(Rowbotham). We see their refusal to subordinate to rule as a
strength, derived from the flexibility (readiness to violate rule
in the service of principle) required by a universal vision.
A stronger sense of the distinction between Rowbotham and Gramsci
was provided in our earlier discussion (see section III) of the
'traditionalist' tendency within Gramsci's writing. In that
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section we indicated the hostility of socialist feminists to one
of Gramsci's main pre-figurative forms - the 'workers' coucil'.
Although Gramsci's later, more universal, socialist vision of
'The Prison Notebooks' is more compatible with
socialist-feminism, the failure to take up the idea of the
'councils' may be indicative of potential contradictions in the
way in which Gramsci and socialist-feminists view the process of
prefiguration.
Furthermore there is one sense in which Gramsci can be considered
superior to Rowbotham. This is in the sense that Gramsci has
both a clearer conception of what theory is, and the necessity of
theory to the revolutionary enterprise. I do not intend here
that Gramsci has an ecelctic version of theory - he is quite
precise and specific - only an 'organic', ie engaged theorising
can provide a socialist of universal vision for mankind.
Rowbotham, however, is less than clear both about what theory is
and what theory's place is in relationship to revolution. (This
emphasis upon providing a critique of Rowbotham's conception of
theory is an interest which also exercises Gunn 56) 'Theory' is
not rejected 'in toto'. Rowbotham recognises that we cannot
orient to principle, we cannot 'totalise' or 'universalise'
without theory. Thus she admits 57
"Our summation of the whole may be incomplete
and imperfect, but vie still need it.... It is
this kind of activity I mean when I use the
word 'theory'. Abstraction should help us to
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communicate and spread experience, feelings,
understandings and ideas and thus facilitate
action."
Although she accepts that theory has some role to play, there is
a strong sense in which this appears as a grudging, or reluctant,
acceptance. The problem of her analysis is a failure to
adequately theorise the relationship between theory and
experience. Her treatment of the relationship between theory and
experience is inconsistent and vacillating.
In some passages, Rowbotham appears to imply a complete reduction
of theory to experience. Thus she argues that (theoretical)
views 'are valid because they come from within us, and not
because we hold a received correctness'. There are a number of
problems with this position. Firstly, there is the problem of
the extreme relativity of this position. If theory can simply be
read-off from experience, then all theories are of equal validity
and status, ie there are no criteria provided, by which socialist
feminism could be seen as more valid than any other perspective.
Secondly, given these assumptions, it is difficult to see how one
could communicate anything other than difference with theory. At
the least, differences between perspectives would be difficult to
resolve given the incompatibility of individual experiences.
Furthermore this version of theory's relationship leaves open the
question of by which criteria a theory's validity is to be
assessed (see below for extended discussion of this point).
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'Theory', then, may have a place, but Rowbotham finds it
troublesome and awkward. Thus theory can 'easily become
fossilised', or become 'a series of coded signposts which only an
elite can decode'. All of this indicates towards a conclusion
that theory need not be taken seriously into account. In this
context she argues that what it means to theorise is to 'sit back
momentarily, from our immediate experience '. Again, this is
a problematic assertion. So we could ask what does the concept
of momentarity means? How long do we have to 'sit back' from our
experiences, if theorisation is to be characterised as momentary?
Theory, here, is seen as a 'dangerous' pursuit, in the sense that
to 'sit back' more than momentarily would somehow get in the way
of the 'real issue' - revolutionary practice.
Rowbotham goes on to argue that having sat back 'momentarily' to
theorise, theory must constantly be 'dipped back into
experience'. Once more this leaves unansv/ered the question of
the criteria of validity in assessing theory's relationship to
experience. What seems to be implicit in Rowbotham's analysis is
the contention that experience, or 'feeling' is the criterion by
which theory's validity is to be assessed - a theory is vailid if
it 'feels right'. However we have to ask what are the criteria
used when 'dipping theory back into experience'? What is being
ignored here is recognition that establishing criteria of
validity is of itself a theoretical activity. The irony of
Rowbotham's analysis is that she herself is entering into a
theoretical position by asserting that 'feeling' is the criterion
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of theory's validity.
Perhaps one of the most important problems in Rowbotham's
analysis is that she confuses theory with abstraction. This
failure is related to the evident impact of E. P. Thompson's 'The
Poverty of Theory' (Merlin, London, 1979) upon Rowbotham's
theorising. While this influential, but malign, work is
ostensibly an attempt to criticise one theorist - Althusser - it
succeeds in attacking all forms of theorising. It is essentially
a work of panic, oriented to survival and seeing no place for
theory with respect to this. In spite of being seen as a work of
socialism, I see it as having more to say about a tradition of
thought - a mode of theorising which is antipathetic to
theorising - the British Empiricist tradition - than a mode of
thought (socialism) which requires a theoretical vision.
What Rowbotham needs to know is how to develop what she has
herself unwittingly initiated, ie an engaged or dialectical mode
of theorising - theorising which can be both general and
universal, but which never loses a grip on particularity - which
risks but does not succumb to abstraction. The irony of
Rowbotham is that she has herself initiated a theoretical quest
of this nature. To fail to develop that engagement or
theoretical intervention would be to fail to take up a necessary
challenge.
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